标准必要专利歧视性许可收费的竞争效应

发布时间：2018-03-04 11:43

本文选题：标准必要专利　切入点：歧视性许可收费　出处：《浙江财经大学》2017年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：标准必要专利持有者滥用市场支配地位,对下游企业实行歧视性专利许可收费会严重损害市场竞争,但是标准必要专利也有其激励创新,促进效率改进的一面,现有的经济学研究成果没有对标准必要专利歧视性专利许可收费的竞争效应给出明确的结论。论文主要采用标准必要专利竞标博弈模型、专利套牢模型以及纵向差异化歧视性许可收费模型,按照标准必要专利歧视性许可收费“事前竞标机制-事中套牢激励-事后竞争效应-反垄断违法判定及救济政策”的逻辑对标准必要专利歧视性许可收费的形成、激励机制及竞争效应进行分析,并在此基础上对标准必要专利反垄断政策提出建议。标准必要专利事前竞争分析。标准必要专利歧视性许可收费是事后市场,但是在手机芯片等高技术行业,标准竞争已经从事后市场延伸了事前市场,标准事前竞争的结果可能会影响事后标准持有者是否会采用歧视性许可收费。通过研究发现:不同专利类别对标准必要专利造成的影响不同。替代性专利事前竞争会导致标准获胜者挤出其他参与的替代性专利持有者,从而可能造成市场势力滥用,阻碍创新。对于互补性专利,由于其是合作投标的形式,因此最优方法是采取Shapley值法来确定专利,在这种情况下回促进竞争,促使每个参与者获得合理收益,从而促进标准必要专利的制定,有利于创新。反垄断执法机关应该重点关注替代性专利事前竞争情形,因为在替代性专利情况下有很大可能会造成市场势力滥用。相反对于互补性专利则可以不用重点关注,对于互补性专利应该发挥标准必要专利组织的作用,以市场谈判来合理确定互补性专利持有人的收益。标准必要专利套牢与歧视性许可收费。专利成为标准后会套牢下游企业,对其收取歧视性许可费。但是其套牢机制还不清晰。专利成为标准后是否会套牢下游厂商?套牢下游厂商之后是否会产生歧视性许可收费?FRAND规则歧视性许可收费是否是有效的?通过构建专利套牢模型分析发现:专利成为标准必要专利后,标准必要专利持有人会套牢下游企业,造成歧视性许可收费现象,虽然现行FRAND原则能够在一定程度上减轻套牢带来的影响,但是在消除歧视性许可收费上并不一定是有效的。标准必要专利歧视性许可收费的竞争效应。由标准必要专利歧视性许可收费激励机制分析可以看出标准必要专利持有者对下游企业实施歧视性许可收费几乎是无法避免的。既然无法避免,那么歧视性许可收费是否是伤害下游企业,具有反竞争效应呢,目前学术界并没有对此得出一个相同的结论。通过标准必要专利纵向差异化价格歧视模型研究发现:歧视性许可收费提高了低成本和高质量企业的许可费,降低了低成本和高质量企业的产量和市场份额,扭曲了下游低成本企业和高成本企业、高质量和低质量企业之间的竞争状况。在质量差异情景下,歧视性许可收费对高质量收取的高价最终会转嫁到消费者身上,造成了消费者福利损失,不仅阻碍了下游产品技术升级,也阻碍了最终市场消费升级。现有的标准必要专利歧视性许可收费反垄断政策存在诸多不足,亟需创新标准必要专利反垄断政策体系,应系统设计标准必要专利歧视性许可收费的反垄断政策。首先,应建立完善的标准必要专利信息披露机制。完善的信息披露机制是解决歧视性许可的重要途径,应当从反垄断法和标准必要组织两方面来解决信息披露问题。其次,标准必要专利许可费应当基于专利本身的价值。标准必要专利许可费应当基于专利对下游的贡献价值,而不能基于标准本身的价值。再次,反垄断执法机关应避免直接确定许可费。由于确定合理许可费需要考虑较多因素,反垄断执法机关可能无法兼顾,但可以以判决前的许可费为基准同时考虑合理利润率确定一个合理区间,从而兼顾双方当事人利益。最后,维护标准必要专利微观自由交易机制的有效性。应重视平等交易下的标准必要专利许可主体间私人谈判,采取合同法优先于反垄断法原则。
[Abstract]:The standard necessary patent holders abuse of market dominance, discriminatory licensing fees will seriously damage the market competition on the upstream and downstream enterprises, but also has its standard essential patents to encourage innovation, promote a efficiency improvement, the economics of the existing research results have no competitive effect on the standard necessary patent discriminatory patent license fee of the thesis gives a clear conclusion. Mainly uses the standard necessary patent bidding game model of patent hold up model and the difference of the vertical discriminatory licensing fee model, in accordance with the standard necessary patent discriminatory licensing fees "before the bidding mechanism in secure - incentive after the competition effect - antitrust violations judgment and relief policy" logic on the formation of the standard necessary patent discriminatory licensing fees the analysis of the incentive mechanism and the competition effect, the standard necessary patent antitrust policy and based on the Recommendations. The standard necessary patent prior competition analysis. The standard necessary patent discriminatory licensing fee is the post market, but in the mobile phone chip industry of high technology, the standard competition has been engaged in the market after the extension of the advance market competition standard beforehand could affect the results of the post standard holders will use discriminatory licensing fees. Through the study found effect of different categories of patent standard essential patents by patent. Different alternative pre competition leads to the winner in other standard extrusion alternative patent holders, which may cause the abuse of market power, hindering innovation. For the complementary patent, because it is the cooperative bidding form, so the best method is to take the Shapley method to determine the value of the patent, in this case the next time to promote competition, prompting each participant to obtain a reasonable return, so as to promote the formulation of standards essential patents That is conducive to innovation. The anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies should focus on alternative patent beforehand because in competitive situations, alternative patent case is very likely caused by market power abuse. Contrary to complementary patent can not focus on, should play the role of the organization for standards essential patents complementary patent, with the market to rational negotiation determine the complementary patent holders of income. The standard essential patents to secure and discriminatory licensing fees. The patent will become the standard stuck downstream enterprises, the collection of discriminatory licensing fees. But its mechanism is not clear. Secure patent has become the standard of whether stuck downstream manufacturers? After stuck downstream manufacturers will produce discriminatory licensing fees? Whether the FRAND rule discriminatory licensing fee is effective? By constructing the patent secure model. It is found that the patent has become the standard essential patents, The standard necessary patent holders will be locked in the upstream and downstream enterprises, resulting in a discriminatory licensing fees, although the current FRAND principle can reduce the impact of up to a certain extent, but in the elimination of discriminatory licensing fees is not necessarily effective. The competition effect of standard essential patent discriminatory licensing fees. By the standard necessary patent discriminatory licensing fees the incentive mechanism of the analysis we can see that the standard necessary patent holders of discriminatory licensing fees for downstream enterprises is almost unavoidable. Unable to avoid, so whether the license fee discrimination is hurting the downstream enterprises, has anti competition effect, the current academic circles did not come to a similar conclusion. Through the standard necessary patent vertical difference the research found: price discrimination model alienation discriminatory licensing fee increases with low cost and high quality business license fees, reduce the Low cost and high quality production and market share, distort the low cost and high cost of downstream enterprises between enterprises, high quality and low quality of enterprise competition conditions. Differences in quality scenarios, discriminatory licensing fees charged by the high price of high quality will eventually be passed on to the consumer body, resulting in the loss of consumer welfare that not only hindered the upgrading of downstream products, but also hindered the final market consumption upgrade. The standard necessary patent existing discriminatory licensing fee antitrust policy has many disadvantages, need innovation standard necessary patent antitrust policy system, the system design should be the standard necessary patent discriminatory licensing fee antitrust policy. First of all, should establish a standard mechanism the necessity of patent information disclosure perfect. Perfect information disclosure mechanism is an important way to solve the discriminatory licensing, should from the anti-monopoly law and standard of two party organization To solve problems of information disclosure. Secondly, the standard necessary patent licensing fees should be based on the value of the patent itself. Standard patent licensing fees should be based on the value of patent contribution to the downstream, but not on the standard itself value. Thirdly, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies should avoid direct determination of licensing fees. Due to licensing fees need to be considered more reasonable the factors, the anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies may not account, but can be in before the judgment of license fees for reference considering reasonable profit rate to determine a reasonable range, so as to balance the interests of both parties. Finally, the effectiveness of the maintenance of the standard necessary patent free micro transaction mechanism. Attention should be paid to the standard necessary patent licensing transaction between equal subjects private negotiations, to take priority in the contract law principle of anti-monopoly law.

【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D923.42;D922.294

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