不完全合同视角下的公司治理规则

发布时间：2018-03-10 00:35

本文选题：不完全合同　切入点：剩余控制权　出处：《法学》2017年04期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：科斯认为企业存在的原因是市场交易成本不为零,企业的合同纽带说认为企业内部其实是各种合同的集束和纽带。不完全合同理论进一步认为,因为人的有限理性和信息不对称等因素,市场交易的合同和企业内部的合同集束都是不完备的,在初始合同基础上的事后重新谈判不可避免。在不完全合同的理论视角下,公司法(公司治理规则)有积极的功能,表现在就初始合同中没有约定的内容,公司治理规则应富有效率地加以空白填补。不完全合同理论视角下的公司治理规则的基本框架包括:第一,通过事前的企业剩余控制权的分配,正确地激励所有者和管理层,激励他们对企业做出有价值的投资,防止寻求事后谈判筹码和权力的行为;第二,依据公司法提供一套企业所有者之间的集体决策机制、管理层之间的集体决策机制以及企业所有者与管理层之间的事后谈判沟通机制,使得事后谈判的成本最小化;第三,借助公司法中的强制规则和默认规则,以不同的方式填补合同的不完全。
[Abstract]:Coase believes that the reason for the existence of enterprises is that the market transaction costs are not zero, and the firm's contract ties theory holds that the internal enterprises are actually the clusters and bonds of various contracts. Because of human's limited rationality and information asymmetry, the contract of market transaction and the contract cluster inside the enterprise are not complete, so it is inevitable to renegotiate on the basis of the initial contract. The company law (the rules of corporate governance) has a positive function, which is manifested in the content not stipulated in the initial contract, The basic framework of corporate governance rules from the perspective of incomplete contract theory includes: first, through the prior allocation of residual control right of the enterprise, the owner and management should be encouraged correctly. To encourage them to make valuable investments in the enterprise and to prevent the search for bargaining chips and powers after the event; second, to provide a collective decision-making mechanism among business owners under the Company Law. The collective decision-making mechanism between management and the communication mechanism of after-negotiation between owner and management minimize the cost of post-negotiation. Thirdly, with the help of mandatory rules and default rules in company law, Fill the incomplete contract in different ways.
【作者单位】：清华大学法学院;
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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