论我国限制转售价格行为的违法性认定

发布时间：2018-04-14 07:26

本文选题：限制转售价格 + 本身违法原则　；参考：《中国社会科学院研究生院》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：限制转售价格行为属于纵向限制竞争协议的范畴。传统上对该行为的违法性认定遵循本身违法原则。这是因为强调该行为便利生产商和经销商形成垄断协议从而产生限制竞争的消极影响。但是经济学研究成果发现限制转售价格行为同时具有促进竞争的积极效果和限制竞争的消极效果。国内相关案件的出现也有利于深入分析该行为。本文首先从限制转售价格行为的法理分析入手,探究该行为的概念和对市场竞争的影响。其次,通过分析美国和欧盟对此类行为违法性认定的经验,一窥反垄断法先行国家对此问题形成的共识。同时,通过案例分析我国反垄断法执法中对该行为违法性认定的实际做法。接着,在对《反垄断法》规范分析的基础上,总结了我国司法和执法过程中存在的问题。最后提出了对此问题进行违法性认定的建议。本文的主要创新点:第一,明确了限制转售价格行为为“交易双方”之间的限价。限制转售价格行为是上游企业和下游企业间相互博弈的动态过程。上游企业依靠其产品优势对下游经销商限价,或者下游企业凭借其信息和销售渠道优势对供应商的限价。交易双方力量的此消彼长带来了多样的方式。第二,限制转售价格行为对竞争的影响方面从三方面即供应商或经销商、消费者以及市场三个方面进行分析。在目前我们倾向于对限制转售价格行为进行合理性评价的背景下,对该行为的影响分析越具体越有利于作出更加科学、有说服力的结论。第三,通过具体案例,总结我国司法和行政执法过程中对限制转售价格行为违法性认定的实际做法,提出我国《反垄断法》规范和实际操作中存在的突出问题。针对这些问题提出了三点建议:首先要准确解释《反垄断法》文本;其次行政机关执法应逐步走向统一,完善执法的信息公开;最后提出了限制转售价格行为进行合理性分析的框架。
[Abstract]:The behavior of restricting resale price belongs to the category of vertical restrictive competition agreement.Traditionally, the illegality of the act is determined according to its own illegal principle.This is due to the fact that this behavior facilitates monopoly agreements between manufacturers and distributors, which has a negative effect on limiting competition.However, economic research results show that restricting resale price behavior has both positive and negative effects of promoting competition and restricting competition.The emergence of domestic related cases is also conducive to in-depth analysis of this behavior.This paper begins with the legal analysis of the behavior of restricting resale price, and probes into the concept of this behavior and its influence on market competition.Secondly, through the analysis of the experience of the United States and the European Union regarding the illegality of this kind of behavior, we can see the consensus of the leading countries of the antimonopoly law on this issue.At the same time, this paper analyzes the practice of illegality in the enforcement of anti-monopoly law.Then, on the basis of analyzing the norms of Anti-monopoly Law, the problems in the process of judicature and law enforcement in China are summarized.Finally, the author puts forward some suggestions on the illegality of this problem.The main innovations of this paper are as follows: firstly, the behavior of restricting resale price is defined as the price limit between the two parties.The behavior of restricting resale price is a dynamic process of mutual game between upstream and downstream enterprises.The upstream enterprise depends on its product superiority to limit the price to the downstream dealer, or the downstream enterprise to limit the price to the supplier with the advantage of its information and sales channel.The rise and fall of power on both sides of the deal has brought a variety of ways.Secondly, the influence of restricting resale price behavior on competition is analyzed from three aspects: supplier or dealer, consumer and market.At present, we tend to evaluate the rationality of the behavior of restricting resale price, the more specific the impact analysis of the behavior, the more conducive to making a more scientific and persuasive conclusion.Third, through the concrete case, summarizes our country judicature and the administrative law enforcement process to limit the resale price behavior illegal confirmation actual practice, proposed our country "the antimonopoly law" the norm and the actual operation existence prominent question.In view of these problems, three suggestions are put forward: firstly, the text of Anti-monopoly Law should be accurately interpreted; secondly, the law enforcement of administrative organs should be unified step by step, and the information publicity of law enforcement should be perfected.Finally, the framework of rationality analysis of restricting resale price behavior is put forward.
【学位授予单位】：中国社会科学院研究生院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.294

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