论经营者集中审查制度在国有企业并购中的适用

发布时间：2018-04-28 13:59

本文选题：国有企业改革 + 竞争性国企　；参考：《华东政法大学学报》2015年04期

【摘要】：在深化国有企业改革大背景下,一般观点认为,并购重组乃优化国有经济布局和升级产业结构、避免同业恶性竞争、提高国有资产监管效率、提升规模经济水平的有效途径,于是这成为政府产业政策的偏好。但国有企业尤其是中央企业并购这种大规模经营者集中会对市场竞争带来负面影响,从而背离党的十八届三中全会《决定》提出的"市场在资源配置中起决定性作用"的原则。《反垄断法》作为规范市场竞争秩序的"经济宪法",理应适用于包括国有企业尤其是竞争性国企在内的所有市场主体。涉国有企业尤其是竞争性国企的经营者审查集中适用《反垄断法》的"社会公共利益"豁免制度时,必须严格限定其适用条件;当产业政策与反垄断规制冲突时,应该坚持竞争执法优先。国企并购适用经营者集中审查制度当前的法律障碍主要在于缺乏灵活的经营者集中申报标准、清晰的经营者集中实体分析框架和类型化的经营者集中豁免条件。
[Abstract]:Under the background of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises, the general view is that M & A is an effective way to optimize the layout of state-owned economy and upgrade the industrial structure, avoid vicious competition in the same industry, improve the efficiency of supervision of state-owned assets and raise the level of scale economy. So this becomes the preference of government industrial policy. However, the concentration of large-scale operators such as mergers and acquisitions of state-owned enterprises, especially those of central enterprises, will have a negative impact on market competition. Therefore, it deviates from the principle that "the market plays a decisive role in the allocation of resources", which was put forward by the third Plenary session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. As an economic constitution regulating the order of market competition, the Anti-monopoly Law should be applied to including the country. There are enterprises, especially competitive state-owned enterprises, including all market players. When the operators involved in state-owned enterprises, especially competitive state-owned enterprises, examine and apply the exemption system of "social public interest" of the Anti-Monopoly Law, they must strictly define the applicable conditions, and when the industrial policy conflicts with the anti-monopoly regulation, Competition enforcement should be a priority. The main legal obstacles to the application of centralized examination system in SOE M & A are the lack of flexible criteria for centralized reporting of operators, the clear analytical framework of centralized entity of managers and the type of exemption conditions for centralized operators.
【作者单位】：武汉大学竞争法与竞争政策研究中心;
【基金】：国家社科基金项目“竞争性国企改革的法律困境与出路”(项目号12BFX088) 国家2011计划司法文明协同创新研究的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：D922.294

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