中国金融上市国企高管薪酬法律制度研究

发布时间：2018-04-29 07:40

本文选题：上市金融国企 + 国企高管　；参考：《华东政法大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：本文试图解决的问题在于如何完善上市金融国企高管薪酬不合理的问题。针对上市金融国企高管“政治与商业”的双重身份、严重的在职消费与隐性福利、自定薪酬等各种典型问题,笔者试图从法律的视角解读本土化问题的表征与本质,并提出一揽子的解决方案。本文总共3万余字,分为五个部分。第一部分着眼于介绍我国上市金融高管薪酬的历史沿革及现状分析;第二部分则是在制度上分析目前我国上市金融国企高管薪酬的制度设定以及上市金融国企与非上市金融国企在薪酬制度上的异同;第三部分着重介绍英美上市金融高管薪酬的法律制度以及它们对中国金融国企高管薪酬制度的借鉴意义;第四部分分析了我国上市金融国企高管薪酬的特殊问题及解决方法;第五部分则对我国上市金融国企高管薪酬的法律规制提出了建设性的意见。第一部分,回顾与总结。我国上市金融国企高管薪酬制定具有强制性变迁和渐进性变迁的特征,目前上市金融国企高管薪酬仍然不合理,体现在无法与业绩挂钩,自定薪酬、国企隐性福利严重等特殊的问题,而上述问题产生的机理在于出资人的“虚置”,经理人权力的膨胀以及国企高管“政治与商业”地位的双重身份。第二部分,剖析与比较。我国上市金融国企高管薪酬制度可以用事前安排和事后救济措施进行划分。在事前安排方面,本文分别从制定主体、制定依据以及信息披露方面对我国上市金融国企高管薪酬制定进行了梳理;在事后救济中,文章着重介绍了股东派生诉讼以及证券瑕疵披露责任。同时文章也试图从出资人代表、“零元薪酬问题”以及薪酬制定依据方面对上市金融国企与非上市金融国企在高管薪酬安排上进行对比。第三部分,借鉴与学习。文章介绍了英美法中上市高管薪酬制度,认为中国上市金融企业应当学习西方长期股权激励的制度设计,并强化信息和制定程序的披露。第四部分,思考与解密。文章针对“经理人权力”、“在职消费与期权行使”、“权衡高管政治与经济地位”、“公共事业单位改革中的人才流失”的角度对上市金融国企高管的本土化问题进行全面解释,并提出了自己的意见。第五部分,展望与建议。笔者认为中国上市金融国企高管薪酬制度的法律规制仍然还有很多完善的空间。中国的立法者应当从薪酬委员会、出资人代表审查,信息披露、股东派生诉讼、高管不合理薪酬追回制度等角度全面重构中国上市金融国企高管薪酬的法律体系,最终试图建立完善合理的中国上市金融国企高管薪酬制度。
[Abstract]:This paper attempts to solve the problem of how to improve the listed financial state-owned enterprise executives pay unreasonable. In view of the dual identity of "politics and commerce", the serious problems of in-service consumption and implicit welfare, self-determined salary and other typical problems, the author tries to interpret the characterization and essence of localization from the perspective of law. And put forward a package of solutions. There are more than 30,000 words in this paper, which are divided into five parts. The first part focuses on introducing the history and current situation of listed financial executive compensation in China. The second part is the institutional analysis of the current listed financial SOEs executive compensation system settings and listed financial SOEs and non-listed financial SOEs in the pay system similarities and differences; The third part mainly introduces the legal system of British and American listed financial executives' compensation and their reference significance to the executive compensation system of China's financial state-owned enterprises, the fourth part analyzes the special problems and solutions to the executive compensation of listed financial state-owned enterprises in China. The fifth part puts forward constructive suggestions on the legal regulation of executive compensation of listed state-owned enterprises in China. The first part, review and summary. The formulation of executive compensation for listed financial state-owned enterprises in China has the characteristics of mandatory and gradual changes. At present, the executive compensation of listed financial state-owned enterprises is still unreasonable, which can not be linked to performance and can not be determined by itself. The hidden welfare of state-owned enterprises is serious and so on, and the mechanism of the above problems lies in the "empty position" of the investors, the expansion of the executive power and the dual status of the "political and commercial" status of the senior executives of the state-owned enterprises. The second part, analysis and comparison. The executive compensation system of listed state-owned enterprises in China can be divided into pre-arranged and ex post-relief measures. In the aspect of advance arrangement, this paper combs the formulation of executive compensation of listed financial state-owned enterprises in China from the aspects of main body of formulation, basis of formulation and disclosure of information. This paper mainly introduces the shareholder derivative litigation and the liability of securities defect disclosure. At the same time, the article also tries to compare the executive compensation arrangement between listed financial state-owned enterprises and non-listed financial state-owned enterprises in the aspects of investor representatives, "zero yuan salary issues" and the basis of salary formulation. The third part, learn from and learn. This paper introduces the executive compensation system in Anglo-American law, and holds that listed financial enterprises in China should learn from the design of long-term equity incentive system in the West, and strengthen the disclosure of information and procedures. The fourth part, thinking and decryption. The article aims at "executive power", "on the job consumption and option exercise", "balancing the political and economic status of senior executives", From the perspective of "brain drain in the reform of public utilities", this paper comprehensively explains the localization of senior executives of listed financial state-owned enterprises and puts forward their own opinions. The fifth part, prospect and suggestion. The author thinks that there is still a lot of room to perfect the legal regulation of executive compensation system of listed financial state-owned enterprises in China. Chinese legislators should comprehensively restructure the legal system of executive compensation in China's listed financial and state-owned enterprises from the perspectives of compensation committees, investor representatives' review, information disclosure, shareholder derivative litigation, and the system of unreasonable executive compensation recovery. Finally, it tries to establish a reasonable executive compensation system of listed financial state-owned enterprises in China.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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