新制度经济学视野下的反垄断集团诉讼制度研究

发布时间：2018-05-02 19:00

  本文选题：反垄断 + 集团诉讼　； 参考：《江西财经大学》2016年博士论文

【摘要】：反垄断法的经济学原理是,一个企业如果取得市场垄断或者市场支配地位,它势必压低产品的市场供给量,抬高产品价格,损害竞争者利益、广大消费者利益和社会公共利益。反垄断法如何实现对垄断行为受害人的救济是个重要的问题。我国《反垄断法》在借鉴发达国家和地区立法经验的基础上,规定了违法垄断行为的民事赔偿责任。反垄断民事诉讼最困难的领域在于,当违法垄断行为损害的是广大消费者的利益,单个损失的价值不高,合并在一起就是垄断者的暴利,谁来主张权利追责、如何将如此大规模的受害者组织起来维护共同利益实现接近正义的目标?救济发散利益、新型利益的方法在传统民事诉讼框架内困难重重,美国竞争法和联邦民事诉讼规则为此提供了很有效的范例和成功经验。但是美国反垄断集团诉讼究竟是惩罚垄断者的一把利器还是使司法承担更高成本让律师受益而被滥用的工具?存在很大争议,反垄断集团诉讼究竟能否引进我国,立法者和实务界持审慎的态度,且反对派为主流观点。本文立足于新制度经济学的交易成本理论、制度变迁理论、委托代理理论和激励监督理论,综合运用历史分析、比较制度分析、规范分析和实证分析相结合、案例分析、多学科交叉研究的方法,研究反垄断集团诉讼的制度来源、结构及演化,分析反垄断集团诉讼制度运行的交易成本及其对法律规则实施的决定性影响,比较各种替代性安排的利弊,探求其程序设置的公平性,解决反垄断集团诉讼引入中国的体制性障碍和技术性障碍,由此提出我国反垄断集团诉讼程序的设想,试图构建出总体上比原来更好的实施机制。制度研究起源于对历史的追问和思考。美国集团诉讼自1938年规则确立、1966年修改、2005年再次修正以来,在反垄断案件的适用过程中经历了最初挫败、中期迷惑至近期严格监管中前进的曲折变化,使得微软、苹果、英特尔等高科技企业都卷入反垄断集团损害赔偿诉讼,为消费者提供了有力的救济手段。欧盟在美国的基础上进行了制度创新,使得原告类型、资金支持和预防权利滥用等方面更具有可操作性。反垄断的全球化发展使得许多国家都建立了不同效力和组合的反垄断执法手段,引入反垄断集团诉讼制度成为其维护分散性团体性利益的重要选择。通过梳理制度演进,笔者回答了反垄断集团诉讼制度是什么、起什么作用的问题,并得出客观看待其利弊的启示。制度是影响人们理性选择的博弈规则。为解决当事人众多以至于合并审理不可能的困难,集团诉讼由原告代表"私人检察官"起诉,以默示方式认可代表人代表公益的诉权,突破单个个人不能提出公益诉求而政府代理人、消费者组织又缺乏积极性的瓶颈,降低订立集团合约的交易成本,降低非人格化交换的交易成本,降低将发散利益转化为共同利益的交易成本。在集团诉讼的过程中,网络化的电子通知降低原告通知缺席集团成员的信息成本,强制证据开示降低各方当事人收集信息的成本,集团诉讼成立的裁决有力促成和解,降低消费者与垄断者博弈的交易成本。由法院审查律师的代理资格、监督律师行为是否符合律师职业道德、禁止原被告律师串通,建立律师与集体成员的沟通机制、律师费用承担规则,降低了律师与集团成员的协调成本。司法程序公开而透明,各方当事人难以规避法律、拒不提供证据或进行寻租,比起行政模式更为有效降低寻租成本。胜诉报酬费协议降低了案件败诉的机会成本。考虑到法院的管理和监督成本,集团诉讼成立的条件还包括作为集团诉讼裁决的效率比其他可用的裁决方式更高效和经济,在法院可管理的范围之内。为解决原告诉讼动力不足的问题,在诉权保障成本收益分析的基础上,美国克莱顿法案直接规定了三倍损害赔偿的诉讼激励措施,抑制了那些滥用垄断减少社会财富的行为,弥补了行政执行不能完全将垄断损失内部化的漏洞,达到反垄断应有的威慑水平。基于诉讼效力范围的成本收益分析,集团诉讼的判决效力具有扩张性,以一个诉讼消灭其他潜在的重复诉讼,降低了社会总成本支出。为避免诉讼的失控和滥诉,通过法官对原告适格性、举证责任、专家证人证明力和实质性责任标准等的审查建立了严格的监督审查机制,有效降低了制度运行的政治成本和诉讼的错误成本。与其他替代的群体性纠纷解决机制相比,公民个人诉讼不能将诉的利益归于集体,检察官参与民事公诉缺乏专业性和积极性而太少运用这样的权力,消费者组织团体诉讼不能将赔偿金直接分配给消费者,因此公民诉讼、民事公诉、团体诉讼等启动模式均存在局限,而集团诉讼的私人总检察官启动模式将少数人的积极性与司法监控结合起来,考虑了确认集团成员和量化诉讼请求的困难,成为接近正义的最有效方式。制度的整体设计理念深受新制度经济学的影响,是真正直接赔偿给大规模受害者的兼顾效率与公平的新举措。法律移植是一个长期的制度变迁过程。从中国日益严重的反竞争行为造成市场扭曲、消费者福利损失转移到利益集团手中、贫富差距拉大来说,规制垄断、由消费者提出损害赔偿诉讼在中国有相应的制度需求。而中国的反垄断民事诉讼还只是一个笼统的、框架性的规定;代表人诉讼制度没有针对性地处理契约的不完全性和非人格化交换,公告登记、诉权行使需特别授权等规则使得形成集团的交易成本高,不确定的风险高,造成事实上的诉讼动力不足,处于被搁置的状态;2012年新修订的民事诉讼法仅赋予检察机关和消费者组织提起公益诉讼的资格,实施以来案件非常少,在制度上还存在供给不足的差距。在制度供需失衡的前提下,需要由第一行动集团(立法者、检察官和消协负责人)和第二行动集团(律师、其他社会组织、高校教师、法学毕业生及媒体等)共同组成推动制度变迁的力量,构建反垄断集团公益诉讼的社会实施方案。同时,外部制度或制度环境是支撑内在制度的关键,反垄断集团诉讼制度的优势要融入中国的反垄断实施模式、司法体制及经济社会文化的土壤之中,解决路径依赖的历史惯性问题,才能焕发出制度的生命力。因此,反垄断行政执法的主导模式转向行政、司法模式双管齐下,司法权依法独立公正行使职权得到充分保障,能够有效发挥司法规制经济的功能,加之市民社会的生长和竞争文化的培育,从而在制度环境中蕴生引入反垄断集团诉讼的可能性。制度构建需要理性借鉴国外反垄断集团诉讼制度设计的经验,注重制度整体性及其配套机制,激励消费者诉讼,避免集团原告律师背离委托代理协议牺牲集团的利益,解决信息不对称和道德风险,兼顾制度运行的效率与公平。如果不考虑法律运行的成本与收益,导致法律不具有可操作性,设计的制度失灵,乃是双重浪费。而有损害发生,被害人却难以获得赔偿的机会,实际上是社会中最不公平的现象。我国引入反垄断集团诉讼需要对代表人诉讼进行内部制度的技术改良,让反垄断集团诉讼的性质由私人执行转为公益保护的社会实施,原告诉讼的资格由直接利害关系人转为法律利益当事人,集团代表的担当由明示授权转为默示同意,反垄断审查标准由制定法转为判例法。在具体程序设计上,建立反垄断集团诉讼的必要要件和审查机制、诉权激励机制、诉讼代表的默示授权和其他成员的明示退出机制、证据开示程序和审查机制、和解机制、赔偿和分配机制及制约监督机制。
[Abstract]:The economic principle of antitrust law is that if an enterprise obtains market monopoly or market dominance, it is bound to lower the market supply of the product, raise the price of the product, damage the interests of the competitors, the interests of the broad consumers and the public interests. On the basis of drawing lessons from the legislative experience of developed countries and regions, China's "antitrust law" stipulates the civil liability for the illegal monopoly. The most difficult area in the anti-monopoly civil action is that when the illegal monopoly is damaged by the interests of the broad consumers, the value of the individual loss is not high, and the merger is the profit of the monopolist. In order to advocate right pursuit, how to organize such large-scale victims to maintain common interests to achieve the goal of approaching justice? The method of relief and diverging interests and new interests is difficult in the framework of traditional civil procedure. The American competition law and federal civil procedure rules provide a very effective example and successful experience for this reason. Is the national antitrust group a tool to punish the monopolist or the tool that makes the judiciary bear the higher cost for the lawyers to benefit and be abused? There is a lot of controversy. Whether the antitrust group is able to introduce our country, the legislator and the practice circle is prudent and the opposition is the mainstream view. This article is based on the new institutional economics. The theory of transaction cost, institutional change, principal-agent theory and incentive supervision theory, comprehensive use of historical analysis, comparison of institutional analysis, normative analysis and empirical analysis, case analysis, multi-disciplinary cross research methods, research on the origin, structure and evolution of antitrust group litigation, analysis of the antitrust group litigation system The transaction cost of the operation and its decisive influence on the implementation of the legal rules, compare the advantages and disadvantages of various alternative arrangements, seek the fairness of its procedure, solve the institutional and technical barriers to the introduction of the antitrust group litigation into China, and then put forward the idea of the procedure of the antitrust group in our country and try to build a general comparison. The institutional research originated from the question of history. The American group litigation has been established in 1938, amended in 1966, and amended in 2005. In the process of the application of the anti monopoly cases, the initial frustration has been experienced in the process of the application of antitrust cases, and the mid-term is puzzled by the zigzag changes in the recent strict supervision, which makes Microsoft, apple, and British special. The high-tech enterprises are all involved in the action of compensation for the damages of the antitrust group, providing a powerful remedy for the consumers. The European Union has carried out a system innovation on the basis of the United States, which makes the plaintiff type, capital support and the abuse of the prevention right more operable. The anti-monopoly law enforcement means with the same effect and combination and the introduction of the antitrust group litigation system have become an important choice to maintain the decentralized group interests. By combing the evolution of the system, the author answers the question of what the antitrust group litigation system is, what role it plays, and draws the inspiration for the guests to see the advantages and disadvantages of the system. The system is the influence of the people's theory. In order to solve the difficulty of the choice of sex, in order to solve the difficulties of the many parties so that the trial is impossible, the group litigation is prosecuted by the plaintiff on behalf of the "private prosecutor", and in a silent way, it recognised the right of appeal by the representative to represent the public welfare, breaking through a single person who can not put forward the public interest claim and the government agent, and the consumer organization is lack of the bottleneck of enthusiasm. In the process of group litigation, network electronic notification reduces the information cost of the plaintiff notifications to the members of the absent group, and the mandatory evidence opens the cost of reducing the cost of collecting information by the parties. The verdict established by the group litigation strongly facilitated the reconciliation and reduced the transaction costs of the consumer and the monopolist. The court examined the agency qualification of the lawyer, supervised the lawyer's behavior in conformity with the professional ethics of the lawyer, prohibited the collusion between the original defendants and lawyers, and established a gap between the lawyers and the collective members, and the lawyer's expenses took the rules and reduced the lawyers and the collection. The judicial process is open and transparent, and the judicial process is open and transparent. The parties are difficult to avoid the law, refusing to provide evidence or rent-seeking, and reduce the cost of rent-seeking more effectively than the administrative model. The winning fee payment agreement reduces the opportunity cost of the case losing the case. Considering the court's management and supervision costs, the conditions for the establishment of the group lawsuit are also considered. The efficiency and economy of the ruling of group litigation is more efficient and economical than other available adjudication methods. In order to solve the problem of insufficient power of the plaintiff's litigation, on the basis of the analysis of the cost and benefit of the protection of the right of appeal, the Clayton act of the United States directly stipulates three times the litigation incentives for damages. Some acts of abuse of monopoly to reduce social wealth, make up for the loopholes in which administrative enforcement can not completely internalize the monopoly loss and reach the level of deterrence due to antitrust. Based on the cost-benefit analysis of the scope of litigation effectiveness, the effectiveness of the decision of the group litigation is expansionary, with a lawsuit to eliminate other potential repeated litigation and reduce the society. In order to avoid running out of control and indiscriminate litigation, a strict supervision and review mechanism has been established through the examination of the judges' suitability for the plaintiff, the burden of proof, the proof of the expert witness and the standard of substantive responsibility, which effectively reduces the political cost of the system operation and the error cost of the litigation. Compared with the mechanism, civil individual litigation can not return the interests of the lawsuit to the collective. The prosecutor's participation in civil public prosecution is lack of professionalism and enthusiasm, and so little power is used. The consumer organization group action can not directly distribute the compensation to the consumers, so there are limitations in civil action, civil public prosecution, and group litigation. The private attorney general of the group lawsuit combines the enthusiasm of the minority people with the judicial monitoring, and considers the difficulties of identifying the group members and quantifying the litigation requests. It is the most effective way to get close to justice. The overall design concept of the system is deeply influenced by the new institutional economics and is a real direct compensation for the large-scale victims. The legal transplant is a long-term process of institutional change. From the increasingly serious anti competitive behavior in China, the market distorts, the loss of consumer welfare is transferred to the interests of the interest groups, the gap between the rich and the poor has been widened, and the regulation monopoly is regulated by the consumers, and the consumers' compensation litigation has the corresponding system demand in China. The anti monopoly civil action in China is only a general and framework rule; the rules of the representative litigation system do not deal with the incompleteness and depersonalization of the contract, the announcement registration and the special authorization of the exercise of the right of appeal make the formation of the group high transaction cost, the high risk of uncertainty, and the factual litigation. In 2012, the newly revised civil procedure law only endows procuratorial organs and consumer organizations with the qualification of public interest litigation. Since the implementation of the new civil procedure law, there are very few cases since the implementation of the system, and there is still a gap in the system. CO in charge) and the second action group (lawyers, other social organizations, college teachers, law graduates and the media) together to form the power to promote the institutional change and construct the social implementation scheme of the anti monopoly group public interest litigation. At the same time, the external system or institutional environment is the key to support the internal system and the advantages of the antitrust group litigation system. In order to integrate the anti monopoly implementation mode of China, the judicial system and the soil of the economic and social culture, to solve the historical inertia of the path dependence, can the vitality of the system be radiant. Therefore, the dominant mode of the anti monopoly administrative law enforcement is turned to the administration, the judicial mode is both in accordance with the judicial power, and the judicial power is fully guaranteed in accordance with the law in accordance with the law. The barrier can effectively bring into play the function of the judicial regulation economy, as well as the growth of the civil society and the cultivation of the competitive culture, thus the possibility of introducing the antitrust group litigation in the system environment. The system construction needs to be rationally used for reference to the experience of the design of the litigation system of the foreign antitrust group, and pay attention to the integrity of the system and its supporting mechanism, and encourage the system. Consumer litigation, avoid the group's plaintiff lawyers deviate from the principal-agent agreement to sacrifice the interests of the group, solve information asymmetry and moral hazard, take into account the efficiency and fairness of the system operation. If the law does not consider the cost and benefit of the operation, the law is not operable and the system failure is double waste. The victim is difficult to obtain the opportunity for compensation, in fact it is the most unfair phenomenon in the society. The introduction of the antitrust group litigation requires the technical improvement of the internal system of the representative litigation, which allows the nature of the antitrust group litigation to be transferred from private execution to public welfare protection, and the qualification of the plaintiff's litigation is from direct interest. People turn to the parties of legal interest, the responsibility of the group representatives is transferred from explicit authorization to implied consent, and the antitrust review standard is transferred from the formulation law to the case law. In the specific procedure design, the necessary requisites and the examination mechanism of the antitrust group litigation, the incentive mechanism of the right of action, the implied authorization of the representative and the express exit machine of the other members are set up. The system includes evidence discovery procedure and review mechanism, reconciliation mechanism, compensation and distribution mechanism, and restriction and supervision mechanism.

【学位授予单位】：江西财经大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2016
【分类号】：D922.294
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本文编号：1835094