论我国上市公司高管薪酬的法律规制

发布时间：2018-05-16 14:17

本文选题：高管 + 薪酬　；参考：《华中科技大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：所有权与经营权的高度分离是现代企业制度最重要的特征,公司的所有者和经营者之间形成了委托代理关系。然而,所有者与经营者所追求的目标并不完全一致,代理问题因此在两者之间产生,代理成本也随之而来。薪酬制度便是公司为了消除所有者与经营者之间的矛盾而设置的,其目的是使经营者在追求自身利益的同时能够最大程度地实现公司价值。因此,构建一套完善的薪酬体系将会有效地激励和约束经营者,从而推动公司的健康发展,维持整个市场经济的繁荣稳定。然而在实践中,我国上市公司的治理结构不健全,主要表现为:一股独大、内部控制严重,信息披露不充分,薪酬对公司业绩的敏感性差,高管薪酬已经远远背离了最初设定时的目标。所以,有必要对上市公司的高管薪酬进行规制,以进一步完善公司内部治理结构。本文以我国上市公司高管薪酬的法律规制为研究对象,综合运用了实证研究法、比较分析法、文献调查法,依照提出问题、分析问题、解决问题的一般思路进行论述。本篇文章包括四个部分:第一部分首先对基本概念进行界定,阐述了三大基础理论,随后研究了对高管薪酬法律规制的动因以及法律规制的目标诉求;第二部分重点分析了我国当前上市公司高管薪酬所存在的问题:薪酬与公司业绩不相关、薪酬结构不合理、决定机制不完善、信息披露不充分,并进一步分析了出现上述问题的成因;第三部分主要介绍薪酬规制的域外经验,特别是市场经济发达的美国,归纳了域外规制的趋势及对我国的启示;第四部分根据前文的分析提出相应的完善建议,具体包括薪酬决定机制方面、信息披露方面、薪酬结构方面、政府监管方面及司法救济方面,并着重介绍了薪酬追回制度与股东派生诉讼。笔者认为,针对高管薪酬问题,法律规制应当坚持适度原则,将法律规制与市场调节相结合,二者互补,充分发挥薪酬制度对高管的激励与约束作用,促进公司股东与高管利益相一致,从而有效解决高管薪酬问题。
[Abstract]:The separation of ownership and management is the most important feature of modern enterprise system, and the principal-agent relationship is formed between the owner and manager of the company. However, the goals pursued by the owner and the operator are not exactly the same, so the agency problem arises between the two, and the agency cost also follows. Compensation system is set up in order to eliminate the contradiction between the owner and the operator. The purpose of the system is to make the operator realize the value of the company as much as possible while pursuing his own interests. Therefore, the construction of a perfect compensation system will effectively motivate and restrain managers, thereby promoting the healthy development of the company and maintaining the prosperity and stability of the entire market economy. However, in practice, the governance structure of listed companies in our country is not perfect, mainly as follows: one stock is dominant, the internal control is serious, the information disclosure is insufficient, and the compensation is not sensitive to the company's performance. Executive pay has been far from the original goal of setting a time. Therefore, it is necessary to regulate the executive compensation of listed companies in order to further improve the internal governance structure. This paper takes the legal regulation of executive compensation of listed companies in our country as the research object, synthetically uses the empirical research method, the comparative analysis method, the literature investigation method, according to the question, the analysis question, the solution question general thought carries on the discussion. This article includes four parts: the first part defines the basic concepts, expounds three basic theories, and then studies the motivation of the legal regulation of executive compensation and the goal of legal regulation; The second part focuses on the analysis of the problems existing in the executive compensation of listed companies: the compensation is not related to the company performance, the salary structure is unreasonable, the decision mechanism is not perfect, and the information disclosure is not sufficient. The third part mainly introduces the extraterritorial experience of salary regulation, especially the developed market economy in the United States, summarizes the trend of extraterritorial regulation and its enlightenment to our country. The fourth part according to the above analysis puts forward the corresponding consummation suggestion, including the compensation decision mechanism aspect, the information disclosure aspect, the compensation structure aspect, the government supervision aspect and the judicial relief aspect, The compensation recovery system and shareholder derivative litigation are introduced emphatically. The author believes that the legal regulation should adhere to the principle of moderation, combine the legal regulation with the market regulation, complement each other, and give full play to the incentive and restraint function of the compensation system to the executives. To promote the interests of shareholders and executives consistent, so as to effectively solve the problem of executive compensation.
【学位授予单位】：华中科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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