论打车软件补贴行为低于成本价销售的界定

发布时间：2018-05-16 19:23

本文选题：打车软件 + 低于成本价销售　；参考：《天津大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：打车软件以其方便快捷的特点,一定程度上解决了我国出租车市场分配不均的问题。但经过两年多的发展,打车软件行业内部兼并不断,竞争愈演愈烈。从最盛期的30余款打车软件逐渐形成快的打车和嘀嘀打车两家独大的局面。快的打车和嘀嘀打车为了争夺市场更是开展了价格补贴战,从现金补贴发展为打车红包、优惠券、积分换礼品等“暗补贴”模式。目前,我国《反不正当竞争法》中尚无对类打车软件补贴行为不正当竞争的规定,面对激烈的打车软件竞争市场,我国的法律规制相对滞后,《反不正当竞争法》的一般条款不尽完善。本文以《反不正当竞争法》第11条为基础,从经营者主观目的及商品成本构成两大构成要件来分析打车软件的补贴行为的性质。打车软件基于其正向外部性以及软件产品的使用相关性,其大范围补贴行为具有明显的掠夺性特征,但是由于软件类产品的特点及打车软件行业竞争的新模式使得传统的判定标准显得力不从心。因此,依照目前《反不正当竞争法》第11条的规定,打车软件的补贴行为不能构成低于成本价销售。但是,针对打车软件的补贴现象,我们还应当警惕采用如此大规模的补贴进行推广是否在无形之中抬高了打车软件行业的交易成本。营销创新的标准以及政府监管的尺度都应将是否有利于民生发展作为首要原则,打车软件产生的根本原因也是为了使广大用户平等的享有社会公共资源,不能沦为盲目竞争而变相的增加了社会交易成本。
[Abstract]:Because of its convenient and quick characteristics, the taxi hailing software solves the problem of uneven distribution of taxi market in China to a certain extent. But after more than two years of development, ride-hailing software industry continued to merge, competition intensified. From the peak of more than 30 ride-hailing software gradually formed a fast taxi and Didi Didi two major situation. In order to compete for the market, fast taxi hailing and Didi taxi have launched a price subsidy war, from cash subsidies to taxi red envelopes, coupons, points for gifts and other "hidden subsidy" mode. At present, there is no unfair competition regulation on the subsidy of tax-hailing software in the Anti-unfair Competition Law of our country. In the face of the fierce competition market of ride-hailing software, China's legal regulation lags behind, and the general provisions of Anti-unfair Competition Law are not perfect. Based on Article 11 of the Anti-unfair Competition Law, this paper analyzes the nature of the subsidy behavior of the taxi hailing software from the subjective purpose of the operator and the composition of the commodity cost. Based on its positive externalities and the relevance of the use of software products, ride-hailing software has a predatory nature in its extensive subsidy behavior. However, due to the characteristics of software products and the new model of competition in taxi-hailing software industry, the traditional criteria appear to be inadequate. Therefore, according to the current article 11 of the Anti-unfair Competition Act, the subsidization of ride-hailing software cannot constitute a sale below the cost price. However, in view of the subsidy phenomenon of ride-hailing software, we should also be on the alert whether the use of such a large-scale subsidy to promote the promotion of ride-hailing software industry in the invisible increase in transaction costs. The standard of marketing innovation and the scale of government supervision should regard whether it is beneficial to the development of people's livelihood as the first principle. The root cause of the taxi software is also to make the vast number of users equal access to social and public resources. Can not be reduced to blind competition and the disguised increase in social transaction costs.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.294

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