我国优先股类别表决法律问题研究

发布时间：2018-05-20 18:33

本文选题：利益冲突 + 优先股类别表决权　；参考：《山东科技大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：优先股作为类别股最典型、最普遍的一种,从诞生至今已有100多年的历史,是一种集股权、债权于一体的金融工具,不仅能够在稳定公司治理结构的前提下进行快速融资,而且能够满足投资主体日益多元化的投资需求。《优先股试点管理办法》的颁布标志着优先股制度在我国的正式确立,为保障优先股股东的合法利益,《试点管理办法》第10条列举出五项需要召开优先股类别表决大会的情形,但通过与美国、日本、德国等域外国家对类别表决权适用范围的相关立法规定相比较,我国规定的优先股类别表决在实体和程序两方面均存在问题。首先,在实体方面,优先股类别表决权适用范围过宽且缺乏灵活性,对优先股股东保护过度,妨碍公司行为自由,降低公司的决策效率,有违商事效率优先原则;其次,在程序方面,未对有效召开类别股东大会的最低出席人数、特别利害关系股东表决权排除等进行规定,表决生效要件的绝对化降低公司决策效率等,使表决程序不公正,导致优先股类别股东大会不能代表优先股股东意志,无法实现制约普通股股东权利滥用的目的,而且优先股股东大会与普通股股东大会同时召开会增加公司决策成本。在此建议,我国优先股类别表决应当借鉴域外国家的立法和实践经验,为确立更为合理的优先股类别表决权适用范围,应以平衡公司整体利益与优先股股东利益为原则、以优先权的变更可能会对优先股股东权益造成损害为标准,通过减少强制性规定、以公司章程规定资本充足条款等方式,缩小我国优先股类别表决权的适用范围;引入独立董事制度、规定优先股类别股东大会最低出席人数、分别召开优先股股东大会及普通股股东大会,并完善利害关系股东表决权排除制度等,以程序正义保证实体正义的实现,最终达到优先股股东保护与公司行为自由之间的利益平衡。
[Abstract]:As the most typical and most common type of stock, preference stock has a history of more than 100 years since its birth. It is a kind of financial instrument that integrates equity and creditor's rights, and can not only finance quickly under the premise of stabilizing the corporate governance structure. Moreover, it can satisfy the diversified investment demand of the investors. The promulgation of the "preferred stock pilot management method" marks the formal establishment of the preferred stock system in our country. In order to safeguard the legitimate interests of preferred stock shareholders, Section 10 of the "pilot Management measures" lists five cases in which preference stock class voting meetings are required, but through consultations with the United States, Japan, Compared with the relevant legislative provisions of the applicable scope of category voting in Germany and other foreign countries, there are problems in both substantive and procedural aspects in the voting of preferred shares in China. First of all, in the aspect of entity, the voting right of preferred stock is too wide and inflexible, which overprotects the shareholders of preferred stock, hinders the company's freedom of conduct, reduces the efficiency of corporate decision-making, and violates the principle of commercial efficiency. In terms of procedure, there is no provision for the minimum number of attendees of the effective convening of the general meeting of shareholders, the exclusion of the voting rights of the shareholders with special interests, and the absolute reduction of the efficiency of the company's decision making by the elements of the effective voting, so that the voting procedure is unfair. As a result, the general meeting of preferred stock shareholders can not represent the will of the shareholders of preferred stock and can not achieve the purpose of restricting the abuse of the rights of shareholders of common stock. Moreover, the holding of the general meeting of preferred stock shareholders at the same time as the general meeting of common stock shareholders will increase the cost of decision-making. In this paper, it is suggested that the voting of preferred stock in China should draw lessons from the legislation and practical experience of foreign countries. In order to establish a more reasonable scope of application of the voting right of preferred stock, the principle of balancing the interests of the whole company and the shareholders of preferred stock should be taken as the principle. According to the criterion that the change of priority may cause damage to the shareholders' rights and interests of preferred stock, the scope of application of voting rights of preferred stock in China can be reduced by reducing the mandatory provisions and providing sufficient capital clauses in the articles of association. Introducing the system of independent directors, stipulating the minimum number of attendees of the shareholders' general meeting of preferred stock class, convening the general meeting of preferred stock shareholders and the general meeting of common stock shareholders, and perfecting the system of excluding the voting rights of interested shareholders, etc. The realization of substantive justice is guaranteed by procedural justice, and the benefit balance between the protection of preferred shareholders and the freedom of corporate behavior is finally achieved.
【学位授予单位】：山东科技大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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