国有企业高管薪酬双轨制改革的法律探究
本文选题:国有企业 + 高管薪酬 ; 参考:《山东大学》2015年硕士论文
【摘要】:国有企业是国民经济的中流砥柱,在经济发展和社会稳定方面均发挥着举足轻重的作用。国家将大量资源、资本甚至是经营权力给予了国有企业,从某种程度上讲,国有企业具有企业和公共组织的双重特点,同时,国有企业的高管人员作为企业的直接领导者,也就具有企业家和行政官员的双重身份。为了充分调动高管人员的积极性,必须有一套行之有效的激励体系与之配套。然而,现行的激励机制过于简单机械,从而引发许多社会问题。国企高管薪酬的节节攀升引起了社会公众的强烈不满,而且对薪酬形成机制的公平性、合理性、科学性和透明性也产生了质疑。究其原因有以下四个方面:一是国企高管任免过度行政化,难以适应国有企业参与市场竞争的能动性。二是国企高管“富”与“贵”兼得,难以体现社会公平。三是缺乏科学合理薪酬管理体系,企业业绩和高管薪酬之间难以有效链接。四是高管薪酬信息披露制度的匮乏,国家机构和社会公众难以对其有效的监督。应该如何改变当下国企高管薪酬的种种弊端,本文认为,应该在充分结合我国基本国情基础上,积极合理的借鉴外国先进经验,制定专门的法律法规和完善相关的管理制度,建立现代企业制度,通过对高管人员薪酬的双轨激励,实现对企业高管管理的制度化,实现企业运行的科学化,提高国企的市场竞争力,体现国企的社会价值。本文分为四章对相关问题进行论述第一章,把我国建国至今的国企高管薪酬制度进程分为三个阶段:完全行政化阶段;逐步市场化阶段;以及市场化和行政化的双轨制探索阶段。旨在通过对以上三个阶段优势和不足之处的总结、分析和比较,为下一步的改革奠定基础,指明方向。第二章,通过对美国,英国,法国,德国,新加波五个国家国有企业薪酬制度的解读和探究,为我国国企高管薪酬改革带来些许启示,希望在借鉴企业高管制度设立比较成熟国家的先进经验的基础上,制定出适合我国国情的薪酬制度。第三章,对当下我国国企高管薪酬欠缺之处进行了总结,希望通过国有企业分类制度、企业治理结构、激励方式及职业经理人制度的缺失,信息披露不全面五个方面的分析,找出问题的根源,以求对症下药。第四章,本章在上文研究的基础上,建议通过建立现代企业制度,完善公司治理结构,在国企高管薪酬双轨管理的前提下,完善职业经理人制度,制定有效的薪酬激励方式,和信息披露制度等几个方面的改革,为我国国企高管薪酬创设一个完备有序的法律体系,制定出适合我国国情的国企高管薪酬制度。
[Abstract]:State-owned enterprises are the mainstay of national economy and play an important role in economic development and social stability. The state has given a great deal of resources, capital and even operating power to state-owned enterprises. To a certain extent, state-owned enterprises have the dual characteristics of enterprises and public organizations. At the same time, senior executives of state-owned enterprises are the direct leaders of enterprises. It also has the dual identity of entrepreneur and administrator. In order to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of senior executives, we must have an effective incentive system. However, the current incentive mechanism is too simple and mechanical, thus causing many social problems. The rising executive compensation of state-owned enterprises has aroused the strong dissatisfaction of the public, and the fairness, rationality, science and transparency of the salary formation mechanism have also been questioned. The reasons are as follows: first, the senior executives of state-owned enterprises are too administrative to adapt to the market competition of state-owned enterprises. Second, state-owned executives "rich" and "expensive" both, difficult to reflect social equity. Third, the lack of scientific and reasonable compensation management system, enterprise performance and executive compensation is difficult to effectively link. Fourth, the lack of executive compensation information disclosure system, the state institutions and the public difficult to effectively supervise it. How to change the malpractice of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises at present? this paper holds that we should make special laws and regulations and perfect the relevant management system on the basis of fully combining the basic national conditions of our country, actively and reasonably drawing lessons from foreign advanced experience. To establish the modern enterprise system, to realize the institutionalization of the executive management, to realize the scientific operation of the enterprise, to improve the market competitiveness of the state-owned enterprises, and to reflect the social value of the state-owned enterprises through the dual-track incentive to the compensation of the executives. This paper is divided into four chapters to discuss the related issues. The first chapter divides the process of executive compensation system of state-owned enterprises into three stages: the stage of complete administration, the stage of marketization, the stage of marketization. And the market-oriented and administrative dual-track system exploration stage. The purpose of this paper is to summarize, analyze and compare the advantages and disadvantages of the above three stages, to lay the foundation for the next step of the reform and to point out the direction. The second chapter, through to the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Singapore five countries state-owned enterprise compensation system interpretation and exploration, for our state-owned enterprise executive compensation reform brought some inspiration, It is hoped that on the basis of drawing lessons from the advanced experiences of the mature countries in the establishment of the executive management system of enterprises, a salary system suitable for the national conditions of our country can be formulated. The third chapter summarizes the lack of executive compensation in China's state-owned enterprises, hoping to pass the state-owned enterprise classification system, corporate governance structure, the lack of incentives and professional managers system, information disclosure is not comprehensive analysis of five aspects. Find out the root of the problem and find the right remedy. In the fourth chapter, on the basis of the above research, it is suggested that through the establishment of modern enterprise system, the improvement of corporate governance structure, under the premise of dual-track management of executive compensation in state-owned enterprises, the professional manager system should be perfected, and an effective way of salary incentive should be formulated. The reform of the system of information disclosure and other aspects creates a complete and orderly legal system for the executive compensation of state-owned enterprises in our country, and formulates the system of executive compensation of state-owned enterprises which is suitable for the national conditions of our country.
【学位授予单位】:山东大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:D922.287;D922.291.91
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