上市公司收购中目标公司董事信义义务研究

发布时间：2018-05-27 05:26

本文选题：上市公司收购 + 目标公司　；参考：《辽宁大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：近年来,随着市场经济的高速发展,公司制度的不断改革和变迁,上市公司收购合并现象越来越凸显,主要体现在公司内部对公司控制权的争夺。这一制度的设计有两大优点:其一是能够促进资源重组,使公司的资金和资产在最小的浪费情况下进行最大的利用,能够为公司带来最大的利益,也能达到一种优胜劣汰的自然竞争状态;其二是能够因此合并一些小型公司,使得上市公司朝着集团化发展,形成规模。但是这一制度的发展也会为公司内部的治理结构等方面带来危险,许多公司通过采取各种反收购措施来阻止或拖延收购的进行,试图扭转公司被改组的局面。然而,在我国这一制度的是适用还有很大空白,法律的规定尚未成熟,存有很多不足之处。在实践中,以董事为代表的公司管理层出于自己利益的考量,会滥用反收购措施来阻止收购的进行。但是在立法中设置反收购制度的目的是为了使目标公司能够通过反收购来保全自己的公司,使其免受敌意收购,或者是在不可避免的被收购的情况下为公司和股东争取最大的利益。由此可见,对反收购中目标公司管理层进行信义义务的规制是十分必要的。本文首先对阐述上市公司收购中目标公司董事信义义务产生的理论基础,包含的内容以及设定这一制度的价值分析。其次,通过分析英美德三国对上市公司收购中目标公司董事信义义务的立法及评价,总结完善我国相关立法可以借鉴的经验。再次是以分析我国立法为切入点,从我国反收购决定权的归属不明确,董事信息披露的相关规定不完善,董事内部信义义务之法律规制欠缺,董事违背信义义务的责任追究机制缺失等四个方面分析我国立法的不足之处。最后,针对存在的问题,在借鉴外国立法经验基础上,结合我国国情,提出完善和构建上市公司收购中目标公司的董事信义义务的法律建议。
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the rapid development of market economy and the constant reform and change of corporate system, the phenomenon of takeover and merger of listed companies becomes more and more prominent, which is mainly reflected in the internal competition for corporate control. The design of this system has two major advantages: one is that it can promote the reorganization of resources and maximize the use of the company's funds and assets with minimal waste, which can bring maximum benefits to the company. It can also achieve a natural competitive state of survival of the fittest; second, it can merge some small companies and make the listed companies develop towards collectivization and form a scale. However, the development of this system will also bring danger to the internal governance structure of the company. Many companies try to reverse the situation of corporate reorganization by taking various anti-takeover measures to prevent or delay the acquisition. However, there is still a big gap in the application of this system in our country, the provisions of the law are not mature, and there are many deficiencies. In practice, the management of the company represented by the directors will abuse the anti-takeover measures to prevent the acquisition from going on out of their own interests. But the purpose of setting up the anti-takeover system in the legislation is to enable the target company to protect its own company from hostile takeover through anti-takeover. Or fight for the best interests of the company and shareholders when it is inevitable to be acquired. Therefore, it is necessary to regulate the fiduciary duty of target company management in anti-takeover. This paper first expounds the theoretical basis, the content and the value analysis of the establishment of the target company directors' fiduciary obligation in the takeover of the listed company. Secondly, by analyzing the legislation and evaluation of the fiduciary duty of the target company in the acquisition of listed companies by Britain and Germany, the author summarizes the experience that can be used for reference in perfecting the relevant legislation of our country. The third is to analyze our legislation as a starting point, from the ownership of China's anti-takeover decision is not clear, director information disclosure of the relevant provisions are not perfect, the director's internal fiduciary duty of legal regulation is not enough. The deficiency of our legislation is analyzed from four aspects: the lack of accountability mechanism for directors violating fiduciary duty. Finally, in view of the existing problems, on the basis of foreign legislative experience, combined with the national conditions of our country, the author puts forward some legal suggestions on perfecting and constructing the directors' fiduciary duty of the target company in the acquisition of listed companies.
【学位授予单位】：辽宁大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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