垄断认定标准下企业内部共谋理论研究

发布时间：2018-06-01 22:11

本文选题：垄断 + 联合行为　；参考：《天津大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：企业集团化发展过程中,以各类形式所表现的存在于企业内部的联合行为一度演变为实施限制竞争行为的工具,此种形式的联合行为具有相当程度的复杂性和稳定性,对垄断认定标准提出了更高的要求,对企业内部共谋的相关问题进行梳理和研究,是成熟市场经济国家反垄断法立法和执法的重要环节。通常而言,共谋属当然违法行为,尽管也可以其他规则来管制企业内部联合实施的反竞争行为,但要受制于合理原则,这将大大降低规制的效率,从相反角度看,当然违法行为的认定是会在相当程度上影响公平的,如何在效率与公平之间做出平衡,是企业内部共谋理论和规则的核心,平衡的基础则是具体的经济发展水平和市场竞争环境。在美国诉黄色出租车公司案中,美国法院确立了企业内部共谋理论的雏形,那个时期美国法院认为,共谋者之间的相互关系并不能排除《谢尔曼法》的适用。从Copperweld诉独立钢管公司案之后,企业内部共谋理论得到了革新,一直到今天为止,美国法院都认为母公司与其全资子公司之间的联合行为不能被认定为是《谢尔曼法》第1条所称的共谋。对于企业从属关系的其他情形,美国法院并无统一结论,而是在具体案件中看各行为主体是否具有完全一致的利益。欧盟与美国不同,其在司法实践中发展出了“单一经济体”原则来判定具有相互关系的企业间的联合行为是否属于欧盟竞争法所禁止的共谋。欧盟对于此问题的关注不在于形式,而是看行为各方主体在实质上是否属于“单一经济体”。我国《反垄断法》存在垄断认定标准模糊等问题,影响其实际操作性。从国内市场看,我国大量存在企业集团利用企业间的相互关系公然进行限制竞争的行为。从国际市场看,跨国公司也利用各种内部安排冲击我国的国际竞争环境。在现阶段,我国应当结合经济发展水平和市场竞争环境对企业内部共谋的认定标准进行界定,确定企业间的相互关系与共谋的认定无关,明确关联企业间的共谋属当然违法行为,肯定在当前形势之下用共谋规制关联企业间联合行为的效率优势,在增强我国反垄断法实际操作性的同时,保障和促进母子公司间和企业集团内部关系的健康发展。
[Abstract]:In the process of enterprise collectivization development, the joint behavior which exists in the enterprise in various forms once evolved into a tool to restrict competition behavior, and this kind of joint behavior has a considerable degree of complexity and stability. It is an important link for the legislation and enforcement of antitrust law in mature market economy countries to carve out and study the related problems of collusion in enterprises. Generally speaking, collusion is an offence of course. Although other rules can also be used to regulate joint anti-competitive behavior within an enterprise, it is subject to the principle of reasonableness, which will greatly reduce the efficiency of regulation. Of course, the determination of illegal behavior will affect fairness to a certain extent. How to strike a balance between efficiency and fairness is the core of the theory and rules of collusion within an enterprise. The basis of balance is the specific level of economic development and market competition environment. In the case of American v. Yellow Taxi Company, the United States court established the embryonic form of the theory of complicity within the enterprise. In that period, the American court held that the mutual relationship between the conspirators could not exclude the application of Sherman Act. Since the case of Copperweld v. Independent Steel Tube Company, the theory of internal conspiracy has been innovated to this day. U.S. courts have held that a joint act between the parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary cannot be considered complicity within the meaning of section 1 of the Sherman Act. For other cases of corporate subordination, the United States courts do not have a unified conclusion, but in a specific case to see whether the actors have completely consistent interests. Different from the United States, the European Union has developed the principle of "single economy" in judicial practice to determine whether the joint acts between enterprises with mutual relations belong to the collusion prohibited by the EU competition law. The EU's focus is not on form, but on whether the actors are essentially "single economies." China's Anti-monopoly Law has some problems, such as vague standards of monopoly recognition, which affect its practical operation. From the point of view of domestic market, there are a large number of enterprise groups in our country to make use of the interrelationship between enterprises to restrict competition. From the international market point of view, multinational corporations also use various internal arrangements to impact China's international competitive environment. At the present stage, China should define the criteria for the identification of collusion within enterprises in the light of the level of economic development and the market competition environment, and make sure that the mutual relationship between enterprises is independent of the recognition of complicity. It is of course illegal to make clear the collusion among affiliated enterprises, to affirm the efficiency advantage of using collusion to regulate the joint behavior of affiliated enterprises under the current situation, and to enhance the practical operation of anti-monopoly law in our country at the same time. To ensure and promote the healthy development of relationships between parent and subsidiary companies and within enterprise groups.
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.294

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