中国纵向价格垄断—形态、来源、损害、认知误区与豁免

发布时间：2018-06-08 11:03

本文选题：竞争政策 + 转售价格维持　；参考：《中国科学技术大学》2015年博士论文

【摘要】：价格问题作为分销过程中的核心竞争因素,对于相关市场的分销效率、消费者的利益和相关市场的竞争机制有着很大的意义。而中国《反垄断法》自2008年生效以来,对纵向价格垄断问题的规制还尚处于初期阶段。笔者非常有幸作为反纵向价格垄断案件组的成员亲身历经了茅台、五粮液价格垄断案、乳粉价格垄断案与奥迪价格垄断案。在实际案件处理过程中,笔者深深感触到由于国情、经济环境与执法历史等方面的原因,中国的纵向价格垄断行为非常普遍,对于中国经济效率和公民的福祉的损害非常惊人。然而,目前中国学界、政界、商界、律师界和公众对于纵向价格垄断行为损害的严重性认识并不到位,对于相关问题的认知也存在诸多错误,对于国外法律与执法经验的翻译与介绍亦曾出现过严重偏差,致使对纵向价格垄断的规制与执法问题在中国障碍重重。同时,由于中国的纵向价格垄断行为大多市场覆盖率很高,与其他对纵向价格垄断问题有着很长时间执法历史的国家和地区相比差异非常巨大,这导致国外对纵向价格垄断问题的最新研究成果和执法先例在中国适用度不高,部分结论甚至完全与中国的实际情况相对立。本文分析了纵向价格垄断行为对中国的影响与危害,指出了目前中国对于纵向价格垄断问题存在的一些错误认识。同时基于执法实践和理论分析,探讨性的分析了几种在中国《反垄断法》规定的豁免条件下可以或可能被准许的转售价格维持行为。总而言之,笔者希望能够通过此篇文章抛砖引玉,引发更多的学者从中国的实际情况出发,对纵向价格垄断问题实务进行探讨。总体而言,本文的主要内容为：第一章对文中将会出现的理论和概念进行了解释与定义。第二章从欧盟、美国和中国对于转售价格维持的执法实践入手,从市场状态、经济环境、执法历史和执法目的的角度细致分析了三者的差别,强调了中国与欧盟在反垄断法律方面的相似性,并重点指出由于法律内容和司法体系等方面的差别,导致美国的转售价格维持执法先例对中国缺乏直接借鉴意义。第三章从纵向价格垄断的分类方法入手,从主导力量、实施方式、控制手段与协议类似四个维度,对纵向价格垄断协议的进行了分类探讨。第四章分析了经营者和其雇佣的经营管理人员实施纵向价格垄断的根本目的,并指出相应管理能力的缺乏、经营管理人员的管理惰性与利益诉求才是绝大部分经营者实施纵向价格垄断的内在动力。第五章从分销体系设计和价格体系维护的角度解释了为何在分销体系设计存在缺陷时经营者会考虑实施纵向价格垄断,并分析了纵向价格垄断对于分销效率的损害。第六章系统性的分析了纵向价格垄断行为是如何造成损害的。第七章纠正了一些中国经常出现的对纵向价格垄断行为的错误认知,并着重指出国际公认的“纵向限制的损害通常比横向限制的损害小”结论在中国不适用。第八章从中国《反垄断法》的豁免规则与对纵向价格垄断的执法实践出发,探讨性的分析了几种在中国《反垄断法》规定的豁免条件下可以或可能被准许的转售价格维持行为。第九章在总结全文的分析结论后,提出了具有实际操作意义的政策建议。
[Abstract]:As the core competitive factor in the distribution process, the price problem is of great significance to the distribution efficiency of the related markets, the interests of the consumers and the competition mechanism of the related market. And since the anti trust law has come into effect in 2008, the regulation of the vertical price monopoly is still in the early stage.
I was very lucky to be a member of the anti vertical price monopoly case group, who had experienced Moutai, Wuliangye price monopoly, the price monopoly of the milk powder and the price monopoly of Audi. In the process of handling the actual cases, the author deeply touched the reasons of the national conditions, the economic environment and the history of law enforcement, and the vertical price monopoly in China. It is very common that the damage to China's economic efficiency and the well-being of the citizens is stunning. However, at present, Chinese academics, politicians, business, lawyers and the public are not well aware of the severity of the damage to vertical price monopolies, and there are many mistakes in the cognition of related issues, and the translation of foreign law and law enforcement experience. There have also been serious deviations in the introduction, resulting in many obstacles to the regulation and enforcement of vertical price monopolies in China. At the same time, because most of the vertical price monopolies in China have high market coverage, the difference is very large compared with other countries and regions that have a long history of law enforcement for vertical price monopoly. The latest research results and law enforcement precedents for vertical price monopoly in China are not very applicable in China, and some of the conclusions are even completely opposed to the actual situation in China.
This paper analyzes the impact and harm of vertical price monopoly on China, and points out some misunderstandings on the problem of vertical price monopoly in China. At the same time, based on the practice of law enforcement and theoretical analysis, it analyses several kinds of resale prices which can or may be permitted under the exemption conditions stipulated in China's "antitrust law". In a word, I hope that through this article, I hope that more scholars will start from the actual situation in China and discuss the practice of vertical price monopoly.
In general, the main contents of this article are as follows:
The first chapter explains and defines the theories and concepts that will appear in the paper.
The second chapter, starting with the law enforcement practice of resale price maintenance in the EU, the United States and China, analyzes the differences between the three in terms of market status, economic environment, law enforcement history and law enforcement purposes. It emphasizes the similarities between China and the EU on antitrust laws, and points out that the legal content and judicial system are also pointed out. Differences lead to a law enforcement precedent for resale prices in the US, which is of no direct reference to China.
The third chapter starts with the classification method of the vertical price monopoly, and classifies the vertical price monopoly agreement from the four dimensions of the dominant force, the way of implementation, the means of control and the agreement.
The fourth chapter analyzes the fundamental purpose of the managers and their employed managers to implement the vertical price monopoly, and points out the lack of the corresponding management ability. The management inertia and interest demands of the management personnel are the intrinsic motivation for most operators to carry out the vertical price monopoly.
The fifth chapter explains why operators consider the vertical price monopoly when the design of the distribution system is defective in distribution system design and the maintenance of the price system, and analyzes the damage to the distribution efficiency by the vertical price monopoly.
The sixth chapter systematically analyzes the causes of vertical price monopoly.
The seventh chapter rectified some of China's frequent misperceptions about vertical price monopolies, and emphasized that the internationally recognized "damage to the vertical restrictions is usually smaller than the lateral limit", which is not applicable in China.
The eighth chapter, starting from the exemption rules of China's "antitrust law" and the law enforcement practice of the vertical price monopoly, analyses several kinds of resale price maintenance which may or may be permitted under the exemption stipulated in China's "antitrust law".
In the ninth chapter, after summarizing the conclusions of the full text, the policy recommendations with practical significance are put forward.
【学位授予单位】：中国科学技术大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.294

【参考文献】