论双重股权架构在中国的适用
发布时间:2018-07-03 06:11
本文选题:双重股权架构 + 普通股股份 ; 参考:《华东政法大学》2015年硕士论文
【摘要】:双重股权架构(Dual Class Stock Structure)随着阿里巴巴集团上市,吸引了财经媒体的眼球。双重股权架构的支持者认为,双重股权架构的优点在于:(1)使公司创始人/管理层在公开的资本市场融资的同时,维持其对公司的控制权;(2)使公司创始人/管理层可实施长期战略(long-term strategy),专注于公司整体发展前景,而不必迫于普通股股东的压力,因短期回报而牺牲了长期战略。虽然双重股权架构已经得到诸多国家监管的许可,但对于双重股权结构可能造成的管理层滥用控制权的顾虑,阻碍了该架构得到更广泛的适用和认可。本文在梳理双重股权结构逻辑基础之上,通过对双重股权结构和其他不同投票权架构进行分析,对如何平衡管理层对控制权的需要和投资者利益做出研究,并得出结论:双重股权结构本身具有中立性,如何合理运用双重股权结构是公司治理和法规监管的关键。在此基础上,笔者提出了如何构建双重股权结构的具体制度建议。首先,需要阐明的是“一股一权”原则和双重股权结构。“一股一权”原则也被称为“一股一票”原则,其内涵为:股东享有的表决权、利润分配权等权利与其所持有的股份比例呈严格得正相关对应。具体包含两方面内容:其一,每一股都享有一个表决权;其二,不允许一股享有多个表决权。与“一股一权”相对的,则是不同投票权的股权结构。公司发行不同类型的股票,各类型的股票,其持有者享有的表决权和红利分配权是不相同的。双重股权结构,即按照每股附着的表决权大小,普通股被划分为A、B股两类:A类普通股的表决权遵循“一股一票”原则,B类普通股则具有数倍于A类股的表决权,比率多为10:1。具有高价投票权的B类普通股一般由企业创始人或管理层持有,一般不能对外转让;若要对外转让,这些B类普通股需先行转换成“一股一票”的普通股;而遵循“一股一票”的A类普通股则面向公众发售,可自由流通。其次,笔者梳理了双重股权受到管理层青睐及世界各地不同监管者的原因。双重股权结构之所以被采纳的一个主要原因在于控股股东希望维持控制权而不必承担过度的现金流风险。控制权对于创始人/管理层而言,相较于普通投票权的股东,有独特的价值。De Angelo和De Angelo在1985年的论著中发现,高级投票权股票在被并购时,有较高的溢价。De Angelo和De Angelo在该篇文章中总结了双重股权结构为公司带来的效率性因素。首先,创始人/管理层出于对公司长期发展战略的考虑,而维持控制权,是合法的需要。其次,关于保障管理层对于公司投入的特殊人力资本。在公众公司,投票权可以保护现有的管理层免受挑战,从而鼓励这些特殊的人力资本可以在未来得到相应的回报。第三,管理层掌握公司控制权时,可以克服集体行动难题,使股东获得更高的收购溢价双重股权结构并非新鲜产物。早在二十世纪20年代就在美国受到了欢迎,至今在世界多个证券市场得到不同程度的认可。NYSE(纽约证券交易所)、NASDAQ(纳斯达克交易所)、AMEX(美国证券交易所)和加拿大的证券交易允许采取上市公司在首次发行(IPO)中采取多重表决权股权结构;欧洲的瑞典、爱尔兰、英国也原则上允许双重股权结构公司在各自的证券市场上市;香港、新加坡和中国内地的证券交易所目前均不认可上市公司采取多重表决权股权结构。虽然各界对双重股权制度的评价褒贬不一,但这一制度被不少国际资本市场接纳,具有合法地位。长期来看,双重股权结构也受到大量企业和投资者的欢迎。对于中立的监管者来说,不能忽视这一制度对不同市场和交易所的监管竞争产生的影响——在日益加剧的国际竞争压力下,交易所倾向于制定受投资者欢迎的规则,如2014年8月香港联交所颁布了名为《概念文件:不同投票权架构》,就是否允许在港交所上市的公司采纳双重股权结构进行了公众意见咨询。可以肯定的是,在资本市场全球化的今天,各国(地区)企业不断进行“监管套利”(regulatory arbitrage),根据自身的商业需要和面临的监管差异选择市场和监管主体。笔者在第二章重点分析了中国企业采纳双重股权结构的现状,并结合现行法律,对允许中国内地企业采纳双重股权结构可能产生的后果提出了观点。根据彭博和美国证监会上市公司披露的数据来看,中国内地公司赴美上市的数量在过去五年中逐步增加,这些上市公司多数采纳了双重股权结构以满足其融资和维持控制权的双重需要,另外阿里巴巴“弃港赴美”上市在一定程度上反映了如果我们完全禁止双重股权结构,无疑会让中国的证券市场流失不少的优质企业。因此,有必要重视如何发挥这一结构积极功能的同时,抑制其可能产生的负面影响——即可能增高的代理成本,和小股东(公众投资者)的利益侵害。至于如何平衡管理层控制权利益和外部投资者的投资权益,则是监管制度的关键所在。在本文的第三章,笔者从以下两个方面提出了双重股权结构在中国适用的制度建议,在允许公司自行采纳双重股权结构这一公司资本结构的情况下,一方面,在某种情势下,若双重股权架构不能服务于管理层合理控制公司的目的,即当双重股权架构沦为管理层私相授受,传递私人利益的工具时,有必要以法定的形式,强制高级投票权股份转换为“一股一权”的单一股权结构,尤其是高级投票权股份转让给非关联人士和创始人/管理层抛售高级投票权股份的情形下,法律不能坐视高级投票权股份所附着的控制权溢价流入控制权人的囊中。另一方面,对于双重股权结构可能造成的风险,如因管理人追求“私人利益”“掘壕自保”,导致外部股东利益受损等问题,则应该从有效公司治理方面,从而降低公司资本结构可能造成的风险,而不应该“因噎废食”,拒绝灵活性强,有效性高的双重股权结构,从而错失将中国内地资本市场迈向成熟的国际化资本市场的契机。
[Abstract]:Dual Class Stock Structure (Dual) has attracted financial media with the listing of the Alibaba group. The dual ownership structure's supporters believe that the dual ownership structure has the advantages of: (1) maintaining the company's control over the company's founder / management in the open capital market; (2) the company's founding. Human / management can implement the long-term strategy (long-term strategy) to focus on the overall development prospects of the company, rather than under the pressure of the common shareholders, and sacrifice the long-term strategy for short-term returns. Although the dual ownership structure has been licensed by many national regulators, the control over the management of the dual ownership structure may be abused. On the basis of combing the logic of dual ownership structure, this paper analyzes the dual ownership structure and other different voting rights structure, and makes a study on how to balance the management needs of control and the interests of investors, and draws a conclusion that the dual ownership structure is based on the structure of the dual equity structure. As a matter of neutrality, how to rationally use dual ownership structure is the key to corporate governance and regulation. On this basis, the author puts forward a specific system proposal on how to construct dual ownership structure. First, the principle of "one right" and dual ownership structure should be clarified. The principle of "ticket" is that the right to vote and the right to distribute profit is strictly related to the proportion of shares held by the shareholders. It contains two aspects: one, each share has a voting right; and second, it is not allowed to enjoy multiple decisions. Share structure. The company issue different types of stock, all types of stock, the holder's right to vote and dividend distribution rights are different. The dual ownership structure, that is, according to the size of the voting rights attached to each share, is divided into A, B shares two categories: the voting rights of a common stock follows the principle of "one share one vote", and the common stock of class B There are many times the right to vote in the class a share, the ratio is that the common stock of class B with high price of 10:1. is generally held by the founder or management of the enterprise, and generally cannot be transferred to the outside world. If we want to transfer the common stock, these B common shares should be converted into "one share one ticket". The main reason why the dual ownership structure is adopted is that the controlling shareholders want to maintain control without having to take over the excessive cash flow risk. The control right is for the founder / management. Compared with the shareholders of ordinary voting rights, there is a unique value.De Angelo and De Angelo in the 1985 book that the high premium shares have a higher premium of.De Angelo and De Angelo in the merger and acquisition. In this article, the dual equity structure is the efficiency factor for the company. First, the founder / management is out of the public. It is a legitimate need to maintain control over the long-term development strategy. Secondly, on the special human capital that guarantees management to the company. In public companies, the right to vote can protect the existing management from the challenge, so that these special human capital can be rewarded in the future. Third, management When mastering corporate control, the problem of collective action can be overcome, and the double ownership structure of a higher purchase premium is not a fresh product. As early as 20s twentieth Century, it was welcomed in the United States, so far,.NYSE (New York stock exchange), NASDAQ (NASDAQ), has been accepted in various securities markets in the world. The AMEX (US stock exchange) and Canadian securities transactions allow listed companies to take multiple voting rights in the first issue (IPO); European Sweden, Ireland, and the UK are in principle allowed double equity companies to be listed in their respective stock markets; Hongkong, Singapore and China's mainland stock exchanges It is not recognized that the listed companies adopt multiple voting rights structure. Although the evaluation of the dual equity system is different, the system is accepted by many international capital markets and has legal status. In the long run, the dual ownership structure is also welcomed by a large number of enterprises and investors. For neutral regulators, it can not be ignored. In view of the impact of this system on the regulatory competition in different markets and exchanges - under increasing pressure of international competition, exchanges tend to formulate rules that are welcomed by investors, such as the August 2014 Hongkong Stock Exchange issued a "concept document: different voting rights framework > to allow companies to be listed on Hong Kong exchanges." The dual ownership structure has been consulted by the public opinion. It is certain that in the globalization of the capital market, the enterprises of various countries (regions) continue to carry out "regulatory arbitrage" (regulatory arbitrage), choose the market and supervision subject according to their own commercial needs and the regulatory differences facing them. In the second chapter, the author focuses on the analysis of Chinese enterprises. The present situation of the dual ownership structure and the current law, put forward views on the possible consequences of allowing Chinese mainland enterprises to adopt dual ownership structure. According to the data disclosed by Bloomberg and the US Securities Regulatory Commission, the number of Chinese companies listed in the United States has gradually increased over the past five years. Most of these listed companies are listed. The dual ownership structure is adopted to meet the dual needs of its financing and control. In addition, the listing of the Alibaba "abandoning the port to the United States" reflects to some extent that if we completely prohibit the dual ownership structure, it will undoubtedly let the Chinese stock market lose a lot of high quality enterprises. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to how to use this structure. In the third chapter, the third chapter of this paper, the author from the following two aspects: how to suppress the possible negative effects - the possible increase of the agency cost and the interests of the small shareholders (public investors). Under the circumstances of allowing the company to adopt the dual ownership structure of the company's capital structure, on the one hand, in a certain situation, if the dual ownership structure can not serve the purpose of controlling the company reasonably, that is, when the dual ownership structure is reduced to the management level, it is transmitted to the management. When a tool of personal interest is delivered, it is necessary to convert the shares of the high voting right into a single ownership structure in the form of a statutory form, especially when the senior voting rights are transferred to the non associated persons and the founder / management to sell the high voting shares, and the law cannot sit on the high voting shares. On the other hand, on the other hand, the possible risks caused by the dual ownership structure, such as the manager's pursuit of "private interest", "entrenching self insurance", and the loss of the interests of the external shareholders, should be taken from the effective corporate governance to reduce the possible risk of the company's capital structure. The "choking", the dual ownership structure that refuses to be flexible and effective, has missed the opportunity to move China's capital market into a mature international capital market.
【学位授予单位】:华东政法大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2015
【分类号】:D922.291.91
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