中国投资者立法保护与银行治理的定性比较分析

发布时间：2018-07-06 20:47

本文选题：投资者立法保护 + 银行治理　；参考：《社会科学论坛》2015年07期

【摘要】：作为具有特殊功能的金融中介,商业银行的行业特征(资本结构的特殊性、合约的不透明性和监管的严格性)引起了银行治理中代理问题的复杂性(股东与经营者、股东与债权人、股东与监管者的代理问题),从而使银行治理目标呈现出多元化的价值取向(安全性、流动性、营利性)。在构造1999-2012年我国上市银行投资者立法保护水平指数的基础上,该文运用定性比较分析(QCA)对126个上市银行案例进行研究,重点考察了投资者立法保护及传统内部治理机制对银行治理绩效三个维度的影响。研究发现,投资者立法保护在达成三维银行治理目标的作用上比起内部治理机制更重要:在正面效应上,提高投资者立法保护水平是能够达成银行治理目标的关键;在负面效应上,较低的投资者立法保护水平会严重影响银行安全性、营利性绩效。从机制选择上来说,银行应当倾向于较小的董事会规模和较高的高管薪酬,尽量避免独立董事比例过低的情况。
[Abstract]:As a financial intermediary with special functions, the industrial characteristics of commercial banks (the particularity of the capital structure, the opaque nature of the contract and the strictness of supervision) cause the complexity of the agency problem in the bank governance (shareholders and operators, shareholders and creditors, shareholders and supervisors' agency problems), which makes the target of bank governance a lot. On the basis of constructing the level index of the legislative protection level of the listed bank investors in China for 1999-2012 years, this paper uses qualitative comparison analysis (QCA) to study 126 listed bank cases, and focuses on the performance of the investor's legislative protection and the traditional internal governance mechanism to the performance of the bank governance. The influence of the three dimensions is found. It is found that the investor legislative protection is more important than the internal governance mechanism in achieving the goal of the three-dimension bank governance. In the positive effect, improving the level of the investor's legislative protection is the key to achieving the goal of the bank governance; in the negative effect, the lower level of the investor's legislative protection will be seriously affected. In terms of mechanism selection, banks should be inclined to smaller board size and higher executive pay, and try to avoid the low proportion of independent directors.
【作者单位】：复旦大学经济学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金面上项目《基于制度视角的跨期动态CEO薪酬激励定价及其治理绩效研究》(课题编号:71373049) 教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目《治理环境变化下的我国公司股权性质与投资绩效研究》(编号:11YJA790180) 上海市哲学社会科学规划课题《我国公司治理环境下的CEO薪酬激励:模式及其治理绩效研究》的阶段性研究成果
【分类号】：D922.28

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