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对纵向价格限制适用违法推定的检讨

发布时间:2018-08-02 08:50
【摘要】:《反垄断法》对纵向价格限制仅做了原则性规定。当前主流观点认为对其应采用违法推定的规制方式,但这一观点是值得商榷的。支持违法推定的观点或来自对《反垄断法》第14条条文以及其与第13条、第15条关系的误读;或来自不了解看似简单的违法推定在执法、司法过程中却会造成更大的混乱,而合理原则却能形成一个高效方便的分析问题的系谱;或来自误认为欧美在对垄断协议的分析模式上存在根本差异,并误读了欧盟法中的有关规定。对纵向价格限制应适用合理原则,最关键的是要积累找寻典型证明要素,从而构建起结构型合理原则的分析模式,提升《反垄断法》适用的准确和效率。具体说来,全文分为以下六个部分:第一部分,介绍研究背景与研究意义、研究现状、研究方法。第二部分,提出问题——针对《反垄断法》第14条纵向价格限制的适用问题进行研究。第三部分,为了便于下文更彻底的检讨,务必先理清两个判断标准——本身违法/合理原则两者的分析模式、历史沿革以及最新发展趋势。在垄断行为的认定上,本身违法逐渐被抛弃,而合理原则逐渐变成认定垄断协议的一般原则。当前,经过长期司法实践的探索,在针对一些典型垄断行为适用合理原则分析的过程中,逐渐形成了比较固定的分析模式,这突破了之前本身违法与合理原则的反垄断认定二分法,形成一个合理原则分析的系谱。第四部分,对我国发生的纵向价格限制的七个案件进行实证分析,行政执法机构采用的违法推定分析模式,在实务中造成三个弊端:过分强调违法性;完全忽视正当性;易造成反垄断法规制的泛化。第五部分,对主张适用违法推定说的检讨。检讨一:垄断协议的定义设置在第13条下,故不能适用于第14条。法条明确指出该定义的适用范围是整部法律;同时既然对危害行为较大的横向垄断行为,法律都规定不能适用本身违法,那么对危害较小的纵向价格限制则更不能适用。检讨二:对纵向价格限制适用合理原则会导致第15条豁免制度被架空。第14条解决的是内部平衡,而第15条解决的是外部平衡,是在第14条已经分析出该行为竞争效用是负的基础上,看其是否存有豁免情形,可见两者分别规制不同内容。检讨三:《反垄断法》第14条法条中“禁止”的措辞以及将纵向价格限制单独列举,表明应适用违法推定。法条对行为模式的处理只有三类:可以、应当、禁止,所以禁止表明的是法律对某种行为所持的一种否定的态度,违法可能需要进一步考察有没产生危险、或造成后果;列举的目的有时仅在于提示这些形式的行为通常情况下符合垄断协议的定义,但不是必然;同时禁止涵盖的范围也包含兜底条款,而兜底条款(如对限定最高价、搭售都包含其中)本身就包含的合理原则的分析方式,这会产生矛盾。检讨四:违法推定能增强提升执法、司法的效率。看似简单的违法推定在执法、司法过程中却会造成更大的混乱,而合理原则却能形成一个高效方便的分析问题的系谱。对于结构型合理原则,只需要考察最有助于识别某类行为的反竞争效果的某些因素,从而实现执法、司法的程序性、轻巧性、高效性。检讨五:违法推定更符合以欧盟为蓝本、利于学习借鉴。欧美在对垄断协议的分析模式上不存在根本差异,这源于有学者对欧盟反垄断法规制方式存在着一些误读。第六部分结语,应采合理原则科学规制纵向价格限制。但合理原则不能以一种过于抽象的方式实现,利用经济学的研究成果,通过积累形成典型证明要素,形成结构形、模板化的合理原则分析模式,应是我国反垄断法的发展方向。
[Abstract]:"Antitrust law" has only made a principled provision to vertical price restrictions. The current mainstream view holds that it should be regulated by illegal presumption, but this view is debatable. The view that supports the presumption of law or from the fourteenth articles of the antitrust law and the misreading of the thirteenth and its fifteenth relations; or from the ununderstanding The simple presumption of law in law enforcement will cause more confusion in the judicial process, and the reasonable principle can form a pedigree of an efficient and convenient analysis of the problem; or from the mistaken opinion that there are fundamental differences in the analysis mode of the monopoly agreement between Europe and the United States, and misread the relevant provisions in the EU law. In principle, the most important thing is to accumulate the typical proof elements, thus construct the analytical model of the rational principle of structural type, and improve the accuracy and efficiency of the application of the antitrust law. In particular, the full text is divided into six parts: the first part, the research background and research significance, the research status, the research method, and the second part, put forward the questions - The study of the application of the fourteenth vertical price restrictions on the antitrust law. The third part, in order to facilitate a more thorough review of the following, must first clear the two criteria of judgment - the analysis model of their own illegal / reasonable principles, the historical evolution and the latest development trend. Abandonment, and the rational principle gradually become the general principle of determining the monopoly agreement. At present, through the exploration of long-term judicial practice, a relatively fixed analytical model has been formed in the process of the application of reasonable principles to some typical monopolies, which breaks through the antitrust dichotomy which was previously unlawful and reasonable. The fourth part is the empirical analysis of seven cases of vertical price restriction in China. The illegal presumption analysis model adopted by the administrative law enforcement agency causes three disadvantages in practice: overemphasizing the illegality; ignoring the legitimacy completely; making the regulation of the antitrust law easy to be generalized. Fifth part, Review 1. Review 1: the definition of a monopoly agreement is set under thirteenth articles, so it can not be applied to the fourteenth article. The law clearly points out that the scope of application of the definition is the whole law; at the same time, since the law stipulates that the law does not apply itself to the law, the law does not apply itself to the law. Price restriction is more inapplicable. Review two: the application of reasonable principles to the vertical price limit will lead to the overhead of fifteenth exemption systems. The fourteenth is the internal balance, and the fifteenth solution is the external balance. On the basis of the fourteenth analysis that the competitive utility is negative, it can be seen whether there is an exemption. Both of them regulate different contents respectively. Review three: the wording of "Prohibition" in the fourteenth articles of antitrust law and the listing of the vertical price restrictions individually show that the illegal presumption should be applied. There are only three types of handling of the behavior pattern in the law article: Yes, should, prohibit, so the prohibition indicates a negative state of law for a certain act. The purpose of the enumeration is sometimes only to suggest that the behavior of these forms is usually consistent with the definition of a monopoly agreement, but not necessarily; and the scope of the prohibition is also covered by the bottom of the pocket clause, and the bottom clause (for example, for the highest price limit, tying is included) An analysis of the rational principle contained in itself will create a contradiction. Review four: the presumption of law can enhance the efficiency of the law enforcement and the judiciary. The seemingly simple presumption of law will cause more confusion in the process of law enforcement and in the judicial process, but the reasonable principle can form a pedigree of efficient and convenient analysis. Then, we only need to examine some factors that are most helpful to identify the anti competitive effect of a certain kind of behavior, so as to realize the law enforcement, the procedural nature of the judicature, the lightness and the efficiency. Review five: the presumption of law is more consistent with the European Union as the blueprint for learning. There are some Misreading in the regulation mode of the anti monopoly law. The sixth part is the conclusion that the rational principle should be adopted to regulate the vertical price limit scientifically, but the rational principle can not be realized in an too abstract way. By using the research results of economics, the rational principle analysis mode of forming the structure form and formating the template should be formed by accumulating the typical proof elements. It is the development direction of China's antitrust law.
【学位授予单位】:扬州大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D922.294

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