限制最低转售价格违法性认定适用原则研究

发布时间：2018-08-02 13:16

【摘要】：反垄断法作为经济宪法,其核心价值在于维护市场竞争秩序和实现社会整体效率。而限制最低转售价格作为纵向价格限制竞争协议的典型,其带来的经济效果具有双重性,既限制和排除竞争,又具有促进竞争的可能性。因此,规制限制最低转售价格成为世界范围内具有争议的难题。美国通过司法实践,确立了两种基本原则判定其违法性;世界其他国家也确立了自己的规制原则和模式;中国作为实施反垄断法的新兴体,也在逐步确立和完善相关判定标准。笔者首先介绍了限制转售价格的基本理论,然后分析域外对该行为的规制原则,重点是如何认定限制最低转售价格协议或行为的违法性。最后,结合我国对该问题的反垄断法规制现状,研究应如何从适应本国国情的角度完善判定标准及相关立法。具体说,文章共分为四部分:第一章主要介绍限制转售价格的基本理论。首先介绍了限制转售价格的基本概念,然后阐述了特征及分类。最后,详细叙述了限制转售价格带来的双重经济效果。一方面,指明其带来的积极效果,即如何促进竞争、提高整体经济效率等;另一方面,分析该行为是如何限制、排除竞争的,譬如巩固价格卡特尔、损害消费者利益等。第二章为本身违法原则和合理原则的相关理论。本章详细阐述了两种原则的基本定义及发展历程。此外,着重比较了两种原则在判定行为是否构成垄断时的优势和劣势。最后,指出理论界和实践中的争议性,即对限制最低转售价格违法性的认定是直接适用严格的本身违法原则,还是考虑到促进竞争性而适用合理原则。第三章为外国认定限制最低转售价格行为违法适用的原则。首先详细阐述了美国认定该行为违法适用原则的发展,其基本规律是适用何种原则取决于当时所处的经济环境和制定的经济政策。之后,简要介绍了其他国家诸如欧盟、德国、日本对该行为的规制情况。最后得出结论:世界范围内对于限制最低转售价格的反垄断规制没有采取绝对的本身违法原则,而是在适用本身违法原则的基础上规定豁免情况,这类似于合理原则。第四章为我国限制最低转售价格违法性认定适用原则的分析及完善。首先从立法上介绍与我国规制限制最低转售价格相对应的法律条文。其次,以纵向限制竞争协议案——“锐邦诉强生”为例,分析法院在审理限制最低转售价格协议是否构成垄断时适用的原则及审理路径。然后评析不同学者对原则适用的不同观点。最后,结合我国实际情况,提出自己的观点,即对限制最低转售价格应逐步适用合理原则判定其违法性。同时提出了适用合理原则的完善建议,包括明确分析要素,公平分配举证责任,“安全港”制度的建立以及专家制度的引入等。
[Abstract]:As an economic constitution, the core value of anti-monopoly law lies in maintaining the order of market competition and realizing the overall social efficiency. As a typical example of vertical price restriction competition agreement, restricted minimum resale price has dual economic effect, which not only limits and excludes competition, but also has the possibility of promoting competition. Therefore, the regulation of limiting the minimum resale price has become a controversial problem worldwide. Through judicial practice, the United States has established two basic principles to judge its illegality; other countries in the world have also established their own principles and models of regulation; China, as a new body implementing anti-monopoly law, is also gradually establishing and perfecting relevant criteria. The author first introduces the basic theory of restricting resale price, and then analyzes the principles of the regulation of this behavior outside the territory, focusing on how to determine the illegality of the restricted minimum resale price agreement or behavior. Finally, according to the current situation of anti-monopoly law regulation in China, this paper studies how to perfect the judgment standard and relevant legislation from the angle of adapting to the national conditions of our country. Specifically, the article is divided into four parts: the first chapter mainly introduces the basic theory of resale price restriction. This paper first introduces the basic concept of restricted resale price, and then expounds the characteristics and classification. Finally, the double economic effect of restricting resale price is described in detail. On the one hand, it points out the positive effects, that is, how to promote competition and improve the overall economic efficiency. On the other hand, it analyzes how the behavior restricts and excludes competition, such as consolidating price cartels and harming consumers' interests. The second chapter is the related theories of the principle of illegality and the principle of reasonableness. This chapter describes the basic definition and development of the two principles in detail. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of the two principles in determining whether behavior constitutes monopoly or not are compared. Finally, the author points out the controversy in theory and practice, that is, whether the determination of the illegality of limiting the minimum resale price should be directly applied to the strict illegality principle, or the reasonable principle should be applied in consideration of promoting competition. Chapter three is the principle of illegal application of limiting minimum resale price by foreign countries. First of all, it expounds the development of the principle of the illegal application of the act in the United States. The basic law of the principle is that the application of the principle depends on the economic environment and the economic policy formulated at that time. Then, it briefly introduces the regulation of this behavior in other countries such as EU, Germany and Japan. Finally, the conclusion is drawn that the antitrust regulation that limits the minimum resale price in the world does not adopt the absolute principle of illegality, but stipulates the immunity on the basis of applying the principle of illegality, which is similar to the principle of reasonableness. The fourth chapter is the analysis and perfection of the applicable principle of illegal determination of the restricted minimum resale price in our country. Firstly, it introduces the legal provisions corresponding to the restriction of minimum resale price in our country. Secondly, taking the case of Vertical restriction of Competition Agreement-"Ruibang v. Johnson" as an example, this paper analyzes the principle and the trial path that the court applies in the trial of whether the limited minimum resale price agreement constitutes a monopoly. Then it analyzes the different views of different scholars on the application of principles. Finally, according to the actual situation of our country, the author puts forward his own viewpoint that the reasonable principle should be applied step by step to limit the minimum resale price to judge its illegality. At the same time, some suggestions on how to apply the principle of reasonableness are put forward, including clear analysis elements, fair distribution of burden of proof, establishment of "safe harbour" system and introduction of expert system, etc.
【学位授予单位】：华东政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.294

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