论公司破产时董事对债权人的责任

发布时间：2018-09-02 09:19

【摘要】：本文以公司濒临破产时事董事对公司债权人的责任为研究对象,从公司治理机制的变迁为切入点,阐述了在公司濒临破产时,股东权益丧失殆尽,董事拥有冒险经营、恶意拖延破产和虚耗公司资产的不当行为以及因此导致的债权人权利损害的事实,得出法律需要对董事施加责任的结论。并通过比较研究的方法分析了不同国家的相关法律制度,最后结合中国立法和司法实践提出完善中国法的建议。全文由引言,正文两部分组成。正文可以分为四个部分:第一部分概述了公司濒临破产时董事对债权人承担责任的原因。具体包括:董事会中心主义、董事在这一时期的不当激励、有限责任的滥用、利益相关者理论以及债权人地位导致的其利益保护的不足。第二部分是本文的重点,比较了德国,英国,美国相关判例法和成文法的规定。德国采用“董事申请破产义务”的模式,英国的成文法采用的是“不当交易”,“欺诈性交易”和“开明的股东价值”等条款,英国的判例法通过董事对公司的信义义务,而要求公司在破产边缘时考虑债权人的利益。美国判例法在否定了董事对债权人直接义务的基础上提出了“债权人派生诉讼”。第二章还对各国董事对债权人的责任的性质、构成要件、追责方式等进行了具体的分析。第三部分从我国的立法现状和司法实践两方面分析了我国在该问题上的不足之处。该问题处于既无法律约束又无法律诱导的局面。并通过案例说明公司濒临破产时董事的冒险经营、不合理地扩大公司债务导致从而使债权人的破产清偿率低的事实。第四部分提出了我国建立董事对债权人的责任制度的观点。
[Abstract]:This paper takes the liability of directors to creditors of companies on the verge of bankruptcy as the research object, from the point of view of the change of corporate governance mechanism, expounds that when the company is on the verge of bankruptcy, the shareholders' rights and interests are lost, and the directors have venture management. The fact that maliciously delaying bankruptcy and misbehavior of wasted assets of the company and the resulting damage to the rights of creditors leads to the conclusion that the law needs to impose liability on the directors. Through comparative study, the author analyzes the relevant legal systems in different countries, and finally puts forward some suggestions on how to perfect Chinese law in combination with Chinese legislation and judicial practice. The full text consists of two parts: introduction and text. The text can be divided into four parts: the first part summarizes the reasons of directors' liability to creditors when the company is on the verge of bankruptcy. It includes the centralism of the board of directors, the improper incentive of directors in this period, the abuse of limited liability, the theory of stakeholders and the insufficient protection of their interests caused by the position of creditors. The second part is the focus of this paper, comparing the relevant case law and statutory law in Germany, Britain and the United States. Germany adopts the model of "director's obligation to file for bankruptcy", British statute law adopts articles such as "improper transaction", "fraudulent transaction" and "enlightened shareholder value". The company is required to consider the interests of creditors at the edge of bankruptcy. American case law puts forward "creditor derivative action" on the basis of negating the direct obligation of directors to creditors. The second chapter also analyzes the nature of directors' liability to creditors, the constitutive elements and the way of liability. The third part analyzes the deficiency of our country from the current situation of legislation and judicial practice. The problem is neither legally bound nor legally induced. The paper also illustrates the fact that the risk management of directors when the company is on the verge of bankruptcy and the unreasonable expansion of the company's debts lead to the low bankruptcy repayment rate of the creditors. The fourth part puts forward the viewpoint of establishing the liability system of directors to creditors in our country.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.92

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