软预算约束视角下破产清算程序之反思及重构
发布时间：2018-11-13 14:01
【摘要】：作为市场机制硬预算约束之法律保障,破产法在我国的司法实践与立法预期存在较大差距,本质原因在于我国破产清算程序存在软预算约束,主要体现为以国有企业破产之优待和劳动债权之优先受偿为代表的制度性软预算约束,以及以行政力量之越位救助和退出机制之监管无效为代表的政策性软预算约束。因其破坏信用经济的良性循环、助长损害信用经济的不良行为、减损信用资本和社会财富,应对破产清算程序的软预算约束进行硬化。可以考虑在营造破产法良好实施氛围的契机下,从内部以信用为标准改造破产法系统,剔除、转化制度性软预算约束,同时从外部杜绝政府失灵触发的政策性软预算约束,并设立破产管理局和破产法院,作为硬化破产清算程序的保障机制。
[Abstract]:As the legal guarantee of the hard budget constraint of the market mechanism, there is a big gap between the judicial practice of the bankruptcy law and the legislative expectation in our country, the essential reason is that the bankruptcy liquidation procedure of our country has the soft budget restriction. It mainly embodies the institutional soft budget constraints represented by the preferential treatment of the bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises and the priority payment of labor claims, and the policy soft budget constraint represented by the ineffective supervision of the offside rescue and withdrawal mechanism of administrative forces. Because it destroys the virtuous circle of credit economy, encourages the bad behavior of damaging credit economy, detracts from credit capital and social wealth, it should harden the soft budget restriction of bankruptcy liquidation procedure. Under the opportunity of creating a good environment for the implementation of bankruptcy law, we can reform the bankruptcy law system from the inside according to the standard of credit, eliminate and transform the institutional soft budget constraints, and at the same time put an end to the policy soft budget constraints triggered by the failure of the government from the outside. And set up bankruptcy administration and bankruptcy court as the safeguard mechanism of hardening bankruptcy liquidation procedure.
【作者单位】： 中国政法大学民商经济法学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(15YJC820078) 国家社会科学基金青年项目(13CFX099) 中国政法大学人文社会科学研究青年项目(15ZFQ82002)
【分类号】：D922.291.92
，
本文编号：2329353
[Abstract]:As the legal guarantee of the hard budget constraint of the market mechanism, there is a big gap between the judicial practice of the bankruptcy law and the legislative expectation in our country, the essential reason is that the bankruptcy liquidation procedure of our country has the soft budget restriction. It mainly embodies the institutional soft budget constraints represented by the preferential treatment of the bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises and the priority payment of labor claims, and the policy soft budget constraint represented by the ineffective supervision of the offside rescue and withdrawal mechanism of administrative forces. Because it destroys the virtuous circle of credit economy, encourages the bad behavior of damaging credit economy, detracts from credit capital and social wealth, it should harden the soft budget restriction of bankruptcy liquidation procedure. Under the opportunity of creating a good environment for the implementation of bankruptcy law, we can reform the bankruptcy law system from the inside according to the standard of credit, eliminate and transform the institutional soft budget constraints, and at the same time put an end to the policy soft budget constraints triggered by the failure of the government from the outside. And set up bankruptcy administration and bankruptcy court as the safeguard mechanism of hardening bankruptcy liquidation procedure.
【作者单位】： 中国政法大学民商经济法学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(15YJC820078) 国家社会科学基金青年项目(13CFX099) 中国政法大学人文社会科学研究青年项目(15ZFQ82002)
【分类号】：D922.291.92
，
本文编号：2329353
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