敌意收购的法律规制研究
发布时间：2018-12-06 18:08
【摘要】：敌意收购是上市公司收购的方式之一,其最大特点就是不需要与目标公司管理层协商即可取得上市公司的控制权。一方面,敌意收购能对公司的管理层产生外部监督的作用,降低股东和董事之间的代理成本,弥补公司治理结构的不足;同时可以淘汰无效率的管理层,实现资源的优化配置,提高整个社会的生产效率。另一方面,敌意收购会对目标公司的股票价格以及证券市场造成很大冲击,常常会损害目标公司股东的利益(特别是中小股东利益)。笔者认为,在对待敌意收购的价值功能上我们应采取折衷说的观点:即不能因为敌意收购会带来公平问题而否定其效率价值,关键在于我们如何对其进行法律制度上的设计,注重效率的同时兼顾公平,使其最大程度地发挥对效率的提升作用,并减少其带来的负面影响。故在此基础上,本文提出了对法律规制的基本原则,即股东平等待遇原则、信息公开原则和中小股东保护原则,并从收购方和目标公司两个方面对我国的敌意收购法律规制提出了相关建议。
[Abstract]:Hostile takeover is one of the ways for listed companies to acquire the control rights of listed companies without consulting with the management of the target companies. On the one hand, hostile takeover can exert external supervision on the management of the company, reduce the agency cost between shareholders and directors, and make up for the deficiency of corporate governance structure. At the same time, the inefficient management can be eliminated, the optimal allocation of resources can be realized, and the production efficiency of the whole society can be improved. On the other hand, hostile takeover will have a great impact on the stock price and stock market of the target company, and will often damage the interests of the shareholders (especially the minority shareholders) of the target company. In my opinion, we should take the compromise view on the value function of hostile takeover: that is, we should not deny the efficiency value of hostile takeover because it will bring fairness, the key lies in how we design its legal system. Pay attention to the efficiency while taking into account the equity, make it to maximize the promotion of efficiency, and reduce its negative impact. On this basis, this paper puts forward the basic principles of legal regulation, that is, the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, the principle of information disclosure and the principle of protection of minority shareholders. Some suggestions on the legal regulation of hostile takeover in China are put forward from two aspects: the acquirer and the target company.
【学位授予单位】：南昌大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.91
[Abstract]:Hostile takeover is one of the ways for listed companies to acquire the control rights of listed companies without consulting with the management of the target companies. On the one hand, hostile takeover can exert external supervision on the management of the company, reduce the agency cost between shareholders and directors, and make up for the deficiency of corporate governance structure. At the same time, the inefficient management can be eliminated, the optimal allocation of resources can be realized, and the production efficiency of the whole society can be improved. On the other hand, hostile takeover will have a great impact on the stock price and stock market of the target company, and will often damage the interests of the shareholders (especially the minority shareholders) of the target company. In my opinion, we should take the compromise view on the value function of hostile takeover: that is, we should not deny the efficiency value of hostile takeover because it will bring fairness, the key lies in how we design its legal system. Pay attention to the efficiency while taking into account the equity, make it to maximize the promotion of efficiency, and reduce its negative impact. On this basis, this paper puts forward the basic principles of legal regulation, that is, the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, the principle of information disclosure and the principle of protection of minority shareholders. Some suggestions on the legal regulation of hostile takeover in China are put forward from two aspects: the acquirer and the target company.
【学位授予单位】：南昌大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.291.91
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9 胡，
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