我国证券监管权力行使问题研究
发布时间：2018-12-27 10:24
【摘要】：金融在现代经济发展过程中已成为经济发展的核心,而证券市场作为现代金融市场的重要组成部分,已成为资本市场发展的核心。经济学家曾经在理论上掀起对市场是否需要进行监管的争论,但随着市场经济的发展,人们发现在市场经济发展过程过程中,会出现因为分配不公、垄断、信息失灵、公共产品性、外部经济性等原因引起的市场失灵,导致社会资源无法得到最优配置。证券市场作为市场的组成部分也存在市场失灵的问题,而导致市场失灵的原因,往往是市场无法靠自身调节解决的问题,因此,引入政府的干预和管理成为必要。我国证券市场由于起步较晚,监管主体的法律定位、职能定位、权力分配都存在一定问题。由于利益集团的寻租行为、监管成本、信息失灵、缺乏激励和约束机制等,导致证券监管效能低下。本文运用经济学理论,对我国证券市场的特殊性及监管权力行使的必要性进行了论述,并就我国政府对证券市场监管权力行使过程中存在的问题和不足进行了理论分析,最后就如何完善证券市场的监督和管理提出了政策建议。初步结论是:我国的证券监管是针对证券市场失灵而对市场进行的一种行政干预,依法实施监管符合市场运行的内在要求,符合市场发展客观规律。证券监管应该是对市场经济的缺陷进行必要的管制,其前提是政府应该充分尊重市场经济的发展规律,科学合理地处理好市场发展与行政监管的关系。一方面中国证监会作为证券市场的主管机构,必须从机构性质、职能定位等方面拥有独立性、中立性和权威性。另一方面,中国证监会要在不损害市场机制的前提下,严格限制自己的权力行使的边界,防止监管过度;证券监管部门应该理顺市场与监管、政府其他部门与监管部门、自律机构与监管机构之间的关系,建立一个具有权威性和独立性的证券监管机构,优化执法机制,建立对证券监管者的激励和约束机制,提升证券监管执法效能,最大程度地为解决证券市场失灵进行弥补和优化,以使社会资源得到最优配置。
[Abstract]:Finance has become the core of economic development in the process of modern economic development, and the securities market, as an important part of modern financial market, has become the core of the development of capital market. Economists once raised a debate about whether the market should be supervised or not, but with the development of the market economy, people found that in the development of market economy, there will be unfair distribution, monopoly, information failure. The market failure caused by public goods and external economy causes social resources to be allocated optimally. As a part of the market, the stock market also has the problem of market failure, and the reason of the market failure is that the market can not be solved by its own adjustment. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce government intervention and management. Due to the late start of the securities market in China, there are some problems in the legal orientation, function orientation and power distribution of the main body of supervision. Because of interest group's rent-seeking behavior, supervision cost, information failure and lack of incentive and restraint mechanism, securities supervision is inefficient. In this paper, the particularity of the securities market and the necessity of exercising the supervisory power are discussed by using the economic theory, and the problems and shortcomings in the process of the government's exercising the supervision power of the securities market are analyzed theoretically. Finally, it puts forward some policy suggestions on how to improve the supervision and management of securities market. The preliminary conclusion is that the securities supervision in our country is an administrative intervention against the failure of the securities market, and the implementation of supervision in accordance with the law accords with the inherent requirements of the market operation and the objective law of market development. Securities supervision should be necessary to regulate the defects of the market economy, and its premise is that the government should fully respect the law of the development of the market economy, and deal with the relationship between the market development and administrative supervision in a scientific and reasonable manner. On the one hand, CSRC, as the competent institution of the securities market, must have independence, neutrality and authority from the aspects of institutional nature and functional orientation. On the other hand, CSRC should strictly limit the boundary of exercising its power under the premise of not harming the market mechanism to prevent excessive supervision. The securities regulatory authorities should straighten out the relationship between the market and supervision, other government departments and regulatory departments, self-regulatory agencies and regulatory bodies, establish an authoritative and independent securities regulatory body, and optimize the enforcement mechanism. In order to optimize the allocation of social resources, we should establish the incentive and restraint mechanism for securities regulators, improve the effectiveness of securities supervision and law enforcement, and make up and optimize the solution to the failure of the securities market to the greatest extent.
【学位授予单位】：中国社会科学院研究生院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.287
[Abstract]:Finance has become the core of economic development in the process of modern economic development, and the securities market, as an important part of modern financial market, has become the core of the development of capital market. Economists once raised a debate about whether the market should be supervised or not, but with the development of the market economy, people found that in the development of market economy, there will be unfair distribution, monopoly, information failure. The market failure caused by public goods and external economy causes social resources to be allocated optimally. As a part of the market, the stock market also has the problem of market failure, and the reason of the market failure is that the market can not be solved by its own adjustment. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce government intervention and management. Due to the late start of the securities market in China, there are some problems in the legal orientation, function orientation and power distribution of the main body of supervision. Because of interest group's rent-seeking behavior, supervision cost, information failure and lack of incentive and restraint mechanism, securities supervision is inefficient. In this paper, the particularity of the securities market and the necessity of exercising the supervisory power are discussed by using the economic theory, and the problems and shortcomings in the process of the government's exercising the supervision power of the securities market are analyzed theoretically. Finally, it puts forward some policy suggestions on how to improve the supervision and management of securities market. The preliminary conclusion is that the securities supervision in our country is an administrative intervention against the failure of the securities market, and the implementation of supervision in accordance with the law accords with the inherent requirements of the market operation and the objective law of market development. Securities supervision should be necessary to regulate the defects of the market economy, and its premise is that the government should fully respect the law of the development of the market economy, and deal with the relationship between the market development and administrative supervision in a scientific and reasonable manner. On the one hand, CSRC, as the competent institution of the securities market, must have independence, neutrality and authority from the aspects of institutional nature and functional orientation. On the other hand, CSRC should strictly limit the boundary of exercising its power under the premise of not harming the market mechanism to prevent excessive supervision. The securities regulatory authorities should straighten out the relationship between the market and supervision, other government departments and regulatory departments, self-regulatory agencies and regulatory bodies, establish an authoritative and independent securities regulatory body, and optimize the enforcement mechanism. In order to optimize the allocation of social resources, we should establish the incentive and restraint mechanism for securities regulators, improve the effectiveness of securities supervision and law enforcement, and make up and optimize the solution to the failure of the securities market to the greatest extent.
【学位授予单位】：中国社会科学院研究生院
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.287
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