合理原则下的单一产品问题——基于中国反垄断法搭售案件的思考
发布时间：2019-03-14 14:08
【摘要】：单一产品分析被认为是判断非法搭售是否成立的前提。中国目前搭售案件分别采用功能标准、需求标准和交易习惯标准,由此引发如何设立最优标准的疑问。单一产品标准理论上争议较大,很难形成广为接受的判断标准。由此,需要从单一产品本身的法律意义出发寻求解决方案。搭售只是反垄断法理论类型化的产物,类型化虽便于分析,但可能造成一些不必要的混淆。由于对搭售的分析逐渐从本身违法向合理原则转变,单一产品判断的重要性降低,并不可避免地和竞争效果的实质判断相结合。因此,在处理单一产品问题时,可以在简单区分搭售品和被搭售品市场的基础上,直接分析行为的竞争效果,避免单一产品判断上的标准冲突。
[Abstract]:Single product analysis is considered to be a prerequisite to determine whether illegal tie-up sales are valid or not. At present, China adopts functional standard, demand standard and trading habit standard respectively, which raises the question of how to set the optimal standard. Single product standard is controversial in theory, and it is difficult to form a widely accepted standard of judgment. Therefore, it is necessary to seek solutions from the legal meaning of a single product itself. Tie-in sale is only the product of antitrust law theory, though it is easy to analyze, it may cause some unnecessary confusion. As the analysis of tie-in gradually changes from illegal to reasonable principle, the importance of single product judgment is reduced, and it is inevitable to combine it with the essential judgment of competition effect. Therefore, when dealing with the problem of single product, we can analyze the competitive effect of behavior directly on the basis of simply distinguishing the market of goods sold and sold, and avoid the standard conflict in the judgment of single product.
【作者单位】： 上海交通大学凯原法学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金青年项目“零售垄断的法律规制研究”(项目编号:11CFX039)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D922.294
本文编号：2440050
[Abstract]:Single product analysis is considered to be a prerequisite to determine whether illegal tie-up sales are valid or not. At present, China adopts functional standard, demand standard and trading habit standard respectively, which raises the question of how to set the optimal standard. Single product standard is controversial in theory, and it is difficult to form a widely accepted standard of judgment. Therefore, it is necessary to seek solutions from the legal meaning of a single product itself. Tie-in sale is only the product of antitrust law theory, though it is easy to analyze, it may cause some unnecessary confusion. As the analysis of tie-in gradually changes from illegal to reasonable principle, the importance of single product judgment is reduced, and it is inevitable to combine it with the essential judgment of competition effect. Therefore, when dealing with the problem of single product, we can analyze the competitive effect of behavior directly on the basis of simply distinguishing the market of goods sold and sold, and avoid the standard conflict in the judgment of single product.
【作者单位】： 上海交通大学凯原法学院;
【基金】：国家社科基金青年项目“零售垄断的法律规制研究”(项目编号:11CFX039)的阶段性成果
【分类号】：D922.294
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