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我国双层股权结构法律问题研究

发布时间:2019-05-12 03:16
【摘要】:我国传统公司法为保证商事公平,要求股权设立严格遵守同股同权的核心原则。在市场经济环境下,随着我国企业迅速壮大,一股一权渐渐不能满足部分企业在发展中对于资金和控制权的要求。对于多数公司而言,发行股份意味着控制权的稀释,可能恶性影响公司的经营管理。而后国内公司出现应用合伙人制度的现实情况,这一制度变相实现将公司股权结构变更为双层股权,使得双层股权结构逐渐在国内引起了广泛关注。虽然双层股权结构与传统公司法原则有所冲突,但其既能够保证公司管理层掌握公司控制权又可以吸引外部资金以发展公司规模,也符合多数投资者的仅获取经济性利益而回避决策风险的需求,达到公司与投资者的双赢状态。就理论体系而言,新制度的出现并非对旧有体系的颠覆与废弃,而是对理论体系的突破,能够推动其创新与发展,使其不落后于现实需求。虽然我国并未承认股份有限公司适用双层股权结构的合法性,但无论是理论创新或是市场经济发展需要,引入双层股权结构具有现实与理论意义。本文从这一制度对于新兴行业发展客观需求、国有企业改革途径、鼓励企业在国内上市、增强企业对外防御力等角度对制度引入合理性进行分析。建议我国通过修改立法确认公司自主选择适用双层股权结构的合法性。对这一制度进行引进,具体包括对适用主体范围、设立时间、持股主体、表决机制、赎回、流通与转化机制等做出规定。通过私权与公权的双重制约加以规制。私权制约可以从通过公司章程规定不当利益追回条款、限制或剥夺股东投票资格、通过合约确立信义义务;公权制约可以通过设立禁止性规定、规范员工持股资金来源、细节化信息披露制度。同时提供司法救济途径,包括允许股东集体诉讼以及引入司法监督程序。通过制度设计以及可能产生的冲突规制,对我国双层股权制度引入进行设计与完善。
[Abstract]:In order to ensure commercial fairness, the traditional company law of our country requires the establishment of equity to strictly abide by the core principle of the same right. In the environment of market economy, with the rapid growth of Chinese enterprises, one share and one right can not meet the requirements of capital and control in the development of some enterprises. For most companies, the issuance of shares means dilution of control, which may adversely affect the operation and management of the company. Then there is the reality of the application of partner system in domestic companies, which changes the ownership structure of the company into double-tier equity in disguised form, which makes the double-layer ownership structure gradually attract extensive attention in China. Although the two-tier ownership structure conflicts with the traditional principles of company law, it can not only ensure that the management of the company holds the control of the company, but also attract external funds to develop the size of the company. It also meets the needs of most investors to obtain only economic benefits and avoid decision-making risks, so as to achieve a win-win situation between the company and the investors. As far as the theoretical system is concerned, the emergence of the new system is not the subversion and abandonment of the old system, but the breakthrough of the theoretical system, which can promote its innovation and development so that it does not lag behind the actual needs. Although our country does not recognize the legitimacy of the double-layer ownership structure applied by the joint stock limited company, it is of practical and theoretical significance to introduce the double-layer ownership structure, whether it is theoretical innovation or the needs of the development of the market economy. This paper analyzes the rationality of introducing the system from the point of view of the objective demand of this system for the development of emerging industries, the way of reform of state-owned enterprises, the encouragement of enterprises to list at home, and the enhancement of the external defense of enterprises. It is suggested that our country should amend the legislation to confirm the legitimacy of the company's independent choice of double-layer ownership structure. The introduction of this system includes the scope of the applicable subject, the establishment time, the ownership of shares, the voting mechanism, redemption, circulation and transformation mechanism and so on. Through the dual restriction of private rights and public rights to regulate. Private right restriction can limit or deprive shareholders of voting qualification by prescribing improper benefit recovery clause through articles of association, and establish fiduciary obligation through contract. Through the establishment of prohibitive provisions, the source of funds for employee shareholding can be standardized and the information disclosure system can be detailed through the restriction of public power. At the same time, it provides judicial remedies, including allowing shareholders to class action and introducing judicial supervision procedures. Through the system design and the possible conflict regulation, this paper designs and perfects the introduction of the double-layer equity system in our country.
【学位授予单位】:辽宁大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:D922.291.91

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