公司收购中毒丸计划法律制度研究

发布时间：2019-05-17 16:25

【摘要】：随着我国资本市场的不断成熟,多数企业已经将公司收购作为扩张经营范围、实现投资收益的主要方式,这也推动了公司收购制度的迅速发展。在日益活跃的收购活动中,目标公司更易面临敌意收购的威胁,为促进公司真正价值的体现,应允许股东或董事会采行反收购措施。毒丸计划是成熟资本市场中运用最为有效的反收购措施之一,因此本文选取毒丸计划作为研究对象。然而,毒丸计划在实践运用中是把“双刃剑”,这在美国收购市场中已经得以显现。因此本文拟解决的主要问题为,通过对毒丸计划的法经济学分析,探讨毒丸计划的合理性以及在我国收购市场实施的可行性,从而构建适宜我国资本市场的毒丸计划法律制度。本文分为六个部分:第一部分是对公司收购法律制度的概述。首先,结合公司并购等概念,明确公司收购行为的定义,并介绍其法律特征与法定形式。其次,厘定公司反收购行为的概念,并对其具体模式予以列举。最后,分析我国公司收购市场活跃的原因,明确敌意收购与反收购的发展趋势,并以毒丸计划为例,说明反收购措施的法律制度缺失。第二部分是对毒丸计划制度起源与基本概念的梳理与介绍。首先概述了毒丸计划的制度起源,并以毒丸计划的演变过程进行分类。其次,依据前文毒丸计划的发展和分类,对毒丸计划的概念进行界定,归纳出毒丸计划制度的法律特征。最后,分析毒丸计划的法律构造,明确董事会、股东和股东大会的权利、义务及责任。第三部分是对美国特拉华州法律中主要毒丸计划类型的典型案例分析。首先,介绍可转换优先股毒丸计划,依据National Education Corporation v.BellHowell Co.一案,对此类毒丸计划的行为模式与合法性进行研究。其次,对认股权毒丸计划进行介绍,阐述该类型毒丸计划具体包括的对外认股毒丸计划、对内认股毒丸计划以及债性毒丸计划,并针对上述三种毒丸计划,分析Moran v.Household International,Inc.一案、Desert Partners,L.P.v.USG Corp.一案和Revlon,Inc.v.MacAndrewsForbes Holdings,Inc.一案,探究其行为模式、正当性理由以及法律依据。再次,对侧重维护董事会自身利益的变种毒丸计划予以介绍,具体包括永久性毒丸计划和长效性毒丸计划,以Carmody v.Toll Brothers,Inc.和Quickturn Design System,Inc.v.Mentor Graphics Co.两个案件作为研究内容,论证其合法性。最后,结合上述典型案例,归纳特拉华州法院对毒丸计划合法性的司法审查标准。第四部分是对毒丸计划合理性的法经济学分析。首先是从代理成本角度对毒丸计划进行分析。明确毒丸计划作为公司收购防御措施涉及公司治理问题,以委托代理理论为基础,探讨公司董事会使用毒丸计划可能造成的事前代理成本与事后代理成本。通过分析毒丸计划的实证研究数据,考察其是增加了股东与董事之间的代理成本,还是保护了股东利益,以论证毒丸计划的价值效应。其次是从利益衡量的角度对毒丸计划进行考量。提出委托代理理论的局限,结合利益相关者理论,探讨董事会所设毒丸计划,是维护公司全体利益相关者的权益、保护中小股东的权益、最大化公司价值,还是沦为董事会谋求私人利益的工具,从而论证毒丸计划是否具有合理性的。第五部分是对我国毒丸计划法律制度的可行性分析,并尝试构建具体法律制度。首先,介绍我国收购市场的法律框架和关于公司收购的国家政策,结合收购市场环境与反收购行为法律规制的现状,明确毒丸计划应用的可能性和必要性。其次,是对毒丸计划具体制度内容的构建。通过比较股东大会决策模式与董事会决策模式的优劣,建议将毒丸计划的决策权授予董事会。同时,明确毒丸计划决策权应受到合理的限制,建议将毒丸计划的否决权与监督权赋予股东大会,以完善对决策权的监管。最后,是对毒丸计划保障措施的构建。建议设立行政救济制度与诉讼救济制度,以填补因实施毒丸计划而可能给股东或公司造成的损害。最后是结语,对本文主要观点做了总结。
[Abstract]:With the development of our country's capital market, most enterprises have taken the acquisition of the company as the main way of expanding the business scope and realizing the investment income, which has also contributed to the rapid development of the company's acquisition system. In an increasingly active acquisition activity, the target company is more likely to face the threat of a hostile acquisition and, in order to promote the true value of the company, the shareholders or the board of directors should be allowed to adopt anti-takeover measures. The poison pill plan is one of the most effective anti-takeover measures in the mature capital market, so this paper chooses the poison pill plan as the research object. However, that poison pill plan is to put the "double-edged sword" in practice, which has been shown in the U. S. acquisition market. Therefore, the main problem to be solved in this paper is to study the rationality of the drug-pill plan and the feasibility of the implementation of the market in our country through the analysis of the method and economics of the drug-pill plan, so as to build the legal system of the drug-pill plan suitable for the capital market of our country. This paper is divided into six parts: the first part is an overview of the company's acquisition of the legal system. First, the definition of the company's acquisition behavior is defined by combining the concept of merger and acquisition of the company, and the legal characteristic and the legal form are introduced. Secondly, the concept of the company's anti-takeover is determined and its specific model is listed. Finally, the reason why our company's acquisition of the market is active is analyzed, the development trend of the hostile takeover and the anti-takeover is clear, and the legal system of the anti-takeover measures is missing by taking the poison pill plan as an example. The second part is the combing and introduction of the origin and basic concept of the drug-pill planning system. First, the origin of the system of the poison pill plan is summarized, and the evolution process of the poison pill plan is classified. Secondly, according to the development and classification of the poison pill plan, the concept of the poison pill plan is defined, and the legal character of the drug-pill planning system is summarized. Finally, the legal structure of the poison pill plan is analyzed, and the rights, obligations and responsibilities of the board of directors, the shareholders and the general meeting of shareholders are defined. The third part is a typical case study of the type of main drug pill plan in the Delaware law. First of all, the paper introduces the plan of convertible-stock drug-pill, which is based on the case of National Education Corporation v. BellHowell Co., and conducts a study on the behavior pattern and the legality of such a drug-pill plan. Secondly, an introduction to the plan for the identification of the drug-based drug-pill is to set out the plan of the drug-based drug-drug pill, the plan for the internal identification of the poison pill and the plan of the debt-based drug pill, and to analyze the case of Moran v. Houshedold International, Inc., Desert Partners, L.P. v. USG Corp. and Revlon for the above-mentioned three drug-drug-pill schemes. Inc.v. MacAndrewsForbes Holdings, Inc., explores its mode of conduct, the justification for justification and the legal basis. Once again, a description of a variety of drug pill plans focusing on the maintenance of the self-interest of the board of directors, including the permanent poison pill plan and the long-acting poison pill plan, is based on Carmoy v. Toll Brothers, Inc. and Quickreturn Design System, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Co. Finally, in combination with the above-mentioned typical case, the judicial review criteria for the legality of the drug pill plan of the State of Delaware are summarized. The fourth part is the legal and economic analysis of the rationality of the drug-pill plan. First, the poison pill plan is analyzed from the agent cost angle. The clear drug pill plan as the company's acquisition and defense measures involves the company's governance, and based on the commission agent theory, it probes into the prior agency cost and the post-agent cost that the company's board of directors may have caused by using the poison pill plan. By analyzing the empirical research data of the drug-pill plan, it is found that the agent cost between the shareholders and the directors is increased, or the interests of the shareholders are protected, so as to demonstrate the value effect of the drug-pill plan. The second is to consider the drug-pill plan from the angle of interest measurement. In order to protect the rights and interests of all the stakeholders, to protect the rights and interests of the small and medium-sized shareholders, to maximize the value of the company, or to be a tool for the board of directors to seek private interests, So as to prove whether the poison pill plan is reasonable or not. The fifth part is the feasibility analysis of the legal system of the drug-pill plan in our country, and tries to build a specific legal system. First, the article introduces the legal framework of the acquisition market and the state policy on the acquisition of the company, and combines the present situation of the legal regulation of the market environment and the anti-takeover act, and the possibility and necessity of the application of the drug pill plan. Second, it is the construction of the specific system of the poison pill plan. By comparing the decision-making mode of the general meeting with the decision-making mode of the board of directors, it is suggested to grant the decision-making power of the poison pill plan to the board of directors. At the same time, it is suggested that the decision-making power of the poison pill plan should be subject to reasonable limitation, and it is suggested that the veto power and the right of supervision be given to the shareholders' general meeting to improve the supervision of decision-making power. In the end, it is the construction of the safeguard measure of the poison pill. It is proposed to set up an administrative relief system and a remedy system to fill the damage that may be caused to shareholders or companies as a result of the implementation of the drug pill plan. In that end, the conclusion is the conclusion of the main point of view of this article.
【学位授予单位】：浙江财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：D922.291.91

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