工程招投标中违规行为分析与监督机制完善

发布时间：2019-07-04 19:43

【摘要】：自从20世纪80年代我国引入招标制度以来,在建筑领域内这种制度得到了广泛的运用。这种制度的广泛实行,对推动我国建筑领域的发展有着非常重要的意义,但是不可否认的是,随着时代的发展,这种制度呈现出一定的弊端,导致工程中的违规行为也是层出不穷,比如投标人围标串标,招标人规避招标,监管部门、行政主管部门审查不力,评标专家接受他人贿赂等违规行为。这些违规行为的出现扰乱了我国的建筑市场,给建筑市场的稳定发展带来了极其不利的影响。针对这些问题,笔者从工程中的违规行为出发,首先分析这些违规行为的表现形式,分析了这种违规行为发生所带来的危害性,然后运用博弈理论的相关原理,从投标人的串标违规行为,招标人的串标违规行为,投标人与监督人的串标行为和案例出发,在归纳总结后认为对经济利益的追逐,违法成本不高,相关法律不完善及监督机制的不完善是违规行为出现的根本原因,最后给出了相应的解决措施。同时在委托代理理论的体系下,对不同的参与主体之间的委托代理关系进行分析,并针对招标代理人、评标人及招标人分别进行激励机制、约束机制及监督机制设计,最后汇总出监督机制存在的不足之处,根据这些不足之处,提出完善监督机制的具体策略,达到减少违规行为的目的。当然本论文也存在着诸多的不足之处:①本论文虽然对很多种违规行为进行了分析,但是没有针对一些具体的环节进行更加深入的研究,是的某些违规行为在描述的过程中针对性不强②在运用博弈论理论时也没有深入的研究,同时在运用博弈论的相关原理时只是针对串标这一种违规行为进行了描述,没有多种违规行为进行研究,使得到的结论针对性不强;③在运用委托代理理论时没有从经济学的角度给出机制设计的数学模型,这也是研究过程中存在的不足;④对于监督机制的研究没有借鉴国外关于监督机制的研究。
[Abstract]:Since the introduction of bidding system in China in 1980 s, this system has been widely used in the field of architecture. The extensive implementation of this system is of great significance to promote the development of the construction field in our country, but it is undeniable that with the development of the times, this system presents certain malpractices, resulting in endless violations in the project, such as bidders encircling bids, inviting bidders to avoid bidding, supervision departments, administrative departments, weak examination of bid evaluation experts, accepting bribes from others, and so on. The appearance of these violations disrupts the construction market of our country and brings extremely adverse influence to the stable development of the construction market. In view of these problems, the author starts from the violations in the project, first analyzes the manifestation of these violations, analyzes the harmfulness caused by the occurrence of these violations, and then uses the relevant principles of game theory, starting from the illegal behavior of bidders, the illegal behavior of bidders and supervisors, the behavior and cases of bidders and supervisors, and then thinks that the pursuit of economic interests is based on the relevant principles of game theory. The low cost of violations, the imperfection of relevant laws and the imperfection of supervision mechanism are the root causes of violations. Finally, the corresponding solutions are given. At the same time, under the system of principal-agent theory, the principal-agent relationship between different participants is analyzed, and the incentive mechanism, restraint mechanism and supervision mechanism are designed for bidding agent, bid evaluator and tenderer respectively. Finally, the shortcomings of supervision mechanism are summarized. According to these shortcomings, the specific strategies to improve the supervision mechanism are put forward to achieve the purpose of reducing violations. Of course, there are many shortcomings in this paper: 1 although this paper analyzes many kinds of violations, but does not carry on the more in-depth research to some specific links, is that some violations are not targeted in the process of description. 2 in the use of game theory, there is no in-depth research, at the same time, when using the relevant principles of game theory, we only describe the illegal behavior of string marking. There are no many kinds of violations to be studied, so that the conclusions are not targeted; (3) when using principal-agent theory, the mathematical model of mechanism design is not given from the point of view of economics, which is also the deficiency of the research process. (4) the research of supervision mechanism does not draw lessons from the foreign research on supervision mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：武汉工程大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：TU723.2;D922.297

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