博弈论视角下民事再审监督机制的程序优化

发布时间：2019-03-24 20:22

【摘要】：2012年《民事诉讼法》修订之后,再审制度实际运行中检察监督权的虚化与失灵困境日益凸显。申请监督人、检察权主体与审判权主体之间在再审中形成结构性互动需要坚实的信息基础。监督者的信息劣势导致以寻租型和机会型监督申请驱逐实质型监督申请为表征的逆向选择态势,而由逆淘汰造就的监督虚化易催生前置审查者与后续实体审理者的道德风险,最终使负担甄别与纠错功能的再审程序整体上沦于空转。民事再审是正统民事程序与涉法涉诉信访交织的接口部位,再审程序优化是实现涉法涉诉信访改革诉访分离、导访入诉等关键目标的重要前提。为此,必须着力提升监督者的信息能力,并且应该尽快选择能够强化激励的程序路径。
[Abstract]:After the revision of the Civil procedure Law in 2012, the falsification and failure of procuratorial supervision power in the actual operation of the retrial system is becoming more and more prominent. The application supervisor, the procuratorial power subject and the judicial power subject need a solid information foundation to form the structural interaction in the retrial. The information inferiority of supervisors leads to the adverse selection situation characterized by rent-seeking and opportunistic supervisory applications expelling substantive supervisory applications, while the false supervision created by reverse elimination tends to lead to moral hazard of pre-reviewers and subsequent physical reviewers, and it is easy to create moral hazard for pre-reviewers and subsequent physical reviewers, which are characterized by rent-seeking and opportunistic supervisory applications. Finally, the burden screening and error correction function of the retrial procedure on the whole reduced to idle. Civil retrial is the interface between orthodox civil procedure and law-related complaint, and the optimization of retrial procedure is an important prerequisite to realize the separation of appeal and petition in the reform of law-related complaint and access to prosecution. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the supervisor's information ability, and should choose the procedure path which can strengthen the incentive as soon as possible.
【作者单位】：西南财经大学法学院;温州市人民检察院;
【基金】：西南财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(项目编号:JBK1407003) 浙江省人民检察院专题调研重点课题“民间金融犯罪与检察监督工作”(课题编号:SY2013A13)与“虚假诉讼检察调研”(课题编号:SYDY201442)资助
【分类号】：D925.18

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