执法过程中陷阱取证的异化问题研究——社科法学视角的再思考

发布时间：2018-02-12 14:28

本文关键词： 信息成本执法机会提供型陷阱取证犯意诱惑型陷阱取证　出处：《法学》2015年07期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：获取动态违法信息的高昂信息成本是陷阱取证(机会提供型)在执法过程中存在的正当性基础。有奖举报制度激励了职业举报团体对违法信息的规模化经营,并进而诱发陷阱取证从机会提供型向犯意诱惑型的异化。这种异化本可以通过执法者的信息过滤机制予以遏止,可是地方财政对罚没收入的渴求、执法机关内部绩效考核的压力以及权利救济途径偏低的成功率等制度环境因素不断削弱信息过滤机制的功能,甚至促成了执法者与职业举报团体的合谋,并最终导致犯意诱惑型陷阱取证的泛滥。可以通过对陷阱取证的正名、重塑职业举报团体的合法身份、夯实违法信息过滤机制等制度改革措施有效防止陷阱取证由机会提供型向犯意诱惑型的异化,以挽救机会提供型陷阱取证。
[Abstract]:The high information cost of obtaining dynamic illegal information is the legitimate foundation of trap evidence (opportunity providing type) in the course of law enforcement. The reward reporting system encourages professional reporting organizations to operate illegal information on a large scale. And then it induces the alienation of trap evidence from opportunity providing type to criminal intent temptation type. This alienation can be stopped by the law enforcement information filtering mechanism, but the local finance's thirst for penalty income, The pressure of internal performance appraisal of law enforcement agencies and the low success rate of the right relief channels have continuously weakened the function of information filtering mechanism, and even contributed to the collusion between law enforcers and professional reporting organizations. And ultimately lead to the proliferation of entrapment trap forensics. We can reconstruct the legal identity of professional reporting groups by taking evidence of traps. The system reform measures such as tamping the mechanism of illegal information filtering can effectively prevent the alienation of trap evidence from opportunity providing type to criminal intention temptation type in order to save opportunity providing type trap evidence collection.
【作者单位】：同济大学法学院;
【分类号】：D922.1

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