委托代理理论视角下我国食品安全监管主体制度研究

发布时间：2018-06-29 01:44

本文选题：食品安全 + 监管主体制度　；参考：《西南政法大学》2015年硕士论文

【摘要】：从制度设计来看,我国食品安全监管主体制度本质上是对公共利益规制理论的阐释和捍卫。公共利益规制理论以政府良善、万能为其主体预设,体现在制度设计上,便是对执法者的激励不足和监督乏力,我国食品安全监管执法不力的现状便是最好的诠释。从经济学的视角看,我国食品安全监管机构不过是全体社会公众的代理人,他们与作为委托人之间的社会公众存在目标函数的差异。如果不从制度层面解决好参与约束和激励相容两个根本性问题,就无法从根本上减少或杜绝我国食品安全监管部门的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”等败德行为。本文在深入分析我国食品安全监管执法不力的理论与制度根源的基础上,针对我国食品安全监管主体激励不足与监督乏力的现状,建议以委托理论取代公共利益规制理论,将激励与约束作为我国食品安全监管主体制度设计的重点,以此防范我国食品安全监管主体的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”等败德行为。本文除引言外,共分为五个部分。引言旨在阐明本文的选题背景、研究综述、研究目的与研究意义。第一部分,我国食品安全监管执法的现状考察。本部分以大量的事实说明我国食品安全监管执法不力现象的存在,从而为后文的分析提供了实践样本。第二部分,我国食品安全监管主体制度的理论基础及其检讨。我国食品安全监管主体制度是对公共利益规制理论的阐释和捍卫。这一理论关于执法主体“良善、万能”的人性预设,忽略了执法部门的“经济人”特性,导致我国食品安全监管主体制度设计中激励与约束的双重软化,由此导致我国食品安全监管实践中执法不力现象频频出现。第三部分,我国食品安全监管主体制度理论基础的应然选择。社会公众与食品安全监管主体之间的关系可以拟制为经济学上的委托代理关系。这一拟制的优点在于,它不仅承认食品安全监管主体的经济人特性,而且承认社会公众与食品安全监管主体之间存在目标函数的差异,从而将激励与约束作为食品安全监管主体制度设计的重点,以防范因委托人虚位、代理人多元以及信息不对称等原因导致的代理人的“逆向选择”与“道德风险”。职是之故,委托代理理论应作为我国食品安全监管主体制度理论基础的应然选择。第四部分,解决食品安全监管执法委托代理人问题的域外经验。加拿大、美国、英国等国通过建立信息交流机制、整合职能部门、提高执法人员收入水平等制度设计解决了信息不对称、代理人激励不足等问题,为我国食品安全监管主体制度的完善提供了可资参考与借鉴的经验。第五部分,委托代理理论视角下我国食品安全监管主体制度的完善。针对委托人虚位、代理人多元等问题,本文提出了引入公益诉讼、整合职能部门等措施,对我国食品安全监管主体制度予以完善,以最大限度减少我国食品安全监管执法不力或怠于执法的问题。
[Abstract]:From the point of view of the system design, the main system of food safety supervision in China is essentially the interpretation and defense of the theory of public interest regulation. The theory of public interest regulation is based on the good of the government, and the omnipotence is the main subject. It is reflected in the system design, which is the lack of incentive and supervision of the law enforcement and the poor supervision of the law enforcement of food safety in our country. From an economic perspective, China's food safety regulators are only agents of the public, and they differ from the social public being the objective function between the clients. If the two fundamental problems are not solved from the institutional level, they can not be fundamentally reduced. On the basis of the deep analysis of the theoretical and institutional roots of our country's food safety supervision and law enforcement, this paper proposes to replace the public with the principle of entrustment theory, on the basis of the in-depth analysis of the theoretical and institutional roots of the poor food safety supervision and law enforcement in our country. The theory of common interest regulation takes incentive and constraint as the focus of the main system of food safety supervision in China, so as to prevent the "adverse selection" and "moral hazard" of the subject of food safety supervision in our country. This article is divided into five parts except the introduction. The introduction aims at clarifying the background of the topic, the research review and the research. The first part, the present situation of food safety supervision and law enforcement in China. This part shows the existence of the poor law enforcement of food safety supervision in our country, and provides practical samples for the analysis of the latter. The second part, the theoretical basis and review of the subject system of food safety supervision in China. The subject system of product safety supervision is the interpretation and defense of the theory of public interest regulation. The human nature presupposition of "good and universal" on the subject of law enforcement ignores the characteristics of the "economic man" in the law enforcement department, which leads to the double softening of incentive and restraint in the design of the main system of food safety supervision in China, resulting in the food safety of our country. In the third part, the relationship between the social public and the subject of food safety supervision can be proposed as an economic principal-agent relationship. The advantage of this system is that it not only recognizes the subject of food safety supervision. It also recognizes the difference between the social public and the subject of food safety supervision, which makes the incentive and constraint as the focus of the design of the subject system of food safety supervision, in order to prevent the "reverse choice" and "morality" of the agent caused by the false position of the principal, the pluralism of the agent and the asymmetric information. The fourth part is the extraterritorial experience of solving the problem of entrusting the agent of the law enforcement of food safety supervision. Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries have established the information exchange mechanism to integrate the functional departments and improve the income of the law enforcement personnel. The system design of level and so on solves the problems of information asymmetry, insufficient incentive of agent and so on. It provides reference and reference experience for the improvement of the main system of food safety supervision in China. The fifth part, the complete good of the main system of food safety supervision in China under the perspective of principal-agent theory. This paper puts forward some measures, such as the introduction of public interest litigation, and the integration of functional departments, to improve the main system of food safety supervision in China, so as to minimize the problems of food safety supervision and enforcement of law enforcement in our country.
【学位授予单位】：西南政法大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2015
【分类号】：D922.16

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