信息不对称情况下公益创投的道德风险
发布时间：2018-07-25 11:53
【摘要】：本文在阐述公益创投兴起的背景、内涵及在国内的实践基础上,基于舞弊三角理论,以无锡市公益创投为分析对象,通过理顺公益创投运作各主体间的关系,具体分析社会组织在创投项目申报及实施过程中的隐蔽性行为。分析结果表明:社会组织在公益创投各个阶段都存在舞弊的压力、机会和借口,形成不同程度的道德风险,但执行报告和内评估等问责工具的有效性并不高。失真的信息直接影响第三方承办组织的协调、督导及评估职能,最终使公益创投的目标无法实现。最后,基于分析结果,本文以道德风险的"机会"要素作为突破点,从社会组织及创投项目、创投项目综合效应评价体系、专家工作等多方面提出政策建议。
[Abstract]:On the basis of expounding the background, connotation and practice of public venture capital in China, based on the theory of fraud triangle, this paper takes Wuxi public interest venture capital as the object of analysis, and straightens out the relationship between the main bodies of public interest venture capital operation. This paper analyzes the hidden behavior of social organizations in the process of application and implementation of venture capital projects. The results show that social organizations have the pressure of fraud opportunities and excuses to form different levels of moral hazard in all stages of public venture capital but the effectiveness of accountability tools such as executive report and internal evaluation is not high. The distorted information directly affects the coordination, supervision and evaluation functions of the third party organization, and ultimately makes the goal of public interest venture capital impossible to achieve. Finally, based on the analysis results, this paper takes the "opportunity" element of moral hazard as the breakthrough point, and puts forward policy suggestions from social organization and venture capital project, evaluation system of comprehensive effect of venture capital project, expert work and so on.
【作者单位】： 江南大学商学院;
【基金】：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金指导项目“长三角民营企业伦理建设和社会责任意识教育”(项目编号:2013SJD630077) 江南大学自主科研项目“新型政企关系、新兴产业培育与经济转型研究”(项目编号:Z20141080033)
【分类号】：D922.182.3
本文编号：2143741
[Abstract]:On the basis of expounding the background, connotation and practice of public venture capital in China, based on the theory of fraud triangle, this paper takes Wuxi public interest venture capital as the object of analysis, and straightens out the relationship between the main bodies of public interest venture capital operation. This paper analyzes the hidden behavior of social organizations in the process of application and implementation of venture capital projects. The results show that social organizations have the pressure of fraud opportunities and excuses to form different levels of moral hazard in all stages of public venture capital but the effectiveness of accountability tools such as executive report and internal evaluation is not high. The distorted information directly affects the coordination, supervision and evaluation functions of the third party organization, and ultimately makes the goal of public interest venture capital impossible to achieve. Finally, based on the analysis results, this paper takes the "opportunity" element of moral hazard as the breakthrough point, and puts forward policy suggestions from social organization and venture capital project, evaluation system of comprehensive effect of venture capital project, expert work and so on.
【作者单位】： 江南大学商学院;
【基金】：江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金指导项目“长三角民营企业伦理建设和社会责任意识教育”(项目编号:2013SJD630077) 江南大学自主科研项目“新型政企关系、新兴产业培育与经济转型研究”(项目编号:Z20141080033)
【分类号】：D922.182.3
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