行政执法中的部门博弈:一项类型学分析

发布时间：2018-11-03 18:43

【摘要】：治理体系碎片化导致行政执法过程中部门博弈常态化。基于庇护性和外部性两个因素,横向政府部门博弈可简化为四种类型:弱正式博弈、强正式博弈、非正式社会关系博弈和退出博弈。在无庇护性和负外部性的博弈情形下,主要执法部门选择弱正式博弈,配合执法部门无回应,执法中止;在无庇护性和正外部性的博弈情形下,主要执法部门选择强正式博弈,配合执法部门被迫回应,出现合作执法的结果;在正庇护性和正外部性的博弈情形下,主要执法部门选择非正式社会关系博弈,配合执法部门主动回应,出现合作执法的结果;在负庇护性和负外部性的博弈情形下,主要执法部门被迫退出博弈,配合执法部门无回应,执法中止。行政执法过程中的部门博弈是正式政治和非正式政治并行的过程。
[Abstract]:The fragmentation of governance system leads to the regularization of department game in the process of administrative law enforcement. Based on the two factors of asylum and externality, the horizontal government game can be simplified into four types: weak formal game, strong formal game, informal social relationship game and exit game. In the case of no asylum and negative externality, the main law enforcement departments choose weak formal game, cooperate with the law enforcement departments to no response, the law enforcement is suspended; In the case of non-sheltered and positive externality, the main law enforcement departments choose a strong formal game, cooperate with the law enforcement departments forced to respond, resulting in the result of cooperative law enforcement; Under the situation of positive asylum and positive externality, the main law enforcement departments choose informal social relations game, cooperate with the law enforcement departments to respond actively, the result of cooperation law enforcement appears; In the case of negative asylum and negative externality, the main law enforcement departments are forced to withdraw from the game and cooperate with the law enforcement departments to have no response, so the law enforcement is suspended. The department game in the process of administrative law enforcement is a parallel process of formal politics and informal politics.
【作者单位】：中山大学中国公共管理研究中心;中山大学政治与公共事务管理学院;
【基金】：国家社会科学基金青年项目“我国城市户籍制度改革的不同路径比较分析研究”(11CZZ040);国家社会科学基金重大项目“扩大公民有序政治参与:战略、路径与对策研究”(12&ZD040)的研究成果
【分类号】：D912.1;D035

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