发展战略，产权结构和长期经济增长

发布时间：2018-06-01 09:50

本文选题：发展战略 + 产权结构　；参考：《西北大学》2013年博士论文

【摘要】：本文致力于为中国近代以来的长期经济增长轨迹建立一个逻辑自洽的理论分析框架。我们认为：由于忽略了经济和制度环境的不断动态演变,使得既有理论在解释近代以来的长期经济增长轨迹存在着局限性,并在回答下述问题方面显得力不从心：近代经济增长停滞的原因是什么?如果国有企业的效率是低效的,那么近代以来的工业化任务为什么是由国有企业,而不是民营企业来完成(赶超战略的合理性)?既然赶超战略是合理的,那又是什么变化导致了赶超战略的不可持续性和进一步的改革,即：发展战略转变的内生机制? 为了回答上述问题,本文首先从微观和宏观两个视角证明了国有企业的动态效率,并进一步从发展战略、产权结构和最优政府行为三个方面对近代以来的长期经济增长轨迹进行了解读。本文发现： (1)在改制后,国有企业的绩效已经有了大幅度的提高,且与非国有企业绩效的差异已经不再明显。除此之外,我们还探讨了市场化水平和不同所有制企业绩效进行了探讨。我们认为,当市场化水平较低时,其将导致不同所有制企业生产率差异的扩大；反之,其会导致不同所有制企业生产率差异的缩小。 (2)国有企业的低效率需要以市场的高效率为前提。在信息不完全的前提下,本文从“生产风险”和“交易风险”两个方面对Yang and Ng(1995)的企业交易效率演进模型进行了扩展,并证明出国有企业低效率的临界交易效率条件：当交易效率较低时,生产风险成本较高,那么国有企业的产权安排将因为有利于节约生产风险成本而促进经济增长；反之,交易风险成本较高,于是民营企业将因为有利于节约交易风险成本而促进经济增长。 (3)鉴于现实经济中广泛存在的金融约束和所有制歧视,本文重新从“生产风险”和“交易风险”两个方面对Yang(1999)进行了扩展。我们认为,金融深化和产权改革之所以能促进经济增长,其得益于不断推进的市场化改革和日益完善的资源配给制度。当市场缺失或失灵,生产风险成为效率损失的主要来源时,金融抑制和传统产权结构仍然有助于弥补私人投资不足,并实现次优的经济增长。 (4)近代以来的长期经济增长轨迹是一个完整的不可分割的整体。基于上述认识,本文利用“外部性”对国有企业的“增长拖累”模型进行了扩展,并进一步从发展战略、产权结构和最优政府行为三个方面进行解读。结果发现,近代(1840-1949)的“增长停滞”可以归因于错误的发展战略、低效的产权结构和政府的机会主义,建国前30年(1949-1978)的有限增长归因于赶超战略、国有企业和政府的有效补贴,建国后30年(1978-至今)的快速增长归因于比较优势战略、民营企业和中性政府,而发展战略转变的内生机制则在于弥补外部性超过了“软预算约束”和由此产生的“道德风险”成本。 (5)鉴于知识产权保护和在此基础上的创新对于跨越“中等收入陷阱”中的重要性,本文对Sun and Lio(1996)的内生投资品种类数分工模型进行了拓展,通过剩余索取权的变化探讨了知识产权保护水平与长期经济增长之间的非线性关系。我们认为：在交易效率较低,分工经济尚未充分展开的经济发展早期阶段,投资品的生产远离世界技术前沿,那么有利于“模仿创新”投资品生产的模糊知识产权保护将实现一定的经济增长；但随着交易效率的演进和分工经济的充分展开,投资品的生产将逐渐接近世界技术前沿并进一步导致“模仿创新”促进经济增长的作用逐渐下降。如果没有知识产权保护水平的改进,传统的经济增长模式将面临增长停滞以及“中等收入陷阱”,那么实现有利于“自主创新”投资品生产的严格知识产权保护制度的转变将成为实现持续经济增长的必然选择。综上所述,通过发展战略、产权结构和最优政府行为对于近代以来长期经济增长轨迹的考察,我们发现不论是发展战略还是产权结构,其对于经济增长的作用均表现出动态性和“阶段适宜性”。这就意味着：忽略发展战略本身的演变,抽象的谈论国有企业的低效率,其合理性是值得商榷的。因此,厘清不同经济发展阶段所依赖的经济和制度环境,科学的认识发展战略和产权结构在经济发展中的作用,才是我们跨越“中等收入陷阱”,实现“大国发展道路”向“强国发展道路”转变的重中之重。
[Abstract]:This article is devoted to the establishment of a logical and consistent theoretical analysis framework for the long-term economic growth track in modern China. We think that, owing to the neglect of the continuous dynamic evolution of the economic and institutional environment, the existing theory has been limited in explaining the long-term economic growth track since modern times, and the following questions are answered. What is the reason for the stagnation of economic growth in modern times? If the efficiency of the state-owned enterprises is inefficient, then why is the modern industrialization task done by the state-owned enterprises, not the private enterprises (the rationality of catching up the strategy)? Since the overtaking strategy is reasonable, then what changes have led to the overtaking strategy The unsustainability and further reform, that is, the endogenous mechanism of transformation of development strategy?
In order to answer the above questions, this paper first proves the dynamic efficiency of the state-owned enterprises from two perspectives of microcosmic and macro, and further interprets the long-term economic growth track from three aspects: the development strategy, the property right structure and the optimal government behavior.
(1) after the restructuring, the performance of the state-owned enterprises has been greatly improved, and the difference from the performance of non-state-owned enterprises is no longer obvious. Besides, we also discuss the market level and the performance of different ownership enterprises. We think that when the market level is low, it will lead to the productivity of different ownership enterprises. The enlargement of differences will result in the narrowing of productivity differences among different ownership enterprises.
(2) the low efficiency of the state-owned enterprises should be based on the high efficiency of the market. Under the premise of incomplete information, this paper extends the enterprise transaction efficiency evolution model of Yang and Ng (1995) from the two aspects of "production risk" and "transaction risk". When the rate is low, the cost of production risk is high, so the property right arrangement of the state-owned enterprises will promote the economic growth because it is beneficial to saving the cost of production risk. On the contrary, the transaction risk cost is high, so the private enterprise will promote the economic growth because it is beneficial to saving the transaction risk cost.
(3) in view of the widespread financial constraints and ownership discrimination in the real economy, this article has expanded the Yang (1999) from two aspects of "production risk" and "transaction risk". We believe that financial deepening and property rights reform can promote economic growth, which is benefited from the continuous reform of the market and the increasingly perfect capital. When the market is missing or failed and production risk becomes the main source of efficiency loss, financial restraint and traditional property structure still help to make up for private investment and achieve suboptimal economic growth.
(4) the long-term economic growth track since modern times is an integral and inseparable whole. Based on the above understanding, this paper uses "externality" to expand the "growth drag" model of state-owned enterprises, and further interprets the three aspects of the development strategy, the property right structure and the optimal government line. The result is that the modern (1840-19) 49) the "growth stagnation" can be attributed to the wrong development strategy, the inefficient property rights structure and the opportunism of the government. The limited growth of the 30 years (1949-1978) before the founding of the people's Republic of China is attributable to the overtaking strategy, the effective subsidy of the state-owned enterprises and the government, the rapid growth of the 30 years after the founding of the people's Republic of China (1978-) is attributable to the comparative advantage strategy, the private enterprise and the neutrality. The endogenous mechanism of the government's development strategy transformation is to make up for the externalities beyond the "soft budget constraint" and the resulting "moral hazard" cost.
(5) in view of the importance of intellectual property protection and the innovation on this basis for crossing the "middle income trap", this paper extends the Sun and Lio (1996) model of endogenous investment category number division, and discusses the nonlinear relationship between the protection level of intellectual property rights and the long-term economic growth through the change of the residual claim right. We believe that, in the early stage of economic development with low transaction efficiency and undeveloped division of labor, the production of investment goods is far from the frontier of the world technology. Then the fuzzy intellectual property protection of "imitation innovation" will achieve certain economic growth, but with the evolution of transaction efficiency and the full division of labor economy If there is no improvement in the level of intellectual property protection, the traditional economic growth model will face growth stagnation and the "medium income trap", which is beneficial to "independent innovation". The transformation of strict intellectual property protection system for investment goods production will become an inevitable choice to achieve sustained economic growth.
To sum up, through the development strategy, the property right structure and the optimal government behavior, we find that both the development strategy and the property right structure play a dynamic and "stage suitability" for the economic growth, which means that the evolution of the development strategy itself is ignored. It is questionable to discuss the low efficiency of the state-owned enterprises in abstract terms. Therefore, to clarify the economic and institutional environment, the scientific understanding of the development strategy and the role of the property right structure in the economic development of different economic development stages, is that we cross the "middle income trap" and realize the "great power development road" to "the powerful country". The road to development is the most important change.
【学位授予单位】：西北大学
【学位级别】：博士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F279.2

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