混合竞争策略下的技术授权分析
发布时间：2018-09-11 19:41
【摘要】：当前社会技术创新不断发展,企业对于先进技术的追求与日俱增,与此同时,世界范围内对于知识产权的保护制度逐步完善,技术授权成为很多企业获得技术创新的主要途径。现如今,技术授权在各个行业中都非常普遍,在授权过程中,技术拥有企业获取授权收费,同时技术接受者也可以通过接受授权改善自己的技术水平。 之前的研究基本上集中在企业之间采取产量竞争或者价格竞争,但市场中两家企业的竞争行为,会出现一家企业采取产量策略,另一家企业采取价格策略的现象,这种竞争策略被称之为“混合竞争策略”。市场中的两家企业进行混合竞争是有其现实意义的,目前来说,混合竞争模型得到的关注相对较少,但现实中的某些行业,像小型车市场中Scion与Honda就是混合竞争的典型案例,另外某些技术部门或机构势力出于政策性考虑,会要求企业间选择不同的竞争策略方式进行竞争,这就使混合竞争这种竞争方式需要得到我们更多的关注。 本文研究一个非生产性的技术研发企业如何决定向进行混合竞争(一家企业采取价格策略,另一家企业则采取数量策略)的两个生产性企业转让其降低成本的技术,其中两生产性企业的产品具有水平差异性。我们探讨技术拥有企业在每种授权合同下授权对象的选择问题及福利变化情况,固定收费与特许权收费的比较及技术拥有企业最优授权合同的选择。 研究结论表明,固定收费合同下,当产品差异性较小且产品创新程度相对较大时,技术拥有者选择授权给进行价格竞争的企业是最优的；当产品差异性较小且产品创新程度较小时,选择将技术授权给进行产量竞争的企业是最优选择；其他情况下,技术拥有企业会选择将技术同时授权给两生产性企业。就社会福利水平而言,将技术同时授权给两企业时消费者剩余与社会总福利水平最高,将技术授权给进行价格竞争的企业时消费者剩余与社会总福利水平最低。 特许权收费合同下,技术拥有企业选择将技术同时授权给两企业是最佳选择,且比较排他性授权时发现,将技术授权给产量竞争的企业时技术拥有企业所获利润要大于授权给价格竞争的企业；双重收费合同下,技术拥有企业将技术同时授权给两企业是最优选择,且技术拥有企业偏好于将技术授权给进行产量竞争的企业,只有在创新程度相对较高的微小区间内,技术拥有企业会选择将技术授权给进行价格竞争的企业。 混合竞争策略下,固定收费合同不一定优于特许权收费合同。出于技术拥有企业授权收入最大化考虑,当创新程度相对较低时,特许权收费合同下的授权收入高于固定收费合同；技术创新程度较高时,选择固定收费合同进行技术授权是更优选择。 三种授权方式中,选择双重收费合同授权是技术拥有企业的最优选择,且混合竞争策略下此种方式总是会提高社会福利水平。
[Abstract]:At present, with the continuous development of technological innovation, enterprises are pursuing more and more advanced technology. At the same time, the protection system of intellectual property rights around the world is gradually improved. Technology authorization has become the main way for many enterprises to obtain technological innovation. The technology ownership enterprise obtains the authorization fee, at the same time the technology acceptor may also improve own technical level by accepting the authorization.
Previous studies mainly focused on the adoption of output competition or price competition between enterprises, but the competition behavior of two enterprises in the market will lead to the phenomenon that one enterprise adopts output strategy and the other adopts price strategy. This kind of competition strategy is called "mixed competition strategy". Competition has its practical significance. At present, the mixed competition model has received relatively little attention. However, in reality, some industries, such as Scion and Honda in the small car market, are typical cases of mixed competition. Competition, which requires mixed competition, needs more attention.
This paper investigates how an unproductive R&D firm decides to transfer its cost-reducing technology to two producers with mixed competition (one firm adopts a price strategy and the other adopts a quantitative strategy). The products of the two producers are of different levels. We explore the difference between the two producers. The choice of authorized objects and welfare changes under such authorization contracts, the comparison between fixed fees and concession fees, and the choice of optimal authorization contracts for Technology-owned enterprises.
The results show that under the fixed fee contract, when the product difference is small and the product innovation degree is relatively large, the technology owner chooses to authorize the enterprise to compete in price, and when the product difference is small and the product innovation degree is small, the technology owner chooses to authorize the enterprise to compete in production is the best choice. In other cases, Technology-owned enterprises will choose to license technology to two productive enterprises at the same time. As far as social welfare level is concerned, the level of consumer surplus and social welfare is the highest when technology is licensed to two enterprises at the same time, and the level of consumer surplus and social welfare is the lowest when technology is licensed to a price-competitive enterprise.
Under the concession fee contract, the technology owner enterprise chooses to license the technology to the two enterprises at the same time, and when comparing exclusive license, it is found that the technology owner enterprise gains more profit than the technology owner enterprise when the technology is licensed to the production competition enterprise; under the double fee contract, the technology owner enterprise will license the technology to the price competition enterprise. Empowering technology to two enterprises is the best choice, and Technology-owned enterprises prefer to empower technology to production competition enterprises. Only in the relatively high degree of innovation within a small range, Technology-owned enterprises will choose to empower technology to price competition enterprises.
Under the mixed competition strategy, the fixed fee contract is not necessarily superior to the concession fee contract. Considering the maximization of the authorized income of the Technology-owned enterprises, when the degree of innovation is relatively low, the authorized income under the concession fee contract is higher than that under the fixed fee contract; when the degree of technological innovation is high, the fixed fee contract is chosen for the technology licensing. Better choice.
Among the three authorization modes, the choice of double-charge contract authorization is the best choice for Technology-owned enterprises, and this mode will always improve the level of social welfare under the mixed competition strategy.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F273.1;F271
本文编号：2237680
[Abstract]:At present, with the continuous development of technological innovation, enterprises are pursuing more and more advanced technology. At the same time, the protection system of intellectual property rights around the world is gradually improved. Technology authorization has become the main way for many enterprises to obtain technological innovation. The technology ownership enterprise obtains the authorization fee, at the same time the technology acceptor may also improve own technical level by accepting the authorization.
Previous studies mainly focused on the adoption of output competition or price competition between enterprises, but the competition behavior of two enterprises in the market will lead to the phenomenon that one enterprise adopts output strategy and the other adopts price strategy. This kind of competition strategy is called "mixed competition strategy". Competition has its practical significance. At present, the mixed competition model has received relatively little attention. However, in reality, some industries, such as Scion and Honda in the small car market, are typical cases of mixed competition. Competition, which requires mixed competition, needs more attention.
This paper investigates how an unproductive R&D firm decides to transfer its cost-reducing technology to two producers with mixed competition (one firm adopts a price strategy and the other adopts a quantitative strategy). The products of the two producers are of different levels. We explore the difference between the two producers. The choice of authorized objects and welfare changes under such authorization contracts, the comparison between fixed fees and concession fees, and the choice of optimal authorization contracts for Technology-owned enterprises.
The results show that under the fixed fee contract, when the product difference is small and the product innovation degree is relatively large, the technology owner chooses to authorize the enterprise to compete in price, and when the product difference is small and the product innovation degree is small, the technology owner chooses to authorize the enterprise to compete in production is the best choice. In other cases, Technology-owned enterprises will choose to license technology to two productive enterprises at the same time. As far as social welfare level is concerned, the level of consumer surplus and social welfare is the highest when technology is licensed to two enterprises at the same time, and the level of consumer surplus and social welfare is the lowest when technology is licensed to a price-competitive enterprise.
Under the concession fee contract, the technology owner enterprise chooses to license the technology to the two enterprises at the same time, and when comparing exclusive license, it is found that the technology owner enterprise gains more profit than the technology owner enterprise when the technology is licensed to the production competition enterprise; under the double fee contract, the technology owner enterprise will license the technology to the price competition enterprise. Empowering technology to two enterprises is the best choice, and Technology-owned enterprises prefer to empower technology to production competition enterprises. Only in the relatively high degree of innovation within a small range, Technology-owned enterprises will choose to empower technology to price competition enterprises.
Under the mixed competition strategy, the fixed fee contract is not necessarily superior to the concession fee contract. Considering the maximization of the authorized income of the Technology-owned enterprises, when the degree of innovation is relatively low, the authorized income under the concession fee contract is higher than that under the fixed fee contract; when the degree of technological innovation is high, the fixed fee contract is chosen for the technology licensing. Better choice.
Among the three authorization modes, the choice of double-charge contract authorization is the best choice for Technology-owned enterprises, and this mode will always improve the level of social welfare under the mixed competition strategy.
【学位授予单位】：山东大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F273.1;F271
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