广东省战略性新兴产业专利联盟合作博弈研究

发布时间：2018-10-15 10:21

【摘要】：从跨国企业的先进做法来看,组建专利联盟已经成为一种重要的知识产权竞争利器,通过建立专利壁垒对中国企业进行专利围剿,阻碍中国企业进入市场。在这种背景下,我国广东省战略性新兴产业也陆续组建了相关产业专利联盟,所组建模式大概分为以下三种：一是企业自发创建,政府积极支持；二是协会统筹创建,政府培育推动；三是政府主导创建,各方联动发展。在组建专利联盟过程中,政府、企业、高校和科研机构以及中介机构都发挥了不同的作用,都是专利联盟的参与主体,且这些联盟尚处于发展的初级阶段,有别于目前学术界研究比较多的国外成熟型专利联盟,其主要目的是促进企业技术创新和专利应诉能力,而不是进行专利许可交易。本文以合作博弈为研究方法,以广东省战略性新兴产业为背景,详细分析该背景下组建的专利联盟的需求,然后介绍“政产学研介”各主体在专利联盟中发挥的作用,重点研究专利联盟技术创新合作和专利诉讼合作过程中的收益分配及成本分担问题。具体来讲,本文主要研究内容包括以下三个方面： 1、根据目前已有的专利联盟、战略联盟、产学研联盟等研究成果,界定“政产学研介”专利联盟的具体内涵,并以中山市半导体照明行业知识产权联盟为实例进行分析。目前广东省战略性新兴产业组建的专利联盟多属于防御性质,再加上中外市场化程度的不同,除了企业之外,政府、学研方和中介机构在联盟的组建和合作过程中都发挥了重要作用。目前组建的专利联盟的主要作用不是进行专利交叉许可和交易,而是技术创新合作和专利诉讼合作。 2、运用基于科布道格拉斯生产函数的技术创新投入产出模型,引进人力投入L和资金投入K两个变量,分析不同参与主体合作模式下的创新收益,得出“政产学研介”五位一体同时参与为最优合作技术创新合作模式。然后基于Shapley值法对该创新收益在参与主体间进行合理分配,发现各主体分配获得收益均优于不合作时的收益。 3、通过目前企业专利诉讼现状分析及所遇问题进行相关假设,然后建立合作博弈模型分析,得到最优的专利信息检索和防御布局成本投入,最后基于Rubinstein讨价还价模型求出成本分担系数。
[Abstract]:From the point of view of the advanced practices of multinational enterprises, the establishment of patent alliance has become an important competitive tool for intellectual property rights. Through the establishment of patent barriers, Chinese enterprises are encircled and suppressed by patent, which hinders the entry of Chinese enterprises into the market. In this context, the strategic emerging industries in Guangdong Province have also set up a patent alliance for related industries one after another. The models for the establishment of these alliances can be divided into the following three types: first, the spontaneous establishment of enterprises, with the active support of the government; and second, the establishment of associations as a whole. The government cultivates the promotion; third, the government leads the establishment, the each side linkage development. In the process of forming patent alliances, the government, enterprises, universities and scientific research institutions and intermediary organizations all play different roles, all of which are the main bodies of patent alliances, and these alliances are still in the initial stage of development. Different from the foreign mature patent alliance, which has been studied more in academic circles at present, its main purpose is to promote the technological innovation and patent response ability of enterprises, rather than to carry out patent licensing transactions. This paper takes the cooperative game as the research method, takes the strategic emerging industry of Guangdong Province as the background, analyzes in detail the demand of the patent alliance formed under this background, and then introduces the role played by the main bodies of the "politics, industry, education and research" in the patent alliance. This paper focuses on the distribution and cost sharing of technology innovation cooperation and patent litigation cooperation in patent alliance. Specifically, the main contents of this paper include the following three aspects: 1, according to the existing research results of patent alliance, strategic alliance, industry-study-research alliance, define the specific connotation of patent alliance of "politics, industry, education and research". And take Zhongshan semiconductor lighting industry intellectual property alliance as an example to carry on the analysis. At present, most patent alliances set up by strategic emerging industries in Guangdong Province are defensive in nature. In addition to the differences in the degree of marketization between China and foreign countries, in addition to enterprises, the government, Researchers and intermediaries play an important role in the formation and cooperation of the alliance. The main role of the patent alliance currently being formed is not to carry out patent cross-licensing and transaction, but to cooperate in technological innovation and patent litigation. 2. Using the input-output model of technological innovation based on Cobb Douglas production function. By introducing the variables of manpower input L and capital input K, this paper analyzes the innovation income under the cooperation mode of different participants, and draws the conclusion that "government, industry, education and research" is the best cooperative technological innovation cooperation mode. Then, based on the Shapley value method, the innovation income is reasonably distributed among the participants. It is found that the income of each subject is better than that of non-cooperation. 3. Through the analysis of the current situation of patent litigation and the problems encountered in the enterprise, the author establishes a cooperative game model. The optimal patent information retrieval and defense layout cost input are obtained. Finally, the cost sharing coefficient is calculated based on Rubinstein bargaining model.
【学位授予单位】：广东工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2014
【分类号】：F276.44;F273.7;F224.32

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