上市公司成长性、相对业绩评价与高管薪酬研究

发布时间：2018-03-29 21:18

本文选题：高管薪酬　切入点：相对业绩评价　出处：《沈阳工业大学》2017年硕士论文

【摘要】：在当今知识经济时代,高管人员对公司的重要性不言而喻,并已经逐渐成为公司的一种核心竞争力,这也使得高水平的薪酬成为公司吸引和留住高级管理人才的重要武器。但随之而来的问题是,高管薪酬是否与其业绩相匹配。因此,如何准确客观地衡量公司业绩,并以此制定出高效合理的高管薪酬制度成为了近些年的研究热点。由于公司的业绩很大程度上受到一些外生性因素的影响,因此有必要通过一套可过滤外部环境影响的业绩评价方法来刻画高管的经营能力和努力程度,相对业绩评价应运而生。对于成长性公司的高管来说,公司成长性越高,面临的不确定性就越大,因此相对业绩评价的使用能够为高管提供在不稳定的环境下,对抗共同的外生性冲击的保证,降低其所面临的风险。那么我国上市公司高管薪酬合约中是否存在使用相对业绩评价的证据?公司成长性与高管薪酬合约中相对业绩评价的使用程度之间存在什么关系?这是本文要研究的问题。本文选取2012年至2014年沪深两市的制造业上市公司为研究样本,利用SPSS22.0统计软件,通过理论与实证相结合的方法检验了我国上市公司高管薪酬合约中是否存在使用相对业绩评价的证据,即高管薪酬的制定是否参照了同行业业绩,并进一步考察了公司成长性与高管薪酬合约中相对业绩评价使用程度的关系。研究结果表明,当选取资产收益率和股票回报率分别作为会计回报和股票回报方面的指标来衡量公司业绩时,存在使用相对业绩评价的证据。进一步检验的结果表明,公司成长性越高,高管薪酬合约中相对业绩评价的使用程度越低,即两者呈负相关关系。据此,本文结合我国上市公司的实际情况,从科学评价公司业绩方面提出了一些合理的建议,以期望能够较好地完善我国上市公司的高管薪酬制度。
[Abstract]:In the era of knowledge economy, the importance of executives to the company is self-evident, and has gradually become a core competitiveness of the company. This also makes high levels of pay an important weapon for companies to attract and retain senior managers. But the question is whether executive pay matches their performance. So how to accurately and objectively measure corporate performance? It has become a research focus in recent years to establish an efficient and reasonable executive compensation system. The performance of the company is largely influenced by some exogenous factors. Therefore, it is necessary to use a set of performance evaluation methods which can filter the external environmental impact to describe the management ability and the degree of effort of the executives, and the relative performance evaluation emerges as the times require. For the executives of the growth companies, the higher the growth, the higher the growth. The greater the uncertainty, the more the use of relative performance evaluations can provide executives with the assurance to withstand common exogenous shocks in an unstable environment. Reduce the risk it faces. Then is there evidence of the use of relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contracts of listed companies in China? What is the relationship between corporate growth and the relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contracts? This is the question to be studied in this paper. This paper selects manufacturing companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2012 to 2014 as the research samples, and uses SPSS22.0 statistical software. Through the combination of theory and empirical methods, this paper tests whether there is evidence of relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contracts of listed companies in China, that is, whether the formulation of executive compensation refers to the performance of the same industry. Furthermore, the relationship between corporate growth and relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contracts is investigated. When the return on assets and the return on stock are selected as the indicators of accounting return and stock return respectively to measure the performance of the company, there is evidence of using relative performance evaluation. The further test results show that the higher the growth of the company, the higher the performance of the company. The lower the degree of relative performance evaluation in executive compensation contract is, the negative correlation exists between the two. According to the actual situation of listed companies in China, this paper puts forward some reasonable suggestions from the aspect of scientific evaluation of company performance. In order to hope to be able to better improve the executive compensation system of listed companies in China.
【学位授予单位】：沈阳工业大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2017
【分类号】：F272.92;F425;F272.5

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