我国大型工业企业市场势力测度研究——基于改进的勒纳指数法

发布时间：2018-05-19 20:47

本文选题：市场势力 + 勒纳指数　；参考：《产经评论》2017年02期

【摘要】：垄断管制及相关产业组织政策制定的一个关键问题是对企业市场势力的科学准确的测度。而处于垄断地位的企业,通过提高工资福利待遇拉大生产经营成本,则可能掩盖其真实的市场势力。采用企业单位工资产出率与行业单位工资产出率的比值对勒纳指数进行修正,解决已有的市场势力测度方法不能测度企业通过提高工资待遇的方式掩盖其市场势力的问题。运用修正的勒纳指数对我国大型工业企业市场势力进行实际测算,结果表明:我国不同行业大型工业企业都使用了显性市场势力和隐性市场势力;其中市场化程度高的行业隐性市场势力大于市场化程度低的行业,而市场化程度低的行业显性市场势力则大于市场化程度高的行业。市场势力测度的更深层意义在于分析政府与垄断企业之间的博弈以调整当前政策制定与管制方法,解决市场供给侧改革过程中存在的问题,因此应依据测算结果,继续深化市场体制改革,完善垄断监管政策措施。
[Abstract]:A key problem of monopoly regulation and related industrial organization policy is the scientific and accurate measurement of enterprise market power. The monopolized enterprises may cover up their real market power by increasing the production cost. This paper uses the ratio of unit wage output ratio of enterprise to unit wage output rate of industry to revise the Lerner index to solve the problem that the existing market power measurement method can not measure the enterprises' market power by the way of improving the wage treatment. The market power of large industrial enterprises in China is measured by using the revised Lerner Index. The results show that the dominant market forces and hidden market forces are used by large industrial enterprises in different industries in China. The recessive market power of the industry with high degree of marketization is greater than that of the one with low degree of marketization, while the dominant market power of the industry with low degree of marketization is greater than that of the industry with high degree of marketization. The deeper significance of market power measurement lies in analyzing the game between government and monopoly enterprises in order to adjust the current policy formulation and control methods and solve the problems existing in the process of market supply-side reform. We will continue to deepen the reform of the market system and improve monopoly supervision policies and measures.
【作者单位】：鲁东大学数学与统计科学学院;大连理工大学;
【分类号】：F425

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