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上海家化股权激励问题探讨

发布时间:2018-06-05 11:56

  本文选题:股权激励 + 绩效考核 ; 参考:《江西财经大学》2017年硕士论文


【摘要】:关于人力资源管理方面,公司面临的问题是如何吸引优秀的人才,如何让股东和经理拥有共同的利益。一个持久并且有效的激励方式可以建立健全公司的激励机制。股权激励在公司中非常普及是因为它在留住人才以及实现企业价值最大化方面有着非常重要的作用。美国的辉瑞制药公司最早采取这种激励方式。辉瑞制药让管理人享有公司权益份额,这样公司的利益就与他们个人的利益一致,降低了他们在工作中做出对公司不利选择的几率。公司采取股权激励的方式可以使被激励者成为公司的所有者之一。被授予公司股份的管理人员持有公司的股份越多,他们与公司的利益相关度就越高,那么因此而承担的责任也是越大的。企业人力资源部门最大的问题就是如何在稳定企业优秀员工的同时又能招揽人才。如果公司能让优秀的员工持有股份,同时建立一个比较科学、完善的绩效考核体系,那么员工为了个人的利益也会奋发向上。员工努力工作的同时,也有助于实现企业价值最大化。一个科学的绩效考核体系会形成优胜劣汰的局面,这样既能解决代理成本问题,又能解决人才流失的问题。我国公司的股权激励计划仍处于发展阶段。本文介绍了上海家化在不同产权性质背景下的股权激励计划。相比之下,产权性质变更之后的股权激励方案更加科学,但是也有不足之处。针对股权激励计划存在的不足,本文分析了原因并提出建议。本文采用了文献研究法、案例研究法、比较分析法和财务分析法。全文被分为六个部分。第一部分是引言,该部分阐述了研究背景和意义,对文献做了总结和归纳,并论述了本文的研究思路以及主要采用的研究方法。第二部分是股权激励的理论概述,该部分陈述了股权激励的概念并总结股权激励的意义、主要模式和理论基础。第三部分对上海家化联合股份有限公司(以下简称“上海家化”)的股权激励方案做了具体介绍并且将四次股权激励方案进行对比,然后分析了股权激励方案的实施效果。虽然相比以前,股权激励方案更加科学,但是还存在一些问题,所以本文的第四部分阐述了上海家化股权激励的具体问题,进而分析这些问题存在的原因。对此,本文有针对性地提出了解决方案,针对上海家化股权激励方案出现的问题提出了一些建议。第六部分是结束语,主要内容就是对本文的总结。总而言之,股权激励在不同产权背景下都会产生问题,并不是说由国企变更为民企之后,上海家化的股权激励方案就是完美无缺的。公司需要有一个完善的治理体系。监管部门也应该区别对待国企和民企。
[Abstract]:As for human resource management, the problems faced by companies are how to attract talented people and how to make shareholders and managers share common interests. A lasting and effective incentive mechanism can be established for a sound company. Equity incentive is very popular in companies because it plays a very important role in retaining talents and maximizing enterprise value. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals in the United States was the first to adopt this incentive. Pfizer gives managers a share of the company's equity, so the company's interests are aligned with their personal interests, reducing their chances of making bad choices at work. Companies can use equity incentives to make the motivated person one of the owners of the company. The more managers who are granted shares in the company, the more relevant they are to the interests of the company, and the greater the liability. The biggest problem of human resources department is how to attract talents while stabilizing outstanding employees. If the company can let the outstanding employees hold shares and establish a more scientific and perfect performance appraisal system, then the employees will also work hard for their personal interests. While employees work hard, it also helps to maximize the value of the enterprise. A scientific performance appraisal system will form the situation of survival of the fittest, which can not only solve the problem of agency cost, but also solve the problem of brain drain. The stock right incentive plan of our country company is still in the development stage. This paper introduces the equity incentive plan of Shanghai Jiahua under the background of different property rights. In contrast, the equity incentive scheme after the change of property rights is more scientific, but also has shortcomings. In view of the deficiency of equity incentive plan, this paper analyzes the reasons and puts forward some suggestions. This article adopts the literature research method, the case study method, the comparative analysis method and the financial analysis method. The full text is divided into six parts. The first part is the introduction, which describes the background and significance of the research, summarizes and summarizes the literature, and discusses the research ideas and main research methods adopted in this paper. The second part is an overview of the theory of equity incentive, which describes the concept of equity incentive and summarizes the significance, main mode and theoretical basis of equity incentive. The third part introduces the equity incentive scheme of Shanghai Jiahua United Co., Ltd (hereinafter referred to as "Shanghai Jiahua") and compares the four equity incentive schemes, and then analyzes the implementation effect of the equity incentive scheme. Although the equity incentive scheme is more scientific than before, there are still some problems, so the fourth part of this paper expounds the specific problems of Shanghai Jiahua equity incentive, and then analyzes the reasons for these problems. In this paper, the author puts forward some solutions, and puts forward some suggestions on the problems of Shanghai Jiahua's equity incentive scheme. The sixth part is the conclusion, the main content is the summary of this paper. In a word, the equity incentive will cause problems under different property rights background. It is not to say that after the change from state-owned enterprises to private enterprises, Shanghai Jiahua's equity incentive scheme is perfect. The company needs a perfect governance system. Regulators should also treat state-owned and private-owned enterprises differently.
【学位授予单位】:江西财经大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2017
【分类号】:F272.92;F426.72

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