南纺股份非经常性损益盈余管理的案例研究
发布时间:2018-07-03 17:55
本文选题:盈余管理 + 非经常性损益 ; 参考:《石河子大学》2016年硕士论文
【摘要】:中国股市在2015年可谓波澜起伏,经历各种崩盘,面对瞬息万变无法太平的股市,投资者如何应对,是我们应该考虑的大问题。中国资本市场30年来的迅速发展,各类规模企业不断涌现。资本市场增长率较快,然而同期可支配资金增长不能满足其要求,两者之间矛盾日益突出。公司苦心积虑、不择手段隐瞒亏损实情美化财务报表,如此违规盈余管理,严重危害上市公司正常营运。虚假财务报表频频被曝光,引发了信贷危机,进而又导致了市场经济低迷、企业融资困难。然而,资金是企业的生命之源,为了快速融资众多ST公司就又走进了财务报表舞弊的胡同,形成恶性循环。尤其是2008年的经济危机更加重了这个恶性循环。经济危机后,纺织业国内外需求下降,以纺织品进出口为主要业务的南纺股份,收入下滑严重,于是尝试多元化投资,但是由于投资面过大、投资速度快,几年内竟拥有50多家子孙公司,然而却没有获得多少回报。在内忧外患的情况下,虽大股东商贸公司豁免了相关债务,但仍不能扭转局面,加上内部结构不完善、内控不良、高管利欲熏心等多重原因,南纺股份在2006-2010年连续5年通过盈余管理手段,伪造利润,成为造假典型。但是审计机构却仅仅对2011年南纺股份的财务报告出示“保留意见”,其他年份都是标准无保留意见,这样的行为无非是助纣为虐,有违审计的独立性和公正性。本文对南纺股份实例进行分析,对公司盈余管理的原因和手段进行深入分析,进而发现公司在面临内外部压力尤其是面临退市危机时会产生盈余管理动机,但是盈余管理只能是缓兵之计,不能真正改善经营窘况、产生连续性的积极影响。最后又针对性地提出上市公司盈余管理的防范的措施,提出完善问责制度,要建立高管为报表真实性背书制度,完善事务所选聘制度,严格执行审计师强制轮换制度;并针对我国证券市场监管现状,提出应该赋予证监会部分监管特权,建立及时停牌制度,并设立投资者“买者自付”的具体标准,一定程度上更好的保护投资者权益。本文将对滥用盈余管理的上市公司敲个警钟,对投资者识别舞弊行为理性投资,监管者有效治理财务舞弊整顿资本市场,有一定参考价值。
[Abstract]:China's stock market in 2015 can be described as ups and downs, after various crashes, in the face of the rapidly changing stock market, investors should consider how to deal with the big issue. With the rapid development of China's capital market over the past 30 years, enterprises of all sizes have been emerging. The growth rate of capital market is fast, but the growth of disposable capital can not meet its requirement in the same period, and the contradiction between them is becoming more and more serious. The company painstakingly conceals the fact of losses and beautifies the financial statements, thus violating earnings management seriously endangers the normal operation of listed companies. False financial statements are frequently exposed, causing credit crisis, and then leading to market economy downturn, corporate financing difficulties. However, capital is the life source of enterprises. In order to raise funds quickly, many St companies have entered the hutong of financial statement fraud, forming a vicious circle. In particular, the 2008 economic crisis has exacerbated this vicious circle. After the economic crisis, the demand of textile industry at home and abroad declined. The main business of textile import and export, the shares of Nanfang textile, suffered a serious decline in income, so they tried to diversify their investment. However, because of the overinvestment scope, the investment speed was fast. Within a few years, he owned more than 50 descendant companies, but not much in return. Under the circumstances of internal and external troubles, although the major shareholder trading companies have exempted the related debts, they still cannot reverse the situation. In addition, the internal structure is not perfect, the internal control is poor, and the executives are motivated by profit, and so on. Nanfang shares in 2006-2010 through earnings management for 5 consecutive years, false profits, become a typical fraud. However, the audit institutions only show "qualified opinion" on the financial report of Nanfang shares in 2011, other years are standard unqualified opinions, such behavior is nothing more than aiding the evil, which is contrary to the independence and impartiality of the audit. This paper analyzes the reasons and means of earnings management, and finds out that the company will have motive of earnings management in the face of internal and external pressure, especially in the face of delisting crisis. However, earnings management can only be delayed, can not really improve the operational distress, the positive impact of continuity. Finally, the paper puts forward the measures to prevent earnings management of listed companies, and puts forward to perfect the system of accountability system, to establish the system of endorsing the authenticity of statements by senior executives, to perfect the system of selecting and appointing firms, and to strictly implement the system of mandatory rotation of auditors; In view of the current situation of securities market supervision in China, it is suggested that the Securities Regulatory Commission should be given some special supervision privileges, establish a timely suspension system, and set up a specific standard of "buyer pays" to protect investors' rights and interests to a certain extent. In this paper, the listed companies abusing earnings management will be sounded a warning bell, investors will identify fraud rational investment, regulators will effectively control financial fraud to rectify the capital market, which has certain reference value.
【学位授予单位】:石河子大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2016
【分类号】:F426.81;F406.7
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