考虑碳减排的发电商电量上网机制设计
发布时间：2018-07-16 09:28
【摘要】：现行的发电商上网电量基本上是按发电容量等比例确定,而上网电价则实行统一的"标杆电价"。基于碳排放约束下总上网电量发电成本最小原则,设计寡头发电商的上网电量分配机制与上网电价机制,并与现行的电量上网机制进行数值分析比较,分析结果表明:(1)新机制可诱导发电商真实地报告自己的成本类型、以保证碳排放约束下总发电成本最小目标的实施;(2)相对于现行的等比例电量上网机制,新机制有利于减排CO2,且在相同排放水平下可节省总的发电成本;(3)新机制下低排放发电商电量优先上网,且可促使高排放机组逐步退出市场。
[Abstract]:The current electricity quantity of generators is basically determined according to the proportion of generating capacity, while the price of electricity connected to the net is unified "benchmark electricity price". Based on the principle of minimum cost of total electricity generation under carbon emission constraints, this paper designs the electricity distribution mechanism and price mechanism of oligopoly, and makes a numerical analysis and comparison with the current electricity generation mechanism. The results show that: (1) the new mechanism can induce generators to report their own cost types in order to ensure the implementation of the minimum target of total generation cost under carbon emission constraints; (2) compared with the current equivalent power generation mechanism, The new mechanism can reduce CO2 emission and save the total power generation cost under the same emission level. (3) under the new mechanism, the low emission generators can give priority to Internet access and can promote the high emission units to withdraw from the market gradually.
【作者单位】： 国家电网公司华中分部;长沙理工大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271033) 国家社科基金重大项目(12&ZD051)~~
【分类号】：X32;F426.61
本文编号：2125955
[Abstract]:The current electricity quantity of generators is basically determined according to the proportion of generating capacity, while the price of electricity connected to the net is unified "benchmark electricity price". Based on the principle of minimum cost of total electricity generation under carbon emission constraints, this paper designs the electricity distribution mechanism and price mechanism of oligopoly, and makes a numerical analysis and comparison with the current electricity generation mechanism. The results show that: (1) the new mechanism can induce generators to report their own cost types in order to ensure the implementation of the minimum target of total generation cost under carbon emission constraints; (2) compared with the current equivalent power generation mechanism, The new mechanism can reduce CO2 emission and save the total power generation cost under the same emission level. (3) under the new mechanism, the low emission generators can give priority to Internet access and can promote the high emission units to withdraw from the market gradually.
【作者单位】： 国家电网公司华中分部;长沙理工大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271033) 国家社科基金重大项目(12&ZD051)~~
【分类号】：X32;F426.61
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