电子废弃物非正规回收查处政策及其效果

发布时间：2018-10-05 20:27

【摘要】：建立了包括政府、正规和非正规回收者在内的两阶段动态三方博弈模型研究电子废弃物非正规回收查处政策。研究表明,最优查处力度与回收者的技术经济水平、回收市场条件、用于查处支出的专项预算以及政府的查处能力等因素有关,政府应根据上述具体情况制定最优查处政策。研究也发现,查处政策具有双面作用,一方面,可以降低正规、非正规回收价格,减轻正规回收者与非正规回收者竞争的压力,从而使正规回收数量增加、正规回收率提高;另一方面,使非正规回收的减少量大于正规回收的增加量,从而使得总回收量减少,导致较多电子废弃物滞留在消费者手中,不利于循环经济的实现。因此,查处政策不宜单一执行,而应与其他政策配合使用。
[Abstract]:A two-stage dynamic three-stage game model including government, formal and informal recyclers is established to study the policy of informal recycling of e-waste. The research shows that the optimal investigation and punishment strength is related to the technical and economic level of the recycler, the market condition of the recovery, the special budget used for the investigation and punishment, and the government's ability to investigate and deal with the case. The government should formulate the best investigation and punishment policy according to the above specific conditions. The study also found that the investigation and punishment policy has a dual role. On the one hand, it can reduce the formal and informal recovery prices, reduce the pressure of competition between formal recyclers and informal recyclers, so that the quantity of formal recovery increases and the formal recovery rate increases; On the other hand, the reduction of informal recycling is larger than the increase of formal recovery, which leads to the reduction of total recovery, which leads to more electronic wastes stranded in the hands of consumers, which is not conducive to the realization of circular economy. Therefore, the investigation and punishment policy should not be implemented in a single way, but should be used in conjunction with other policies.
【作者单位】：重庆邮电大学经济管理学院;
【基金】：重庆市科学技术委员会自然科学基金资助项目(cstcjj2011A00021) 重庆市教育委员会人文社科基金资助项目(10SKF12)
【分类号】：F416.6;F713.2

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