上市股份制商业银行高管薪酬对综合绩效影响的实证研究

发布时间：2018-01-02 22:18

本文关键词：上市股份制商业银行高管薪酬对综合绩效影响的实证研究　出处：《云南财经大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：目前，银行高管的天价薪酬受到社会各界的普遍关注，较高的薪酬能否带来较好的银行绩效受到广泛质疑，国内外学者研究结果也不一致，指标选取不完备。因此，本论文选取充分的相关变量指标，利用主成分分析法得出综合绩效得分，以期更加准确的研究高管薪酬与综合绩效的相关关系。本论文选取上市的八家股份制商业银行：招商银行、中信银行、浦发银行、民生银行、光大银行、兴业银行、华夏银行和深圳发展银行为主要研究对象，目的是为我国股份制商业银行薪酬委员会制定高管薪酬提供政策建议。本文首先对高管薪酬与综合绩效关系进行了定性分析，发现高管薪酬差距较大，高管薪酬各部分比例不合理，高管薪酬与实际综合绩效关系不大等问题。然后进行多元回归定量分析，得出了高管薪酬与银行综合绩效显著正相关的结论。与定性分析结果不一致，，我们以定量分析为准，认为银行高管高薪并不是没有绩效这一依据。高管薪酬内部作用机制使得高管努力工作，带来了高绩效，伴随着高薪作为奖励，以强化其继续努力工作。此外，本文还单独对延期支付、股权激励与银行绩效进行了回归分析，考察其对银行综合绩效的影响，为其他银行是否实施延期支付和股权激励计划提供实证依据，其中延期支付的研究弥补了前人研究的缺陷。通过实证研究，我们发现高管薪酬延期支付能很好的解释银行综合绩效，并且延期支付对核心资本充足率显著正影响，对不良贷款率显著负影响；高管股权激励不是影响银行综合绩效的因素，不仅如此，对各项绩效指标均没有解释意义。最后，本文提出优化银行高管薪酬的三大建议：基本薪酬的设置应该既考虑内部公平，进行职位评价，又考虑外部公平，进行市场薪酬调查；绩效薪酬的设置应该既考虑盈利性绩效指标又考虑非盈利性绩效指标，也就是要构造综合绩效指标体系；并且要将短期薪酬激励与长期薪酬激励相结合，更加注重长期激励的作用，加大长期薪酬激励所占的比重。
[Abstract]:At present, bank executives pay price attracted widespread attention from all sectors of society, high salary can bring better performance of banks has been widely questioned, the research results of domestic and foreign scholars are inconsistent, the index selection is complete. Therefore, this thesis chooses relevant variables full index analysis method, comprehensive performance scores using principal component correlation the relationship between the more accurate and comprehensive performance of executive compensation in order. This paper selects eight listed joint-stock commercial bank, China Merchants Bank, CITIC Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Minsheng Bank, China Everbright Bank, industrial bank, Huaxia Bank and Shenzhen Development Bank as the main research object, purpose is for China's Joint-stock Commercial Commission bank executive pay compensation policies to provide policy recommendations.
This paper makes a qualitative analysis of the relationship between executive compensation and comprehensive performance, that the executive compensation gap between executive compensation, the proportion is not reasonable, the relationship between executive compensation and the actual performance is not the problem. Then multiple regression analysis, the significant positive correlation of executive pay and bank performance results are inconsistent with the conclusions. The qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis, we shall prevail, that bank executives and high performance is the basis. The executive compensation mechanism of internal executives makes hard work, bring high performance, with a high salary as a reward, in order to strengthen its work. In addition, this paper also separately on the deferred payment of equity incentive and bank performance by regression analysis, to examine its effect on the performance of the bank, other banks for deferred payment and whether the implementation of equity incentive plan to provide empirical in According to the study, including deferred payments to make up for deficiencies in the previous studies. Through empirical research, we found that executive pay deferred payment can explain the bank comprehensive performance is very good, and pay a significant positive impact on the core capital adequacy ratio, the rate of significant negative impact on non-performing loans; executive equity incentive factors, not affect the comprehensive performance of banks not only that, no explanation of the performance indicators.
Finally, three suggestions are put forward to optimize the bank executive compensation: basic salary setting should not only consider the internal fairness, job evaluation, and consider the external equity, market salary survey; performance salary setting should not only consider profit performance index considering the profitability performance index, which is to construct the index system and comprehensive performance; to be a short-term incentive and long-term incentive combination, pay more attention to the long-term incentive effect, increase the proportion of long-term incentive compensation.

【学位授予单位】：云南财经大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F272.92;F832.33

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