委托—代理理论视角下我国商业银行反洗钱激励机制研究

发布时间：2018-01-06 06:18

本文关键词：委托—代理理论视角下我国商业银行反洗钱激励机制研究　出处：《西南交通大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：上世纪50年代以来,洗钱犯罪日益膨胀,其对国际社会的影响的日益增大。在犯罪形式上,洗钱犯罪日益与上游的犯罪相互剥离,逐渐成为一个独立的犯罪形式。特别是美国9.11事件以来,恐怖活动更加猖獗,国际社会已经意识到打击洗钱犯罪是遏制恐怖活动的重要手段之一。近年来,洗钱对我国金融体系危害日益严重,反洗钱工作受到越来越多的重视,反洗钱体系日益完善。2007年1月1日正式实施的《反洗钱法》标志着我国反洗钱工作进入了一个新的阶段。本法规定反洗钱工作的最重要的主体之一就是金融机构,而大部分洗钱行为是通过商业银行各种复杂的金融工具将“黑钱”转化为表面合法的资金。所以,商业银行仍然承担着反洗钱一线排头兵的重任。但是由于商业银行与反洗钱工作在短期内存在着商业利益上的冲突,反洗钱工作受到了一些限制。研究商业银行的反洗钱行为,探讨如何更好的发挥商业银行的主观能动性,完善其反洗钱工作的内部机制和外部环境成为了学术界不可忽视的重要课题。基于上述背景,本文旨在分析我国当前的反洗钱及激励体系的现状,运用依据委托—代理理论分析商业银行反洗钱激励问题,丰富了相关理论和提出针对性政策建议。具体而言,本文做了以下几方面的工作：首先,本文对于反洗钱基础理论进行了归纳,并梳理了激励理论和委托—代理理论,为解决下文商业银行反洗钱激励问题打下了理论基础。然后,对我国的商业银行的反洗钱及反洗钱激励机制的现状和存在的问题进行了分析,并介绍了欧美国家的反洗钱激励机制特点和对我国建立反洗钱激励机制的启示。再次,建立了基于委托—代理理论的模型,分析监管机构与商业银行二者之间的关系,围绕最优激励水平、监管水平等和影响监管机构的几个主要因素展开分析。最后结合我国的实际,分析了建立反洗钱激励机制的必要性,以及如何按照委托—代理机制建立具有中国特色的反洗钱激励机制,并给出具体的政策建议。本文认为反洗钱激励机制建设应该采用“适度激励,先内后外,制度在前,逐步推进”的工作原则作为其机制设计的基本思路。
[Abstract]:Since -50s, the crime of money laundering is expanding day by day, and its influence on the international community is increasing. In the form of crime, the crime of money laundering is increasingly peeling off from the upstream crime. Gradually becoming an independent form of crime. Especially since the September 11 attacks in the United States, terrorist activities have become more rampant. The international community has realized that combating the crime of money laundering is one of the important means to curb terrorist activities. In recent years, money laundering has become more and more serious to the financial system of our country, and anti-money laundering work has been paid more and more attention. The anti-money laundering system is becoming more and more perfect. In January 1st 2007, the Anti-Money-Laundering Law formally implemented marked a new stage in the anti-money laundering work in China. One of the most important subjects of anti-money laundering work stipulated in this Law is that of the anti-money laundering work. Financial institutions. And most of the money laundering is through various complex financial instruments of commercial banks to transform "black money" into apparently legitimate funds. Commercial banks still bear the responsibility of leading the anti-money laundering front line. However, there is a conflict of commercial interests between commercial banks and anti-money laundering work in the short term. Anti-Money-Laundering work has been limited by some. This paper studies the anti-money laundering behavior of commercial banks and discusses how to better play the subjective initiative of commercial banks. Perfecting the internal mechanism and external environment of anti-money-laundering has become an important subject which can not be ignored by academic circles. Based on the above background, this paper aims to analyze the current situation of anti-money laundering and incentive system in China, and use principal-agent theory to analyze the incentive problem of anti-money laundering in commercial banks. Enrich the relevant theory and put forward targeted policy recommendations. Specifically, this paper has done the following work: first, this paper summarizes the basic theory of anti-money-laundering. And combing the incentive theory and principal-agent theory to solve the following commercial banks anti-money laundering incentive problem laid a theoretical foundation. Then. This paper analyzes the current situation and existing problems of anti-money laundering and anti-money laundering incentive mechanism of commercial banks in China. It also introduces the characteristics of anti-money laundering incentive mechanism in Europe and the United States and the inspiration to the establishment of anti-money laundering incentive mechanism in China. Thirdly, the model based on principal-agent theory is established. This paper analyzes the relationship between the regulatory agencies and commercial banks, focusing on the optimal incentive level, regulatory level and several main factors affecting the regulatory body. Finally, combined with the reality of our country. This paper analyzes the necessity of setting up anti-money laundering incentive mechanism and how to establish the anti-money laundering incentive mechanism with Chinese characteristics according to the principal-agent mechanism. This paper holds that the working principle of "moderate incentive, first inside and then outside, system in the front, advance gradually" should be adopted as the basic thinking of the mechanism design of anti-money laundering incentive mechanism.
【学位授予单位】：西南交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.33

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