利益集团与美国汇率政策调整
发布时间:2018-01-11 10:00
本文关键词:利益集团与美国汇率政策调整 出处:《吉林大学》2013年博士论文 论文类型:学位论文
更多相关文章: 利益集团 美国 汇率政策 结盟游说 “院外援华集团”
【摘要】:作为开放条件下的宏观经济政策的重要组成部分,汇率政策原本是国际经济学研究的重要课题。但这些研究未能考虑到政治因素的重要性,因而存在着严重缺陷。事实上,汇率政策本质上是一种收入再分配政策:一方面,它在国内不同利益集团之间产生“收入再分配”效应。面对利益格局的变化,,“赢家”和“输家”会动员其经济和政治资源,以寻求对决策当局的汇率政策施加影响,直至达到新的利益平衡。另一方面,一国特别是大国的汇率政策会产生重要的“外溢效果”,从而在国内外不同利益集团之间产生“收入再分配”效应。与之相关的“赢家”和“输家”也会为谋求自身利益的最大化做出努力。可见,汇率政策既是一个经济问题,又是一个政治问题;不仅是一个政治经济学问题,更是一个国际政治经济学问题。 依循这一思路,本文从利益集团的角度,运用理论分析与实证分析相结合、逻辑分析与历史分析相结合、整体分析与案例分析相结合的研究方法,研究布雷顿森林体系以来的美国汇率政策调整,考察的对象包括美国汇率政策的决策机制及特征、美国汇率政策制定与调整中所涉及的利益集团、布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团与美国汇率政策的调整、后布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团行为与美国汇率政策的调整、利益集团的活动与美国对华汇率外交。本文的根本目的旨在解决三个方面的问题:第一,思考美国汇率政策的决策机制、决策过程的政治经济特征及政策调整的逻辑;第二,思考美国的货币政治和汇率外交;第三,思考美国汇率政策的外溢效果及外围国家的应对策略。 除“导论”外,论文共分为6章。第1章“美国汇率政策的决策机制及特征”,首先利用政治学理论中的结构—功能论和系统论的方法,用“初始条件”、“政策输入”、“政策决策”、“政策输出”、“政治体制”、“国际政治经济格局”六要素,刻画出政府政策制定与决策过程的一般框架。在此基础上,从制度化程度和分权化程度两个方面将美国政治体制的性质简洁地概括为“依托制度代理关系的权力共享”。论文随后给出了美国汇率政策决策过程的政治经济特征:作为立法机构的国会对政府的汇率政策拥有监督权;作为行政机构的财政部与作为独立部门的美联储之间的非对称合作是美国汇率政策决策的最重要的组织动力;作为美国政治经济生活的重要构成,国内多元化经济利益集团对政府汇率政策的影响力正日益凸显;美国政府也面临着来自外国政府和私人经济利益集团的逐渐增长的外部约束。最后,本章总结了美国汇率政策调整的逻辑:首先,作为立法机构的国会选择逼迫(或压迫)财政部和美联储调整汇率政策的时机,主要取决于国会议员所面临的来自国内外不同类型利益集团的压力大小。其次,汇率政策的决策者采取的是一种“双层博弈”策略,即要兼顾到国内和国外两个层次的利益诉求,既不能忽视国内利益集团的诉求,又要考虑国外利益集团的态度。再次,利益集团是否有意愿、有能力推进决策者的汇率政策调整,以及在多大程度上促成该调整朝向其所期望的方向和目标,是多种因素的函数。 第2章“美国汇率政策制定与调整中的利益集团”,首先回顾了前人对利益集团的理解,并据此给出自己的定义:由对共同利益有着明确认知和诉求的成员所组成的,并以增进其成员的共同利益为动机或目的的组织或实体。随后,论文梳理了利益集团理论的演进脉络。在此基础上,论文分析了与美国汇率政策密切相关的利益集团及其汇率政策偏好,并就利益集团围绕汇率政策存在的集体行动困境展开分析。最后,运用翔实的数据分析了利益集团赖以影响美国政府汇率政策的资源和策略。 第3章“布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团与美国汇率政策调整”,首先考察了布雷顿森林体系初创期内“沉默的”美国利益集团,指出这一“沉默”现象源于五个方面的原因:国际货币政策领域的专业性;国际货币政策决策场所的隔绝性;政府舆论宣传的导向性;集体行动的困境;美国经济的相对封闭性。其次,论文考察了1963-1968年间国内外不同利益集团围绕美国的利息平衡税(IET)、自愿对外信贷限制计划(VFCR)、对外直接投资计划(FDIP)所开展的利益集团政治。最后,分析了1968-1973年间国内外利益集团的行为与尼克松治下的美国汇率政策调整。 第4章“后布雷顿森林体系下的利益集团与美国汇率政策”,首先考察了第一轮强势美元政策给美国国内相关利益集团带来的强烈冲击,以及这些利益集团为此展开的密集游说。随后,研究了第二轮强势美元政策推行期间美国国内利益集团的集体“失声”现象。此外,论文分析了美国金融部门利益集团在后布雷顿森林体系下对美国汇率政策的“悄然影响”。最后,对外国利益集团在美国汇率政策调整中的作为和作用进行了探讨。 第5章“利益集团与美国对华汇率外交”,首先,回顾了美国对华汇率外交的缘起:人民币低估论和汇率操纵指控;其次,考察了美国对华汇率外交中所涉及的私人经济利益集团,分别分析了保护性经济利益集团的结盟游说和美国反保护经济利益集团——“院外援华集团”的联合抵制行动;再次,研究了中国政府回应美国汇率外交的态度、策略以及对美国政府施压的影响;最后,通过对比美元本位制下中日两国在应对美国汇率外交压力方面的能力强弱,揭示了美国对华汇率外交的短板。 第6章“结论与前瞻”,简要总结了论文前面各章的主要结论,并就今后需要进一步研究的问题进行了初步的探讨。
[Abstract]:As an important part of the open conditions of macroeconomic policy, exchange rate policy was an important research topic in international economics. But these studies failed to consider the importance of political factors, thus seriously flawed. In fact, the exchange rate policy is essentially a kind of income redistribution policy: on the one hand, it produces a "redistribution of income" effect in China between different interest groups. In the face of the change of interest pattern, "winners" and "losers" will mobilize its economic and political resources, to seek to influence the decision-making authorities exchange rate policy, to achieve the balance of interests of the new direct. On the other hand, a country especially big exchange rate policy will have an important the "spillover effect", resulting in "income redistribution effect between different interest groups at home and abroad. The" winners "and" losers "will seek for self benefit We should make efforts to maximize profits. We can see that exchange rate policy is both an economic issue and a political one. It's not only a political economy issue, but also an international political and economic issue.
According to this idea, this paper from the point of view of interest groups, the use of theoretical analysis and empirical analysis, logical analysis and historical analysis of combining research methods, analysis of the overall analysis and case combination, the exchange rate policy adjustment of the Bretton Woods system has been the object of study include the decision-making mechanism and characteristics of American exchange rate policy. The formulation and adjustment of the interest groups involved in the exchange rate policy, the Bretton Woods system of interest groups and the adjustment of the exchange rate policy, interest group behavior after the Bretton Woods system and the adjustment of the exchange rate policy, interest group activities and the United States to China foreign exchange rate. The fundamental purpose of this paper aims at three aspects question: first, decision-making mechanism of American exchange rate policy, political and economic characteristics and the adjustment of the policy decision process logic; second, think about America Monetary politics and exchange rate diplomacy; third, thinking about the spillover effect of the US exchange rate policy and the coping strategies of the peripheral countries.
In addition to the "Introduction", the paper is divided into 6 chapters. The first chapter "the decision mechanism and the characteristics of the exchange rate policy, the first use of political science methodology in the theory of structure function theory and system, with the" initial conditions "," policy input "," policy "," policy output. "" the political system "," the international political and economic pattern "six elements, depicts the general framework of government policy formulation and decision-making process. On this basis, from the two aspects of the system and the degree of decentralization will be the nature of American political system briefly summarized as" relying on the system of agency relationship. Then the power sharing "given the political and economic characteristics of making process of American exchange rate policy: as the legislature of the Congress has oversight of the government's exchange rate policy; non symmetry between administrative agencies as the Treasury and the Federal Reserve as an independent department Cooperation is the American exchange rate policy decision is the most important organization power; as an important part of American political and economic life, domestic interest group diversified economic influence on the government's exchange rate policy is becoming increasingly prominent; the United States government is also facing increasing external constraints from foreign governments and private economic interests. Finally, this chapter summarizes the adjustment of exchange rate policy logic: first, as the legislature Congress forced (or compression) the Treasury and the fed to adjust the exchange rate policy of the time at home and abroad from different types of interest group pressure depends mainly on the size of Congress faced. Secondly, the exchange rate policy makers to take a double game "the strategy, take into account the interests of the two levels of domestic and abroad, we can not ignore the demands of domestic interest groups, but also consider the foreign interest Interest group's attitude. Once again, whether interest groups have the will and ability to promote the adjustment of policy makers' exchange rate policy and to what extent to make the adjustment towards their desired direction and goal is a function of many factors.
The second chapter "the American exchange rate policy formulation and adjustment of the interest group", first reviews the previous understanding of the interest group, and gives the definition of their own: composed of members have a clear cognition and pursuit of common interests, and to promote the common interests of the members of the organization or entity motive or purpose then, this paper reviews the evolution of interest group theory. On this basis, the paper analyses the American exchange rate policy is closely related to the interests of the group and its exchange rate policy preferences, and interest groups around the collective action dilemma existing exchange rate policy are analyzed. Finally, using detailed data analysis for the influence of interest group of the United States government exchange rate the policy of resources and strategies.
The third chapter "the Bretton Woods system of interest groups and American exchange rate policy adjustment, first examines the Bretton Woods system start-up period" silent "American interest group, the reason that this" Silence "phenomenon from five aspects: the professional field of international monetary policy; policy places the international monetary isolation oriented government; public opinion propaganda; the dilemma of collective action; the United States economy is relatively closed. Secondly, this paper investigates the interest equalization tax between 1963-1968 domestic and different interest groups around the United States (IET), voluntary foreign credit restraint program (VFCR), foreign direct investment plan (FDIP) to carry out political interest group the analysis of the United States. Finally, adjust the exchange rate between 1968-1973 domestic and foreign interest group behavior and under Nixon.
The fourth chapter "after the Bretton Woods system of interest groups and the exchange rate policy, strong shock first inspected the first round of strong dollar policy to us domestic interest groups brings, and these intense lobbying by interest groups. Then, on the second round of strong dollar policy during the implementation of the interest groups of the collective" voice "phenomenon. In addition, this paper analyzes the financial sector in the US interest groups in the post Bretton Woods system on American exchange rate policy" quietly ". Finally, on foreign interests and exchange rate policy as a role in the adjustment in the United States are discussed.
The fifth chapter "interest group and the United States to China foreign exchange rate", firstly, reviews the origin of American Diplomacy: an undervalued renminbi exchange rate to China on currency manipulation and charges; secondly, investigated the group involved in America's foreign exchange rate in the private economic interests, respectively analyzes the protective economic interest group lobbying and anti American alliance protection economic interest group -- "China lobby" boycott; again, on the China government response to the exchange rate of U.S. diplomatic attitude, strategy and the impact on the United States put pressure on the government; finally, through the comparison of the dollar standard in Japan in response to U.S. foreign exchange rate pressure ability, reveals the short board of America China foreign exchange rate.
The sixth chapter, "conclusion and foresight", briefly summarizes the main conclusions of the chapters in front of the paper, and makes a preliminary discussion on the problems that need further study in the future.
【学位授予单位】:吉林大学
【学位级别】:博士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F837.12
【参考文献】
相关期刊论文 前10条
1 张宇燕,张静春;汇率的政治经济学——基于中美关于人民币汇率争论的研究[J];当代亚太;2005年09期
2 何兴强;;美国利益集团与人民币升值压力[J];当代亚太;2006年03期
3 项卫星;刘晓鑫;;美元本位制的问题及其可持续性[J];国际金融研究;2009年04期
4 周叶菁;;利益集团与美国的国际货币政策——以人民币汇率问题为例[J];国际论坛;2009年01期
5 张兆杰;强势美元政策:由来及未来[J];国际经济评论;2002年Z2期
6 周先平;;拉丁美洲汇率政策的政治经济学——兼评国际金融政治经济学[J];国外社会科学;2006年03期
7 郭树永;利益集团与美国外交[J];世界经济研究;1997年05期
8 李中州;从博弈论看中美关系中的跨国公司因素[J];世界经济研究;2002年03期
9 李俊久;姜默竹;;美元本位制下的货币-金融依附[J];世界经济研究;2011年06期
10 项卫星;王达;;论中美金融相互依赖关系中的非对称性[J];世界经济研究;2011年07期
本文编号:1409059
本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/bankxd/1409059.html