IPO模式与效率的博弈分析

发布时间：2018-01-11 18:03

本文关键词：IPO模式与效率的博弈分析　出处：《科研管理》2011年12期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：IPO效率一直是学术界研究的热点问题,但没有IPO模式与效率关系的专门研究。文献资料显示I,PO本质是一种制度的安排,是一种博弈现象。通过分析IPO模式演化历程的特点,结合我国股市情况,提出基于IPO模式中散户数量与效率对应关系展开博弈研究的新思路,根据参与约束、激励约束的条件,建立理论模型,展开博弈分析。结果发现:完全排除散户的IPO模式效率最差;散户完全参与的IPO模式具有pareto最佳效率;散户有限参与的IPO模式效率介于这两者之间。依据博弈分析结论,为从体制上保障IPO模式的效率,提出消除承销商等中间环节,建立上市公司与投资者直接沟通的市场化机制构想。
[Abstract]:IPO efficiency has always been a hot issue in academic circles, but there is no special research on the relationship between IPO model and efficiency. The literature shows that Impo is essentially a kind of institutional arrangement. It is a game phenomenon. By analyzing the characteristics of the evolution of the IPO model and combining the stock market situation in China, a new idea of game research based on the relationship between the number of retail investors and the efficiency in the IPO model is put forward. According to the conditions of participation constraint and incentive constraint, the theoretical model is established and the game analysis is carried out. The results show that the efficiency of IPO mode is the worst; The full participation of retail investors in the IPO model has the best efficiency of pareto; The efficiency of the IPO model with limited participation of retail investors is between the two. According to the conclusion of game analysis, in order to ensure the efficiency of IPO mode from the system, it is proposed to eliminate the intermediate links such as underwriters. To establish a market-oriented mechanism of direct communication between listed companies and investors.
【作者单位】：浙江财经学院数学与统计学院;
【基金】：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目《基于影子价格非线性推断视角的股市泡沫计量及风险监管机制研究》,项目编号:08JA790118,起止时间:2009.1-2011.12)
【分类号】：F832.51;F224.32
【正文快照】： 1引言截止2010年底,沪市、深市股票发行速度分别为43.5只/年、56.35只/年,而2004年开市的中小板为80.5只/年,2009年10月才开市的创业板为151只/年[1],可见,我国的IPO空前提速;另一方面,随着股改工作的基本结束I,PO长期囤积的系统性风险及市场化问题已经成为股市亟待解决的主

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