核心企业回购下的存货质押融资决策问题研究

发布时间：2018-01-14 00:25

本文关键词：核心企业回购下的存货质押融资决策问题研究　出处：《重庆交通大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：面对日趋激烈的市场竞争与质押物价格风险，传统的存货质押融资业务受到了挑战，银行迫切需要开拓新的存货质押融资模式来扩展业务和控制贷款风险。核心企业回购担保下的存货质押融资业务是近几年比较常用的质押融资模式，该种模式通过核心企业的回购担保行为，质押物的流动性提高，借款企业偿还银行贷款的概率增加，，银行的质押风险降低，因此这一业务模式受到很多银行的青睐。存货质押融资模式的转变直接带来的是参与方的增加，进而是参与者决策的增加，由核心企业、银行、物流和借款企业组成核心企业回购下的存货质押融资业务。依照业务模式流程，如何在参与者之间进行利益分配以扩大整体的收益，同时又达到风险控制的作用，这些都需要参与者做好关键指标决策。因此本文力求在分析核心企业回购下存货质押融资模式的基础上，定量化地分析探讨模式中银行质押率决策与核心企业回购率决策问题，以求能够达到风险控制与平衡利益分配的作用。本文研究核心企业回购下存货质押融资决策问题，将银行与第三方物流企业作为利益共同体，考虑核心企业以回购形式为资金约束的借款企业提供担保。首先构建银行下侧风险控制下的预期收益模型，推导出实际质押率，并分析质押率关于质押物的市场需求分布特征；然后，进一步考虑质押物价格随机波动下银行的质押率决策问题，揭示出质押率与核心企业回购率之间的关系；最后，将质押决策参与主体扩展到三方，构建并分析了回购率对三者预期收益的影响，发现核心企业回购的不合理性，并用Nash协商均衡对回购率进行定价研究，使其更加符合平等与原则。研究的相关结果能够为开展核心企业回购下的存货质押融资业务风险管理与利益分配提供参考。
[Abstract]:In the face of the increasingly fierce market competition and the risk of the price of pledge, the traditional inventory pledge financing business has been challenged. Banks urgently need to develop a new inventory pledge financing model to expand their business and control loan risk. The inventory pledge financing business under the core enterprise repurchase guarantee is the more commonly used pledge financing mode in recent years. Through the repurchase guarantee behavior of the core enterprise, the liquidity of the pledge is improved, the probability of the borrower to repay the bank loan is increased, and the bank pledge risk is reduced. So this business model is favored by many banks. The change of inventory pledge financing mode directly brings about the increase of participants, and then the increase of decision making by the core enterprises and banks. Logistics and borrowing enterprises form the inventory pledge financing business under the core enterprise repurchase. According to the business model process, how to distribute the benefits among the participants in order to expand the overall income. At the same time, to achieve the role of risk control, these need participants to make a good decision on key indicators. Therefore, this paper tries to analyze the core enterprise repurchase under the inventory pledge financing model on the basis of. In order to achieve the function of risk control and balanced benefit distribution, the decision of bank pledge rate and core enterprise repurchase rate in the model is analyzed quantitatively. This paper studies the financing decision of inventory pledge under the core enterprise repurchase, taking the bank and the third party logistics enterprise as the interest community. Considering that the core enterprises provide guarantee for the loan enterprises with capital constraint in the form of repurchase. Firstly, the expected income model under the control of the bank's lower risk is constructed, and the actual pledge rate is deduced. And analyzes the characteristics of the market demand distribution of the pledge rate. Then, the relationship between the pledge rate and the repurchase rate of the core enterprises is revealed by considering the decision of the bank's pledge rate under the stochastic fluctuation of the pledge price. Finally, the main body of pledge decision is extended to three parties, and the influence of repurchase rate on the expected income is analyzed, and the irrationality of core enterprise repurchase is found. The pricing of repurchase rate is studied with Nash negotiation equilibrium. The research results can provide a reference for the risk management and benefit distribution of inventory pledge financing business under the core enterprise repurchase.
【学位授予单位】：重庆交通大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.4

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