基于内部治理机制的公司非效率投资研究

发布时间：2018-01-25 17:02

本文关键词： 非效率投资投资过度投资不足公司治理机制　出处：《华东师范大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：中国经济在改革开放以后经历了飞速的发展,不论从宏观层面还是微观层面来看,作为拉动经济增长的三驾马车之一的投资都对国民经济的发展起了不可替代的作用。房地产行业蒸蒸日上,股市经历了过山车式的发展,各行业做大做强的口号不绝于耳,行业内大鱼吃小鱼的并购重组现象丛生,上市公司的投资呈现了高速、大量、过度的趋势。近几年由于金融危机的影响和国家政策导向的改变,使得经济增速放缓,消费需求的不足又令企业的投资增速放缓,投资意愿下降。不论是从宏观上为了促进国家宏观经济的稳定发展,还是在微观层面上实现公司价值的最大化,研究公司投资行为都显得尤为重要。本文在综述了国内外企业投资理论的基础上,从公司治理的角度提出合理假设,并在Richardson残差度量模型的基础上结合我国实际情况对其进行合理的修改,使其更适合本文的研究背景和研究方向。本文利用2008-2011年非金融类上市公司的数据对企业的投资行为进行了实证研究,结果表明中国上市公司存在非效率的投资行为,且投资不足的企业更多,现象更严重。随后将投资过度和投资不足公司分别作为两个样本组,试图从公司内部治理的角度解释企业的非效率投资。研究结果表明：独立董事机制对企业非效率投资行为缺乏有效的制约,在公司治理中的作用并未发挥出来；第一大股东持股比例的增加会加剧企业过度投资问题,但对投资不足企业的抑制影响则不显著；国有企业是否比非国有企业能更好地抑制非效率投资问题还有待进一步研究；股权制衡机制能有效抑制投资不足的非效率投资行为,但对于投资过度企业来说却会加重过度投资水平：高管持股并没能发挥实质性的公司治理作用,难以约束和抑制企业非效率投资行为。综上所述,中国上市公司普遍存在非效率的投资行为,且投资不足现象更严重,而公司内部治理机制在抑制企业的非效率投资行为方面收效甚微。
[Abstract]:China's economy has experienced rapid development since the reform and opening up, both from the macro level and the micro level. As one of the troika to stimulate economic growth, investment has played an irreplaceable role in the development of the national economy. The real estate industry is booming, the stock market has experienced a roller coaster development. The slogan of making big and strong in various industries is endless, the phenomenon of M & A and reorganization of big fish eating small fish in the industry is numerous, and the investment of listed companies presents a high speed and a large amount. In recent years due to the impact of the financial crisis and the change of national policy orientation, the economic growth rate has slowed down, and the lack of consumer demand has slowed the growth rate of enterprise investment. Whether in order to promote the stable development of national macroeconomic or to maximize the value of the company on the micro level, it is particularly important to study the investment behavior of the company. On the basis of summarizing the investment theory of enterprises at home and abroad, this paper puts forward reasonable assumptions from the angle of corporate governance. On the basis of Richardson residuals measurement model, a reasonable modification is made on the basis of the actual situation in China, which makes it more suitable for the research background and research direction of this paper. Using the data of non-financial listed companies from 2008 to 2011, this paper makes an empirical study on the investment behavior of enterprises. The results show that there are inefficient investment behaviors of listed companies in China. And there are more underinvested enterprises and the phenomenon is more serious. Then the overinvestment and underinvestment companies are taken as two sample groups respectively. This paper attempts to explain the inefficient investment of enterprises from the angle of internal corporate governance. The research results show that the independent director mechanism has no effective restriction on the non-efficient investment behavior of enterprises and has not played a role in corporate governance. The increase of the shareholding ratio of the first largest shareholder will aggravate the problem of overinvestment, but the restraining effect on the underinvested enterprises is not significant. Whether the state-owned enterprises can restrain the non-efficiency investment better than the non-state-owned enterprises still needs to be further studied; The equity balance mechanism can effectively restrain the inefficient investment behavior of underinvestment, but it will aggravate the excessive investment level for the over-invested enterprises: the executive ownership does not play a substantive role in corporate governance. It is difficult to restrain and restrain the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises. To sum up, China's listed companies generally have inefficient investment behavior, and the phenomenon of insufficient investment is more serious, and the internal governance mechanism of the company has little effect on restraining the inefficient investment behavior of enterprises.
【学位授予单位】：华东师范大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.48

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