我国上市商业银行高管薪酬和绩效关系

发布时间：2018-02-04 19:57

本文关键词： 上市银行薪酬绩效激励 EVA　出处：《天津大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：近年来，随着改革开放政策的进一步落实，我国的所有制形式和市场经济结构也在不断的改革和完善之中其中受到人们普遍人们关注的问题之一，就是在不断发展的现代公司制度下，由于权责相互分离而导致在公司经营过程中掌握绝对信息优势和资源优势的高层管理者的薪酬问题在这种经济背景下，对于在运营过程中以货币为其主要商品的银行来说，情况比较特殊，其高层管理者的薪酬政策的实施和完善也更受容易到公司内外众多环境因素的制约，尤其是最近几年以来，在政府的指导下，我国银行业市场化的步伐逐渐加快，高管们的薪酬大多都与市场挂钩与不断飙升的银行经营业绩相比，高层管理者的薪酬也随着水涨船高，创造了一个又一个的历史新高因此，，如何合理的制定银行高层管理者的薪酬，以及他们的薪酬是否真实的反应了其经营成果等问题，再次吸引了公众的眼球，成为时下的热点话题之一那么，对于银行业来说，其高层管理者的薪酬应该处在一个什么样的高度上，如何使他们的薪酬水平客观的反应经营水平，对他们薪酬产生明显影响的敏感因子有哪些，国内外的学者都做了大量的研究，但是由于对研究对象和样本的选择以及在研究过程中使用的方法等都存在较大的差异，因此对于银行高管薪酬和绩效问题的研究结论也相去甚远本文中，在衡量我国银行高管薪酬与绩效的关系时，把关键点放在经济附加值（EVA）上，使其取代以净资产收益率（ROE）为代表的传统业绩考核指标现有研究成果和文献绝大部分都是使用净利润收益率指标作为衡量银行绩效的指标，在查阅了大量的资料和相关的文献并对这些文献资料进行归纳分析后作者看到，计算EVA值时，在进行会计计算时会对涉及到的会计科目会进行一系列的调整，并且加入了大量反映企业经营成果的会计科目因此，以EVA为衡量指标，更加完整和精准，这也是本文选取EVA为衡量指标的原因因此，本文在阐述EVA理论以及薪酬激励理论和方法的基础上，结合我国银行业的特点，将EVA理论具体运用到银行薪酬激励体系评估当中，并通过实证分析，以国内上市的16家商业银行中的11家银行2007—2011年度公布年报的数据为样本，通过分类归纳和分析我国上市银高管薪酬和绩效之间存在的关系
[Abstract]:In recent years, with the further implementation of the policy of reform and opening up, the form of ownership and the structure of market economy in our country are also in the process of continuous reform and improvement. Is in the continuous development of the modern company system, due to the separation of power and responsibility from each other, leading to the management process of the company to grasp the absolute information advantage and resource advantages of the top managers pay in this economic context. For the banks with currency as their main commodity in the course of operation, the situation is quite special, and the implementation and improvement of the salary policy of their senior managers are more easily restricted by many environmental factors inside and outside the company. Especially in recent years, under the guidance of the government, the pace of banking marketization in China has been gradually accelerated, executive compensation is mostly linked to the market and the soaring performance of the bank compared. The salary of the top management also rises with the tide, has created one record high one after another, therefore, how to reasonably formulate the compensation of the senior managers of the bank. And whether their pay reflects the real results of their business and other issues, once again attracted the public's attention, become one of the current hot topics, so, for the banking industry. How to make their salary level reflect the management level objectively, and what sensitive factors have obvious influence on their salary. Scholars at home and abroad have done a lot of research, but due to the choice of research objects and samples, as well as the methods used in the research process, there are great differences. Therefore, the conclusions of the research on the pay and performance of bank executives are far from the same. In this paper, when we measure the relationship between executive compensation and performance, we put the key point on the economic added value (EVA). Make it replace the traditional performance evaluation indicators represented by the return on net assets (ROE) the existing research results and literature are mostly using the net profit return index as a measure of bank performance. After consulting a large number of data and related literature and summarizing and analyzing these documents, the author sees that the EVA value is calculated. In the accounting calculation will be involved in a series of adjustments to the accounting subjects, and a large number of reflect the business results of the accounting accounts, therefore, EVA as a measure, more complete and accurate. This is the reason why EVA is chosen as a measure in this paper. Therefore, on the basis of EVA theory and compensation incentive theory and methods, combined with the characteristics of China's banking industry, this paper applies the EVA theory to the evaluation of bank compensation incentive system. And through the empirical analysis, 11 of the 16 domestic listed commercial banks published annual report data from 2007-2011 as a sample. On the relationship between executive compensation and performance of listed banks in China
【学位授予单位】：天津大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F832.33;F272.92

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