当前位置:主页 > 管理论文 > 信贷论文 >

上市公司外部治理机制与控股股东掏空行为研究

发布时间:2018-03-11 17:43

  本文选题:控股股东 切入点:中小股东 出处:《石河子大学》2013年硕士论文 论文类型:学位论文


【摘要】:我国正处于经济转型升级的关键时期,证券市场经过三十余年的发展已具备了一定的规模。但是,我国证券市场上控股股东对中小股东的掏空问题十分严重。控股股东通过关联交易、无偿占用资金等各种手段掏空上市公司,以此来侵占中小股东利益,对上市公司和我国证券市场的健康发展都带来了极大的危害。控股股东掏空上市公司的问题普遍存在,除了我国特殊的股权结构、公司内部治理机制不完善等因素外,还存在法律对中小股东的保护力度不够、外部审计的监督作用没有充分发挥及控制权市场刚刚起步等外部治理因素。 本文系统地阐述了控股股东掏空上市公司的具体表现形式及其对上市公司乃至整个资本市场的危害,定性分析了公司外部治理机制对控股股东掏空行为的影响,随后基于外部治理机制的视角提供了抑制控股股东掏空行为的可行性建议。 本文的研究表明,在公司内部治理机制失效的情况下,公司外部治理机制对控股股东掏空行为的抑制作用不容忽视,特别是投资者法律保护、公司控制权市场、外部审计和产品市场竞争等外部治理机制的有效实施,将对我国上市公司控股股东掏空行为的抑制起到关键作用,所以,我们要切实采取加大中小投资者保护力度、深化国有产权制度改革、提高外部审计质量及促进行业有效竞争等措施。
[Abstract]:China is in the critical period of economic transformation and upgrading. After more than 30 years of development, the securities market has a certain scale. The problem of controlling shareholders' tunneling to minority shareholders is very serious in our country's securities market. The controlling shareholders empty the listed companies through related party transactions, free use of funds and other means, so as to encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders. It has brought great harm to the healthy development of listed companies and the securities market of our country. The problem of controlling shareholders hollowing out listed companies is common, except for the special ownership structure of our country and the imperfect internal governance mechanism of the company, and so on. There are also some external governance factors, such as inadequate protection of minority shareholders by law, inadequate supervision of external audit, and just beginning of control market. This paper systematically expounds the concrete manifestation of the controlling shareholder tunneling listed company and its harm to the listed company and even the whole capital market, and qualitatively analyzes the influence of the external governance mechanism of the company on the hollowing behavior of the controlling shareholder. Then, based on the external governance mechanism, the paper provides some feasible suggestions to restrain the hollowing behavior of controlling shareholders. The research in this paper shows that when the internal governance mechanism of the company fails, the restraining effect of the external governance mechanism on the hollowing behavior of the controlling shareholders can not be ignored, especially the legal protection of investors and the market of corporate control. The effective implementation of external governance mechanisms, such as external audit and product market competition, will play a key role in restraining the hollowing behavior of the controlling shareholders of listed companies in China. Therefore, we should take effective measures to strengthen the protection of small and medium-sized investors. We should deepen the reform of the state-owned property right system, improve the quality of external audit and promote effective competition in the industry.
【学位授予单位】:石河子大学
【学位级别】:硕士
【学位授予年份】:2013
【分类号】:F832.51;F271

【参考文献】

相关期刊论文 前10条

1 刘建民,刘星;上市公司关联交易与盈余管理实证研究[J];当代财经;2005年09期

2 韩志丽;杨淑娥;史浩江;;企业终极所有者“掏空”行为的影响因素[J];系统工程;2006年09期

3 姜国华;岳衡;;大股东占用上市公司资金与上市公司股票回报率关系的研究[J];管理世界;2005年09期

4 唐宗明,蒋位;中国上市公司大股东侵害度实证分析[J];经济研究;2002年04期

5 刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全;终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J];经济研究;2003年04期

6 白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,宋敏,张俊喜;中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J];经济研究;2005年02期

7 陈冬华,陈信元,万华林;国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J];经济研究;2005年02期

8 叶康涛;陆正飞;张志华;;独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”?[J];经济研究;2007年04期

9 李增泉,孙铮,王志伟;“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J];会计研究;2004年12期

10 王琨,肖星;机构投资者持股与关联方占用的实证研究[J];南开管理评论;2005年02期



本文编号:1599221

资料下载
论文发表

本文链接:https://www.wllwen.com/guanlilunwen/bankxd/1599221.html


Copyright(c)文论论文网All Rights Reserved | 网站地图 |

版权申明:资料由用户1401e***提供,本站仅收录摘要或目录,作者需要删除请E-mail邮箱bigeng88@qq.com