证券分析师跟进行为对应计与真实盈余管理选择的影响研究

发布时间：2018-03-14 02:43

本文选题：证券分析师跟进行为　切入点：应计盈余管理　出处：《东北大学》2013年硕士论文　论文类型：学位论文

【摘要】：作为上市公司和证券市场参与者之间的信息传递力量,证券分析师在资本市场上扮演着双重角色的功能已然得到了众多学者的认可：一是解析上市公司财务信息的媒介力量；二是制约管理层行为的外部监督者。基于盈余管理的资本市场动机,Burgstahler(1997)研究表明美国上市公司具有为了减少盈余、避免亏损、迎合分析师盈利预测而进行盈余管理的动机。此后学者陆续探究了分析师跟进对盈余管理的影响,一方面,有学者研究证明分析师跟进对盈余管理存在监管效应；另一方面,有学者研究表明分析师跟进对盈余管理存在压力效应,但是这些研究的视角还是聚焦于应计盈余管理。事实上,盈余管理行为还包括隐蔽性更强、对公司内在价值危害更大的真实盈余管理行为。因此随着我国监管环境的不断变化以及管理层对不同盈余管理下成本与收益的权衡,在我国证券市场中研究分析师跟进行为对应计与真实盈余管理的选择具有重要意义。本文以2004-2011年间9193家A股上市公司为研究样本,通过建立联立方程组、使用两阶段最小二乘法来考察分析师跟进行为与应计和真实盈余管理之间的内生性问题。对有保盈动机公司的子样本进行回归检验得到了与全样本一致的结论,此外通过进一步结合我国上市公司终极控制人性质考察了分析师跟进行为对应计与真实盈余管理选择的影响。通过对实证结果的分析,本文得出的结论有：(1)基于监督效应,分析师跟进人数越多,管理层的真实盈余管理行为越少；(2)基于压力效应,分析师跟进人数越多,管理层的应计盈余管理行为越多；即分析师跟进人数越多,管理层更青睐使用应计盈余管理来代替真实盈余管理；(3)分析师跟进人数越多,上市公司的整体盈余管理行为越少。(4)与国有控股公司相比,分析师跟进人数越多对非国有控股公司的真实盈余管理抑制作用更强,对应计盈余管理的替换作用更大。最后根据本文的结论提出针对性的建议,完善分析师跟进的相关法律及加强政府部门对分析师的监管,从而有助于分析师更有效地发挥其外部监管作用、抑制上市公司盈余管理行为、促进资本市场健康运行。
[Abstract]:As a power of information transmission between listed companies and participants in the securities market, the function of securities analysts playing a dual role in the capital market has been recognized by many scholars: first, it is the media power to analyze the financial information of listed companies; The second is the external supervisor who restricts the behavior of the management. The capital market motive based on earnings management is Burgstahler1997.Research shows that the listed companies in the United States have the ability to avoid losses in order to reduce their earnings. Since then, scholars have explored the impact of analysts' follow-up on earnings management. On the one hand, some scholars have proved that analysts follow up on earnings management has regulatory effects; on the other hand, Some scholars have shown that there is a pressure effect on earnings management by analysts, but the perspective of these studies is still focused on accrual earnings management. In fact, earnings management behavior also includes more concealment. The real earnings management behavior is more harmful to the intrinsic value of the company. Therefore, with the constant change of the regulatory environment and the balance between cost and income under different earnings management in our country, It is of great significance to study the follow-up behavior of analysts in China's securities market for the choice of accrual and real earnings management. In this paper, 9193 A-share listed companies from 2004-2011 are taken as the research samples, and the simultaneous equations are established. The two-stage least square method is used to investigate the endogenous problem between the follow-up behavior of the analyst and the accrual and real earnings management. In addition, combined with the nature of ultimate controller of listed companies in China, this paper investigates the influence of the follow-up behavior of analysts on the choice of accrual and real earnings management. Through the analysis of empirical results, the conclusion of this paper is: 1) based on the supervision effect. Based on stress effect, the more analysts follow up, the more accrual earnings management behavior is; that is, the more analysts follow up, the more analysts follow up. Management prefers to use accrual earnings management instead of real earnings management.) the more analysts follow up, the less earnings management behavior of listed companies as a whole.) compared with state-owned holding companies, The more analysts follow up, the stronger the restraining effect of real earnings management of non-state-owned holding companies is, and the greater the substitution effect of accounting earnings management. Finally, according to the conclusion of this paper, the author puts forward some specific suggestions. Improving the laws followed by analysts and strengthening government regulation of analysts will help analysts to play their external regulatory role more effectively, curb earnings management of listed companies and promote the healthy operation of capital markets.
【学位授予单位】：东北大学
【学位级别】：硕士
【学位授予年份】：2013
【分类号】：F275;F832.51

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