信息披露质量、控股股东资金占用与审计师选择——来自深市A股上市公司的经验证据

发布时间：2018-03-20 21:11

本文选题：信息披露质量　切入点：信息不对称　出处：《审计研究》2011年02期 　论文类型：期刊论文

【摘要】：资金侵占是控股股东利用控制权获取私人利益的重要表现形式,也是其解决资金缺乏的重要途径,普遍存在于信息不对称严重的公司。而有效的信息披露制度则会提高公司透明度,减轻信息不对称程度,保护中小投资者免受控股股东的掠夺。作为外部治理机制的审计是公司信息披露质量的重要保证,也能够缓解代理问题,对中小投资者起到保护作用。因此,本文选取深圳A股上市公司作为样本,研究信息披露质量、控股股东资金占用以及审计师选择之间的关系。实证结果发现,信息披露质量越高的公司会减少控股股东的资金占用并且倾向于选择高质量的审计师,高质量审计师也能够起到降低控股股东的资金占用的效果。这一研究结果对加强信息披露监管以及审计的治理效应有着重要的启示。
[Abstract]:Capital embezzlement is an important form of controlling shareholders to obtain private benefits by using control rights, and it is also an important way to solve the lack of funds. It is common in companies with serious information asymmetry. Effective information disclosure system will enhance the transparency of companies and reduce the degree of information asymmetry. As an external governance mechanism, audit is an important guarantee of the quality of corporate information disclosure, can also alleviate the agency problem, and play a protective role for small and medium-sized investors. This paper chooses Shenzhen A-share listed companies as a sample to study the relationship among the quality of information disclosure, the capital occupation of controlling shareholders and the choice of auditors. The higher the quality of disclosure, the less capital the controlling shareholders will occupy and the more likely they will be to choose high-quality auditors. High-quality auditors can also play a role in reducing the capital occupation of controlling shareholders. This study has important implications for strengthening the regulation of information disclosure and the governance effect of audit.
【作者单位】：财政部财政科学研究所;
【分类号】：F224;F832.51

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