解禁股份交易中的“择时”行为与大股东侵害

发布时间：2018-03-30 23:21

本文选题：大股东侵害　切入点：内幕交易　出处：《南开管理评论》2011年04期

【摘要】：本文以股改后的解禁股份出售事件为研究对象,考察这一过程中的内幕交易与大股东侵害问题。研究发现,大股东在解禁股份交易中具有显著的择时能力,表现为通过出售股份赚取了超常收益、也及时规避了损失;股东对上市公司的控制力有助增强其择时能力,但由于信息优势在"主动型"内幕交易和"被动型"内幕交易中的不对称作用,只有控制力较强的股东才更有可能及时规避损失;股东关系有助于弥补控制力的不足,在与公司控股股东关系密切的情况下,控制力较弱股东也能在股份交易中及时规避损失。研究从股东控制力和股东关系两个角度,较为全面地分析了大股东侵害的可能途径;研究发现为思考全流通背景下的大股东侵害问题提出了新思路,也为加强对解禁股份的交易监管提供了理论依据。
[Abstract]:In this paper, the issue of insider trading and the infringement of large shareholders in the process of the sale of shares after the lifting of the ban on shares is studied. It is found that the major shareholders have remarkable timing ability in the process of lifting the ban on shares trading. This is manifested in the extraordinary income earned by the sale of shares and the timely avoidance of losses; shareholders' control over listed companies helps to enhance their timing ability. However, due to the asymmetric role of information superiority in "active" insider trading and "passive" insider trading, only shareholders with strong control are more likely to avoid losses in time. In the case of close relationship with the controlling shareholders, the weaker controlling shareholders can also avoid the losses in the stock transaction in time. From the perspective of shareholder control and shareholder relationship, this paper comprehensively analyzes the possible ways of infringement by large shareholders; The research provides a new way to think about the problem of infringement of large shareholders under the background of full circulation, and also provides a theoretical basis for strengthening the supervision of the transaction of shares that are lifted from the ban.
【作者单位】：厦门大学管理学院;
【基金】：国家自然科学基金项目(71002044、70972075)资助
【分类号】：F832.51

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